Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers: Finding a Just Forum by Madden, Alison M.
Hastings Women’s Law Journal
Volume 4 | Number 1 Article 2
1-1-1993
Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill Their
Abusers: Finding a Just Forum
Alison M. Madden
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Women’s Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alison M. Madden, Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers: Finding a Just Forum, 4 Hastings Women's L.J. 1 (1993).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hwlj/vol4/iss1/2
Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill 
Their Abusers: Finding a Just Forum 
INTRODUCTION . . . . • • . . . . • . • . . . . . . . • . . • • • • • . • . . • • . . • • . • • • • . •. 1 
I. CALIFORNIA WOMEN IN PRIsON SEEKING COMMlITATION •.•..•.•.... 4 
A. Background.; -. -. -;-; . -; ;. ;-; . . . -; . . . -; ;-. -. . -.; -. -. . ; -.; ; . . -; ; . ; ; . -4-
B. The Petitioners ....................................... 8 
C. Community Action in Support of the Petitioners .............. 16 
1. The California Coalition 
for Battered Women In Prison ....................... 16 
2. The California Legislature .......................... 19 
II. SELF-DEFENSE AND TIIE BATIERED WOMAN "SYNDROME" .......•.. 20 
A. The Law of Self-Defense .............................. 20 
B. Difficulties in Applying the Self-Defense 
Construct to Battered Women Who Kill .................... 22 
C. Substantive Law Definitions and Their Impact 
in California on the Trials of Battered Women Who Kill ........ 26 
1. The Objective Stanclard and its Application 
to Battered Women Who Kill ........................ 26 
2. Does Imminent Mean Imminent, 
or Does it Mean Immediate? ......................... 29 
3. The Rule of Equal Force in California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 32 
4. The Duty to Retreat and Exceptions 
to the Castle Doctrine ............................. 32 
D. Social and Political Factors and Their Impact 
in California on Battered Women Who Kill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 34 
E. Rethinking the Battered Woman Syndrome ..... . . . . . . . . . . . .. 39 
1. The Expanding Syndrome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 40 
2. The "Actual" Syndrome . ........................... 42 
3. Criticisms of Battered Woman Syndrome ................ 43 
m. THE CLEMENCY POWER, PuNISHMENT, AND TIIE POTENTIAL OF 
CLEMENCY AS A TOOL FOR ACHIEVING JUSTICE ....................... 51 
A. Troubling Questions About Clemency's Role 
in Our System of Punishment ........................... 51 
1. A Retributivist Analysis ............................ 54 
2. A Utilitarian Analysis ............................. 60 
B. The Origin and Nature of the Clemency Power ............... 63 
C. Political Considerations in Battered Women's Cases. . . . . . . . . . .. 69 
D. The Governor's Options ............................... 73 
1. Board of Prison Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 73 
2. The California Legislature .......................... 77 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 86 
------------------, 
Clemency for Battered Women Who Kill 
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by Alison M. Madden· 
INTRODUCTION 
A large number of battered women in California prisons have peti-
tioned Governor Pete Wilson for pardon or for commutation of their 
prison sentences to time already served. Most of these women were sent 
to prison for killing their abusers in defense of themselves or their chil-
dren. The legal, political, and social forces! that influence the criminal 
trials of such women frequently ensure high conviction rates and stiff 
sentences.2 This is true despite efforts to show juries and trial courts that 
many battered women who kill do so out of a reasonable fear that they 
will suffer death or bodily harm that they consider imminent. Most con-
victions of battered women who kill result from a failure to account for 
these reasonable perceptions and reactions and are therefore unjust. 
Governor Wilson can ensure that battered women incarcerated for 
killing their abusers receive a full, fair, and principled review of their 
cases. The governor should recognize the bias in the deflnitions and ap-
plication of the law of self-defense that results in more convictions and 
harsher sentences for battered women. To ensure that justice is done, 
Governor Wilson should work with the legislature and Board of Prison 
Terms to release as many battered women in prison as is consistent with 
'" B.A., Journalism, B.A., French, St. Louis University; Class of 1993, University 
of California - Hastings College of the Law. I would like to thank Moana Kutsche, 
whose comments and suggestions were extremely valuable in bringing this article to 
print. I would also like to thank my parents, my sisters, and my friends, especially 
Rachel Kook and Ty Hyderally, for an inordinate amount of support and patience. In 
doing the research for this article I became involved with, and served as a volunteer 
at, the California Coalition for Battered Women in Prison. However, any opinions 
expressed, and any statements or misstatements of fact, must be regarded as my own 
and in no way reflect the position of the Coalition or any of the individual petition-
ers. 
1. See infra notes 153-82 and accompanying text for discussion of legal, social, 
and political factors that contribute to convictions in battered women's cases. 
2. See infra notes 291-92 and accompanying text for discussion of disproportionate 
sentencing and high conviction rates. 
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the public interest, safety, and welfare through the use of the executive 
clemency power. 
Commuting the sentences of battered women who killed in self-de-
fense is a legitimate exercise of the executive clemency power.3 Clemen-
cy can be used to rectify unjust results in individual cases that have not 
been cured through the judicial channels upon which we normally rely to 
accQ!lllllOdate changes in the laW: It can correct general f~_01.!f 
ctirtiliIal justice systemS that arise from inequities in our society. 
Governor Wilson responded to the petitioners and informed them, 
"Normally, [the governor's] office does not consider applications for ex-
ecutive clemency for individuals currently under sentence except on 
grounds of either extreme and unusual hardship or innocence.,,6 Contrary 
3. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning 
Power from the King, 69 TEx. L. REv. 569, 613 (1991) [hereinafter Kobil, Mercy 
Strained] ("Clemency, properly exercised and freed of political pressures, represents an 
ideal vehicle for remedying many of the problems inherent in an imperfect, overload-
ed, . . . rigid system of criminal justice"). 
4. "Changes in the law" include adopting flexible substantive criminal law defini-
tions already used in a majority of jurisdictions, see infra notes 74-152 and accompa-
nying text, and changing attitudes that result in prosecutors, judges, and juries more 
fairly applying the existing self-defense construct to battered women's cases. 
The belief that our adversarial system of justice is the only proper forum for 
accommodating changes in the law is held by prosecutors, among others. See Lee 
Leonard, Celeste Commutes Sentences of 25 "Battered" Women Felons, UPI, Dec. 22, 
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file [hereinafter Leonard, Celeste Com-
mutes 25] (quoting Cuyahoga County assistant prosecutor Henry Hillow that clemency 
is a "total betrayal of how the jury system is supposed to work" and quoting 
Ashtabula County prosecutor Gregory Brown that it was "improper for Celeste to 
legislate away what a jury has found"). See also Janet Naylor, Schaefer Releases 
Fears, Too, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1991, at Al [hereinafter Naylor, Schaefer Releas-
es Fears] (John Scully, counsel for the conservative Washington Legal Foundation, is 
concerned that clemency decisions subvert the judicial process and give free rein to 
kill - in his view a private right "to impose the death penalty on [abusers]" - and 
Jon Ryan of the National Coalition of Free Men thinks the Maryland clemency deci-
sion "sets a dangerous precedent"). 
In response to the granting of clemency by Maryland Governor William D. 
Schaefer, see infra note 8, a newspaper editorial board claimed that the governor 
"single-handedly overturned the criminal justice system by ignoring the evidence 
from ... trials." The Gov Blunders Again, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at G2. 
The emphasis placed on a "jury of one's peers," and the availability of appellate 
review, reveals that many do not see executive clemency as a valid exercise to cor-
rect injustice that persists in the trial and appellate courts. A deputy United States 
pardon attorney during the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations stated, "It's a 
dangerous trend for the executive to override the function of the courts and the pa-
role system too much, both from the point of view of balance of power and of pos-
sible corruption." Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 603. 
5. These results include disparate and disproportionate sentences, infra notes 291-
92. See also Part n, infra, for discussion of application of legal construct of self-
defense to battered women, and infra notes 153-82 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of political and social forces influencing verdicts. 
6. Letter from Janice Rogers Brown, Governor Wilson's legal affairs secretary, to 
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to the governor's view, the appropriate justification for the exercise of 
clemency in these cases is to secure justice by correcting the jury's (or 
the trial court's) misapplication of a legal theory of self-defense that has 
often proven inadequate to account for the experiences of battered wom-
en. The clemency power should not be limited to extending "mercy" to 
women who should no longer be imprisoned because of poor health, age, 
or other individual factors.7 Moreover, the admissibility of expert testi-
mony on the battered .WOin8ft. synaromeShoWdUootre .tfte .s6le raeter 
considered in determining whether a battered woman received a full and 
fair opportunity to establish that she acted in self-defense, 8 and it should 
not be the controlling consideration in deciding clemency petitions.9 
There are political risks inherent in using the clemency power to 
redress the failings of the judicial system. However, Governor Wilson can 
share these potential risks with the California Legislature and the Board 
of Prison Terms. He should do so by adopting principled standards for 
review of the cases in which battered women are imprisoned for killing 
abusers. He should also consider delegating the power to decide clemency 
petitions of incarcerated battered women to an independent body that is 
the leader of Convicted Women Against Abuse at Frontera Prison (Feb. 17. 1992) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Wilson Letter]. See also Part m. infra. for discussion 
of executive power of clemency. 
7. In addition to Governor Wilson's position, id., see Geraldine Baum, Should 
These Women Have Gone Free? Backlash: Second Guessing Dogged Governors in 
Maryland and Ohio After They Granted Clemency to Wives Who Killed Men They 
Said Abused Them, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1991, at El [hereinafter Baum, Backlash] 
(quoting individuals from House of Ruth, the Maryland clemency support group, and 
Paul Davis, Maryland's parole commissioner, who stated that the task is to "look at 
the gray area and decide whether to grant mercy"). 
8. See infra notes 183-246 for critique of battered woman syndrome as a distinct 
psychological and behavioral model and as an effective means of winning acquittal. 
9. Both governors who have commuted sentences of battered women as a group, 
see infra notes 11-12, have indicated that they did so because either battered woman 
syndrome testimony or evidence of prior beatings had not been admissible in those 
states at the women's trials. Kathy M. Kristof, The Trials of Abused Women, Clem-
ency Efforts for Battered Women, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Apr. 26, 1992, at A7 
[hereinafter Kristof, Trials]; Naylor. Schaefer Releases Fears, supra note 4; Gary 
Spencer, Legislators Seek Release of Women Prisoners, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 5, 1991, at 1; 
Isabel Wilkerson, Clemency Granted to 25 Women Convicted for Assault or Murder, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1990, at AI; Celeste Discusses Clemency Issue On Talk Show, 
UPI, Dec. 26, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI me; Clemency for Bat-
tered Women, 1:1 DoUBLE-TIME (Nat'l Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered 
Women (NCDBW)) Oct. 1991, at 1 [hereinafter Clemency for Battered Women, Dou-
BLE-TIME]; Only Guilty of Being Scared; Ohio Governor Commuting 25 Sentences, 
Revives Battered Women Issue, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1990, at B4 [hereinafter Only 
Guilty]. Legislators in both states have passed bills allowing for the admission of such 
testimony at trial. It is now admissible in Ohio by court decision, State v. Koss, 551 
N.E.2d 970 (1990), and by statute, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (Baldwin 1992); 
in Maryland it is admissible by statute, MD. Crs. AND JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 10-
916 (1991). 
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free from direct political pressure, and he can enlist the legislature in this 
regard. 
In Part I of this article, I introduce some of the women who have 
petitioned Governor Wilson for commutation of their prison sentences. 
The petitioners organized a battered women's support group in prison, 
applied for clemency, and in tum sparked a movement in the community 
to aid them in their plea. Part II describes the application of self-defense 
law to women who defend themselves against their abusers, with a focus 
on the legal rules in California. I criticize the overreliance upon the bat-
tered woman "syndrome" as a distinct behavioral model and as an effec-
tive tool for securing acquittals. A review of the syndrome is followed by 
a survey of some of the criticisms of battered woman syndrome and some 
alternative explanations for battered women's actions. Part III presents an 
overview of theories of punishment and the executive power of clemency, 
with suggestions for the principled use of the power to achieve justice. 
Finally, I recommend that the governor, through the Board of Prison 
Terms or a separate executive commission, identify and review the cases 
of all women who are incarcerated for killing or assaulting those who 
battered them. 10 
I. CALIFORNIA WOMEN IN PRISON 
SEEKING COMMUTATION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Governors in two states have released from prison a number of bat-
tered women who killed their abusers. In December of 1990, Governor 
Richard F. Celeste of Ohio granted clemency to twenty-five battered 
women, including one on death row. He announced his decision to re-
lease the women two weeks before his term expired. JI Governor Wil-
liam D. Schaefer of Maryland granted clemency to eight women two 
months later, in February of 1991.12 In making their decisions, both 
10. It is conceivable that men kill women in self-defense in cases in which the 
woman has been the batterer over the course of the relationship. However, this article 
assumes that this is an extremely rare occurrence. A recent statistical report released 
by the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics reveals that violence against 
women is six times more likely to be committed by intimates than is violence against 
men. Tamar Lewin, 25% of Assaults Against Women Are by the Men in Their Lives, 
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1991, at A20 (reporting on study and giving statistics). Only 
four percent of violent crime committed against men is committed by family members 
or women the men had dated, but twenty-five percent of violent crime against women 
is committed by family members or men the women have dated. [d. 
II. Clemency for Battered Women, DOUBLE-TIME, supra note 9, at I (reporting 
twenty-six commutations); Wilkerson, Clemency Granted to 25, supra note 9 (report-
ing twenty-five commutations). 
12. Clemency for Battered Women, DOUBLE-TIME, supra note 9, at I; Janet Naylor, 
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governors gave great weight to the fact that these women had not had the 
opportunity at trial to present evidence of either battered woman syn-
drome or a history of abuse, because neither state permitted the use of 
such evidence. 13 
Governors in other states have commuted sentences or pardoned 
prisoners on an individual basis. 14 Other than the two "mass" clemencies 
Schaefer to Free 8 Battered Women Who Fought Back, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1991, 
at Al [hereinafter Naylor, Schaefer to Free 8]. 
13. See supra note 9. 
14. These individual cases include the following: 
lliinois: Governor James Thompson (Republican) commuted the sentences of 
Gladys Gonzales and Leslie Brown on December 23, 1988. It was Gonzales's second 
petition for clemency. She had been convicted of solicitation and conspiracy to com-
mit murder for the killing of her husband See Petition Advising the Honorable James 
R. Thompson, Governor of lliinois, in the Matter of Gladys Gonzales, prepared by 
counsel for petitioner, for a description of the years of abuse suffered by Gladys (on 
file with Hastings Women's Law Journal) [hereinafter Gonzales petition]. See also 
Kristof, Trials, supra note 9 (reporting that six battered women in the 19808 were re-
leased by lliinois governors). 
Florida: In December of 1990, then-Governor Robert Martinez (Republican) com-
muted the sentence of a woman convicted of hiring a man to kill her abusive hus-
band in 1975. Clemency Update, 1:1 DoUBLE-TIME (Nat'l Clearinghouse for the De-
fense of Battered Women (NCDBW» Oct 1991, at 6 [hereinafter Clemency Update, 
DoUBLE-TIME]. 
New Hampshire: Then-Governor John Sununu (Republican) granted a conditional 
pardon in 1988 to Kathleen Kaplan, who pled guilty to second-degree murder and re-
ceived a sentence of thirty years to life for soliciting the killing of her husband. 
Laura A. Kiernan, Pardon Granted in New Hampshire Murder-For-Hire Case, BoS-
TON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 1988, at M29. 
New York: Governor Mario Cuomo (Democrat) granted clemency in 1986 to Luz 
Santana, who had been sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison for killing her 
abuser (her stepfather), who she said had physically and sexually abused her family 
for twelve years. Spencer, Legislators Seek Release, supra note 9. 
Iowa: Governor Terry E. Branstad (Republican) commuted the sentence of Kath-
erine L. Sallis on February 12, 1992. She had received a sentence of life in prison 
but was released after public hearings were held (which she was unable to attend) at 
which ninety-five percent of those present supported the commutation. Katherine L. 
Sallis, Address at the Statewide Conference on Battered Women (San Francisco, Cal. 
Aug. IS, 1992). 
Washington: Governor Booth Gardner (Democrat) granted clemency to Delia 
Alaniz, convicted of hiring a hitman to kill her abusive husband She did so after 
seventeen years of sexual, physical, and mental abuse by her husband. He had also 
threatened to rape her fifteen-year-old daughter. Robert McDaniel, Killer of Abusive 
Husband Granted Clemency, UPI, Oct. 27, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, 
UPI file. 
Nebraska: The Nebraska Board of Pardons granted a full pardon to Judy Stunn, 
a battered woman convicted in 1972 of manslaughter for killing her sleeping husband 
after he beat her and threatened to strangle her with a telephone cord. The board 
pardoned her years after her release and after she dedicated herself to helping battered 
women at a Nebraska task force on abused women. UPI, Mar. 16, 1989, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file. 
Other states whose governors have granted clemency to battered women include 
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in Ohio and Maryland, these individual actions resulted in approximately 
a dozen other battered women receiving clemency." According to recent 
news reports, clemency drives of differing sizes are under way in more 
than twenty states, including Florida, lllinois, New Hampshire, Tennessee, 
Washington, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Texas.16 
On March 19, 1991, thirty-four women in the California Institution 
for Women at Frontera, California, met and drafted a letter petitioning 
G<Yvemor Pete-wHSOfiUtOUfeview tIleif·eases aBEl to meefWifB mem at tile 
prisonY In that letter, they requested clemency in the form of pardons 
or commutation of their sentences to time served. After receiving the 
letter, Governor Wilson announced that he would review the trial record 
and additional information provided in individual petitions on behalf of 
each woman who had signed the letter. Although he extended the dead-
line for submission of these petitions, he declined to meet with the wom-
en. ls It is Governor Wilson's policy to conduct hearings only in capital 
cases,I9 and none of the petitioners' cases is a capital case. However, 
hearing the stories fIrst-hand and seeing the women can be a powerful 
experience that could have a strong, positive influence on the governor's 
decision.20 
Louisiana, Tennessee, and New Jersey. Maria Puente, Texas Considers Clemency; 
Will Review Cases Related to Abuse. USA TODAY. May 17. 1991. at 3A; Florida 
Considers Clemency. USA TODAY. Sept. 13. 1991. at 3A. 
15. Richard Barbieri. Battered Women Push for Clemency Program; Bay Area 
Counsel Establish Coalition To Aid Prisoners. THE REcORDER. Dec. 3. 1991. at 1 
[hereinafter Barbieri. Push for Clemency] (quoting Sue Osthoff. director of NCDBW. 
see supra note 9. stating that only twelve had been granted). See also Puente. supra 
note 14 (reporting that approximately three dozen women (including Celeste's twenty-
five) have been released by governors over the past three years). 
16. Gina Boubion. Battered Women Appeal For Clemency: Those Who Killed Abu-
sive Mates Feel They Have Suffered Enough. SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS. Mar. 1. 
1992. at 1A; Candy 1. Cooper. Deadly Defense: Women Who Kill Abusers. S.F. Ex-
AM .• Aug. 30. 1992. at Al [hereinafter Cooper. Deadly Defense]; Jane Gross. Abused 
Women Who Kill Now Seek a Way Out of Cells. N.Y. TIMEs. Sept. 15. 1992. at 
A16; Kristof. Trials. supra note 9. 
17. Letter from Petitioners to Governor Wilson (Mar. 19. 1991) (on fIle with 
Hastings Women's Law Journal); FACT SHEET ON TIffi CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR 
BATIERED WOMEN IN PRISON (Cal. Coal. for Battered Women in Prison. San Fran-
cisco. Cal .• Los Angeles. Cal.) Fall 1992. at 1 (on fIle with Hastings Women's Law 
Journal) [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. 
18. Gross. supra note 16 (the petitioners' invitation to meet with the governor re-
ceived a "polite 'no thank you"'). 
19. Telephone Interview with Minouche Kandel. California Coalition for Battered 
Women in Prison (Dec. 21. 1992). 
20. See Cooper, Deadly Defense. supra note 20. Cooper recounts how California 
Assemblyman John Burton (O-San Francisco). head of the Assembly Public Safety 
Committee, was especially affected by the testimony he heard from eight women in 
the hearings at the prison in September 1991. During the course of "bloodcurdling" 
testimony. Burton scribbled a note to Assemblywoman Jackie Speier (O-So. San Fran-
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The prisoners' group, Convicted Women Against Abuse, was fonned 
in 1988 by eighty-IoUf-poundBrenOa-aubme~uWho hasoeeoln-raiI rune 
years for killing her husband, an ex-police officer, with a champagne 
bottle.21 Because Clubine heard "echoes of her story" from other in-
mates,22 she sought to organize a support group for fonnerly battered 
women in prison. After three years of fighting the prison bureaucracy to 
establish the right to meet, the group nOW assembles every Wednesday 
=-evening. Its membership has::grown from ten to fOrtY fOur, and includes 
women between the ages of twenty-five and seventy-seven. In the weekly 
group support sessions the prisoners talk about their battering experiences, 
the loss of the men they loved and what went wrong.23 They offer sup-
port to one another in the meetings through understanding and accep-
tance. Part of the importance of the support group, as One of the founding 
members stated, is that "[n]obody asks, 'Why did you go back?' They 
just understand.,,24 The women receive certificates for continued atten-
dance. All of the thirty-four group members at the time the letter was 
written joined in the bid for c1emency.2S Most of them were in prison 
for killing their abusers. As of May 8, 1992, twenty-two of the women 
had fonnal, individual petitions submitted by pro bono advocates, and an 
additional twelve petitions had been filed with the governor as of Decem-
ber 1992.26 Approximately 600 of the more than 6,000 women in Cal-
cisco) that read, "I'm glad you forced me to come." Burton has since written legisla-
tion that would have affected battered women and the clemency process. The bill was 
vetoed by Governor Wilson. See infra notes 388-410 and accompanying text. See also 
Howard Schneider, Meeting Battered Women Face to Face; Schaefer Ends Prison 
Visit With Call for New Laws, Parole Study, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1991, at B7 
(reporting that Maryland Governor Donald Schaefer was moved after speaking with 
the women in prison). 
21. Cooper, Deadly Defense, supra note 16. 
22. Id. 
23. Susan Paterno, A Legacy of Violence; The Courts Say They are Killers But 
They Say They Were Abused and Had No Other Way Out, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 
1991, at El. 
24. Id.; Gross, supra note 16 (quoting one woman: "[U]nlike the police stations 
where they filed complaints against their husbands and the courtrooms where they 
were tried, nobody asks: Why did you put up with it?"). 
25. It should be noted that not all of the women in prison for killing abusers, nor 
all those with histories of abuse, could possibly be represented in the support group. 
As a result, the governor may possess an initial pool of petitions that does not accu-
rately reflect the diversity of the women's prison population. 
26. Telephone Interview with Minouche Kandel, California Coalition for Battered 
Women in Prison, supra note 19. See infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text for 
reviews of some of the cases and infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text for dis-
cussion of the Coalition providing legal and other assistance to the petitioners. 
Although thirty-four women originally signed the letter, the advocates who have 
filed petitions on their behalf (members of the California Coalition for Battered Wom-
en in Prison) determined that they would file full petitions and supporting materials 
for only those women whose cases showed the following factors: 1) a woman con-
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ifornia prisons are in prison for murder or manslaughter, and it is estimat-
ed that several hundred of these women killed abusers in self-defense. 27 
B. THE PETITIONERS 
Narrated here are the stories of three of the petitioners included in the 
initial round of petitions sent to Governor Wilson followed by a summary 
of news accounts of two others.28 Although each of the petitions is 
summarizeduwithperlllissioll, the summaries are anonymousbethre pm--
teet the petitioner and to ensure the confidentiality of the clemency pro-
cess, as none of the petitions is public record.29 These stories attempt to 
present the killings in the context of the relationships. It is important to 
understand the history of abuse and what the woman thinks is coming 
(immediately or in the near future) when she acts. The accounts contain 
information from the women that may not have been admitted into evi-
dence at trial. The petition review committee of the California Coalition 
for Battered Women in Prison read thirteen petitions in one day and the 
remaining eight as they arrived periodically over the next week. Needless 
to say, the experience was sobering. These stories challenge our ideas of 
what it is like to be a battered woman and make us reconsider the 
thought that most non-battered women can identify with these women, 
with their childhoods, and with their experiences in marriage. 
Many reporters do not describe the batterings that preceded the kill-
victed of murder or manslaughter, 2) evidence of battering in the relationship with the 
decedent, and 3) exhaustion of all appeals. Twenty-two of the original thirty-four met 
these "requirements." Telephone Interview with Minouche Kandel, California Coalition 
for Battered Women in Prison, supra note 19. Advocates did not determine that 
these twenty-one women suffered from "battered woman syndrome," as some articles 
have supposed. See, e.g., Candy Cooper, It Started Small, But Coalition Flourishing, 
S.F. ExAM., Aug. 3D, 1992, at A9 [hereinafter Cooper, Coalition Flourishing] (stating 
that the California Coalition advocates identified twenty-one women whom they be-
lieve fit the profile) (emphasis added); Gross, supra note 16 (asserting that the ''team 
of lawyers ... determined that 22 women in Ms. Clubine's group were candidates 
for clemency: they met the accepted definition for battered women's syndrome, had 
killed abusers and had exhausted appeals") (emphasis added). The battered woman 
"syndrome" does not appear ever to have been viewed by the Coalition as something 
the potential petitioner must exhibit before receiving assistance from the Coalition. 
27. FAct SHEET, supra note 17, at 3; Telephone Interview with Minouche Kandel, 
California Coalition for Battered Women in Prison, supra note 19. 
28. Petitions of three unnamed prisoners from initial group seeking commutation, 
submitted to Governor Wilson April, 1992. 
29. I contacted several of the petitioners or their advocates in deciding which sto-
ries to present. None of the cases is presented to gain an advantage, to put pressure 
on the decision-making process, or because the story is ''better'' than any other. The 
cases summarized from the petitions, along with the news accounts of two higher-
profIle petitioners (Brenda Clubine organized the support group and has been a vocal 
advocate, and Brenda Aris was the defendant in a published appellate court opinion), 
are intended only to show the range of cases before the governor. 
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ings when writing news accounts. Instead, they relate the case history in 
an abbreviated and sanitized manner, such as: "On August 9, 1991, after 
fifteen years of abuse and after an argument in which the defendant's 
husband stated he would 'kill her and the kids,' Mrs. Jones picked up a 
rifle and fired at her husband as he approached her." Such an incomplete 
account of a woman's experience and her self-defensive act makes it 
tempting to immediately decide - using our own lives as a reference -
tOOl tIle woman's actions CouI600fnave ~-i~ or we ffitiOmlI.. 
ize and conclude that even if she should not be convicted of murder, 
manslaughter is appropriate. However, when faced with the entire tale of 
abuse - how it began, how it escalated, the degree of violence, and the 
continuity - the woman's action becomes more understandable and 
reasonable, and her assertion of self-defense appears more credible.3O 
For example, compare the following two news accounts of Lisa 
Grimshaw, convicted of hiring two men to kill her husband. The first 
contains a brief description of the killing and then criticizes the applica-
tion of the battered woman syndrome to cases in which third parties are 
hired to kill the abuser: 
One summer night in 1985, Lisa Grimshaw watched her boy-
friend put two baseball bats in the trunk of her car, then drove 
him and another man to a secluded boat ramp and dropped them 
off. Next she picked up her estranged husband from work, drove 
him to the boat ramp, and told him she wanted to have sex. 
When he got out of the car, the other two men emerged from 
hiding and beat him to death. Ordinarily [self-defense] wouldn't 
be a plausible defense for someone who sought out another per-
son and escorted him to an ambush killing. But Grimshaw's 
attorneys told the jury that, after years of physical abuse and 
harassment at the hands of her estranged husband, she suffered 
from "battered woman syndrome." This mental disorder, they 
said, caused her to believe that her life was in imminent danger 
and that alternatives to having her husband beaten with baseball 
bats were not available.31 
The following account more fully describes the violence endured by 
Grimshaw and her earlier attempts to take advantage of the "alternatives 
to the ambush killing." 
30. For a full discussion of battering histories in cases with reported court deci-
sions, including some of those cited infra notes 238, 244 see CYNTIDA GILLESPIE, 
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATIERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND TIlE LAW 1-30 
(1989). 
31. Nancy Watzman and William Saletan, Marcus Welby, J.D.: When Doctors Be-
come Judges, THE NEW REPUBUC, Apr. 17, 1989, at 19 (emphasis added). 
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In the beginning, he was sympathetic, but the violence soon be-
gan. She says he held a knife to her belly and threatened to carve 
out her fetus. "He used to make me sit down in the comer of the 
room and sprinkle boiling water on me so I would perform oral 
sex 'cause he told me if I didn't he would pour the water on me. 
He arrived one night while I was hammering the window shut. I 
was ~l»~nails w he_~{)Ukhl~t ~iP. I Wl:l8 b3ck!'d imo ~ 
corrier of the room and lie mOCKed my teeth out with the ham-
mer. That wasn't the fIrst time, and I have dentist records to 
prove it. One time I went downstairs, and he had a gun, and I 
said, 'Well, you just ... kill me; it really doesn't matter any-
more.' I really didn't care if I lived anymore. I tried to get help 
from the system and nobody would help me. My family was use-
less. The cops took him out, and he would come back. He would 
put things inside of me and tie me up in bed and he said if I 
didn't do things, he would kill me. Of course I believed him." 
She had left him, had hid from him and had called the police, 
who failed to help her. After the murder, she stated, "If the cops 
had helped me, maybe he'd be alive today .... It was me or 
him.,,32 
Although the full stories may not convince everyone - and indeed 
do not convince all juries - it is important to know the entire context of 
a woman's action rather than a trivialized description such as "physical 
abuse and harassment. ,,33 
Some battered women's stories are worse than others. However, it is 
important that we not reserve the defense of self-defense, and clemency, 
for only those with the most horrifIc tales. We must consider what it 
must have been like to be the woman in any of these situations. We must 
ultimately judge whether her act was reasonable, not merely whether she 
had a paradigm "battered woman's" case. 
Prisoner #1 
D was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to seventeen 
years to life in prison for shooting her boyfriend, B.34 D had been se-
32. Stan Grossfeld, Love and Te"or: "Safer" and in Jail: Women Who Kill Their 
Batterers, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1991, at Ml. 
33. Watzman and Saletan, supra note 31, at 19. 
34. Identifying the women as "D" (defendant) and as "prisoner" serves as a good 
reminder of how the state aligns itself against women whom it has rarely endeavored 
to protect before the killing of the abuser. 
"B" signifies a boyfriend and "R" a husband. Although I regret having to use 
such letters to identify the parties, it is necessary to protect the prisoners' privacy and 
to ensure that the women who apply for clemency are not exploited. Exploitation 
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verely abJ,J.sed _physicw.~_b-y her bo)'friend i!u' ID9rethan twQ years, B 
began abusing D emotionally, blaming her for his inability to hold a job, 
calling her stupid, a whore, and a slut. Before long, physical violence re-
placed the emotional abuse. B would hit and kick D during arguments 
and once stabbed her in the back four times. D often attempted to fight 
back, but could not because she was much smaller and not nearly as 
---Strong as B. A doctor had concluded that B "was a powderkeg waiting to 
go off.~ B'S abuse of D became more erratic and severe. 
D never called the police, but others did in response to her cries for 
help. Once when the police arrived B had D on the floor, with his hands 
around her neck, strangling her. The police only asked B to cool down 
by walking around the block. Once he severely beat and kicked her in 
public, prompting four young girls who witnessed the attack to call the 
police. B was not arrested. 
On the night of the killing, D told B she was leaving him. She had 
made plans to leave earlier that day. She had also told a friend at dinner 
that night that she was afraid to go back to the trailer in which D and B 
lived. Once the two returned home - and after a fight erupted in which 
B had begun to push D around and to the floor - B loaded a shotgun 
and informed D that he was going to kill the dog, then kill D, and then 
kill himself. He told her to put a bucket over the dog's head. He then 
threatened to tie D to his pickup truck and drag her to the home of X (a 
man whom he had accused her of being interested in) to see "how [he] 
liked her then." B aimed the gun at D, who was able to wrestle the gun 
away from B and point it at him. He advanced toward her, and said, 
"When I get that gun, I'm going to kill you with it." D then shot B. She 
was found hours later, bruised, scratched, and in shock, still holding B in 
her lap, rocking him. At D's first trial, evidence of abuse was admitted. 
However, her attorney disappeared during trial, and that trial ended in a 
mistrial. When the judge polled the jury at that time, seventy percent of 
the jurors indicated that they would have acquitted her based upon the 
testimony they had heard. D's second attorney failed to offer evidence of 
abuse and she was convicted of second-degree murder. 
Prisoner #2 
D had a history of childhood abuse. She was raped at age thirteen 
and became pregnant. She was forced by her parents to marry the man 
who had raped her after she decided to keep the baby. D left that rela-
tionship because her husband was abusive. She later married a second 
abusive man and left him. She began dating B, whom she met at her 
through excessive publicity, and a backlash of negative publicity, have hanned clem-
ency efforts in other states. See infra notes 53, 350-57. 
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apartment building. Despite a peaceful initial relationship, B soon became 
violent, verbally and physically abusing D when she refused to give him 
money for drugs. B once smashed the windows in her apartment with a 
baseball bat after she refused to give him money. D reported the beatings 
(as many as four per week) to the police but was told that because the 
police did not witness the incidents they could do nothing for her. 
B would usually kick and hit D in places where marks would not be 
visib1e, but-sometimes he cholcedlIer. AlthoUgh DcRHedthe pOtICe often 
in the last six months of the relationship, B was never arrested. Once B 
was removed to a house a few houses away from D's. He returned within 
fifteen minutes, threatened her and threw her to the floor, telling her, 
"Bitch, you're going to pay for this." He warned her not to call the po-
lice again and beat her. 
When B was sent out of town by his mother, D began seeing another 
man. When B returned he threatened D, called her a slut and a whore, 
and said that no one could have her but him. He hit D on the head with 
a glass bottle, attempted to strangle her, and swore that he would kill her 
and her new boyfriend. A few days later B confronted D's new boyfriend 
with a pistol and chased him off. He then shoved his way into D's apart-
ment, struck her, and drew the pistol. He stated that he would be back to 
kill her. As he left, D picked up a rifle, followed B, and warned him not 
to return. He responded with obscenities and began to approach her with 
the pistol drawn. D fired once and killed B. She was convicted of sec-
ond-degree murder. No evidence of prior abuse was admitted at her trial, 
and she had no prior record. She is serving a sentence of fifteen years to 
life. 
Prisoner #3 
D was convicted of first-degree murder and received a sentence of 
twenty-five years to life. For five years, D was forced to participate in 
bizarre sex acts and was physically abused and emotionally tormented. 
Shortly after the beginning of their relationship, H began to dominate D 
and insisted that she abort her first pregnancy or he would leave her. He 
repeatedly accused her of infidelity, concocting bizarre tales of sex in 
vans with multiple partners. After a party in which a man had rested his 
hand on the couch behind D's shoulder, H accused D of having an affair 
with the man, whom she had never met. When they returned home, H 
ripped off D's clothes and raped her. On one occasion he suspected her 
of infidelity when she returned home a half-hour late from an appoint-
ment; he ripped off her skirt and underwear to determine if she had been 
with another man and raped her. She was still holding her purse in her 
hand. H ordered her to get up and fix dinner after the attack. 
H often tried to force D into three-way sex with former girlfriends 
and prostitutes. She was disturbed and deeply offended by this. The 
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abuse shifted from emotional and sexual violence to other forms of physi-
cal violence, including pushing, slapping, and ripping off D's clothes. H 
tried more than once to push D outside naked. She would respond by 
locking herself in the bathroom, sometimes spending the night there. D 
could predict when the abuse would start. H would become silent, then 
he would launch into a tirade, calling D a bitch, whore, slut, and stupid. 
He wwldtbrQW pl~ aDd fumitqre, .aad .PU~ ... slap 1lIldsbc>:ve ~. He 
began to play pomogrnpmc movies dUring sex and demanded that she 
imitate the acts in the videos. 
On the night of the shooting, H returned from a week-long absence 
with renewed demands that D engage in three-way sex with H and a 
prostitute. When she said she could not, H beat her. She fled. When she 
returned home later that night, H told her to pack. She packed, made din-
ner, and H went to bed. Until three o'clock in the morning she tried to 
gain the courage to kill herself, but could not. She entered the bedroom, 
planning to kill herself there. Instead, she shot H. She sat in the living 
room all night, terrified that he would be angry and come to get her.35 
In fact, at one point she was so frightened that she was certain that she 
saw him, or what looked like his spirit, coming down the hall. She 
thought he was coming to get her. D was convicted of first-degree mur-
der and sentenced to twenty-five years to life. D's attorney never offered 
evidence of prior abuse, and her case was never appealed. She has served 
ten years of her sentence. The prosecutor who tried the case is recom-
mending commutation. 
Prisoner #4 
Brenda Clubine36 is the founder of Convicted Women Against 
Abuse, a group that meets at the California Institution for Women, at 
Frontera, California.37 Clubine's husband, an ex-police officer, stabbed 
her, broke her bones, fractured her skull, and tore the skin off her face, 
all during repeated instances of abuse over several years. "I've pretty 
much gone through just about all of it," Clubine says. She bears a scar 
on her hand from a time when she deflected a knife wielded by her hus-
band. Most of these battering instances occurred despite the fact that 
Clubine had several restraining orders issued against her husband. "Every 
35. Many of the women in the group of petitioners expected the batterer still to be 
alive and to come after them, believing them to be of super strength and indestructi-
ble. Petitions of unnamed prisoners from the initial group seeking commutation, sub-
mitted to Governor Wilson April, 1992. 
36. This statement of Brenda Clubine's story of abuse is drawn from Boubion, 
supra note 16; from Cooper, Deadly Defense, supra note 16; from Candy Cooper, 
Inmate Fighting For Clemency For Herself and Other Prisoners, S.F. ExAM, Aug. 30, 
1992, at A9; and from Gross, supra note 16. 
37. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text. 
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time he was in violation of the restraining order, whether it was because 
he vandalized our house or physically beat me, the police wouldn't do 
anything. They came to my home, they would meet my husband in the 
driveway and he would just tell them I was being emotional. They 
wouldn't talk to me. . .. [I] had to call [the district attorney] every day 
for six weeks to try to get them to file charges." 
C~ met ber.~ _husband ~ a ~ on_the night that she 
kined liliil. He wassiipposeo to nana over stgneo divorce papers. When 
she arrived, he said he had forgotten them at his hotel room, and she 
agreed to go there with him. Once there, he locked the door. He had a 
copy of a warrant issued for his arrest and told her she was not going to 
make a fool of him. He told her to take off her wedding ring so nobody 
could identify her body, and he slapped and choked her. He stated that he 
would kill her and that nothing would happen to him. She promised him 
she would drop the divorce proceedings and the charges against him. She 
then put three Benadryl capsules in his wine and began to rub his back. 
She grabbed the wine bottle and hit him on the head and stabbed him 
twice before leaving the hotel room. She called his house for three days, 
expecting that he would be angry and come to her house to confront her. 
The last time she called, the police answered his phone; they came to her 
house to notify her of his death, and a few days later arrested her. She 
was convicted of second-degree murder and received fifteen years to life 
in prison. 
Prisoner #5 
Over several years of marriage, Brenda Aris38 lived in fear of her 
husband's violent outbursts. He once returned home from a night of 
drinking and hit Aris while she was sleeping, fracturing her jaw. Another 
time he came home and hit Aris as she slept, slitting her eye. He beat her 
routinely, and once broke her ribs. On the day she was to undergo a 
hysterectomy, her husband was angry with her because she would not be 
able to bear a son. He beat her so severely as they drove that she was 
forced to jump from the moving car. Once he got angry at their newborn 
child for wetting on his leg and he placed the baby outside on the land-
ing at the top of a steep flight of stairs, and would not let Aris retrieve 
the infant. Aris' s husband threatened her at various times with guns and 
knives, and even threatened to make a bomb to blow up her family. He 
also attacked friends and relatives who tried to intervene on her behalf. 
Aris's husband would not allow her to leave the house, and some-
38. This summary of Brenda Aris's case is drawn from Boubion, supra note 16; 
from Cooper, Deadly Defense, supra note 16; from Cooper, Inmate Fighting For 
Clemency, supra note 36; and from People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1184-85 
(1989). 
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times would forbid her to shower or brush her teeth. He was constantly 
jealous, and threatened to kill her and her family if she ever left him. 
She did, however, leave him several times. Every time, he would follow 
her, beg for forgiveness, and promise to change. The beatings continued, 
however, and he eventually threatened to kill her when she left. 
The day that Aris killed her husband resembled many others. He 
knocke<i ~rto ~gr()lIndand. began ~ .~ .. her in front Q.( her friends. 
He ordered her to go to her room until he told her she could come out. 
She left the bedroom to go to the bathroom. Her husband followed her 
and ordered her to open the door; when she did not, he kicked it in. He 
started to kick and hit her. One of her friends, who was still in the house 
offered to take one of Aris's children overnight and offered to take Aris, 
too. Aris agreed to let her child go with her friend, but stayed herself 
because she believed her husband would become furious if she left and 
might hurt her other friends who were still at the house and who left 
shortly thereafter. 
Aris's husband then hit her in the stomach, causing her to curl up on 
the bed. He continued to beat her on the neck and head, and pulled her 
hair back violently. He told her he "didn't think he was going to let [her] 
live till the morning.,,39 He continued to hit her until he passed out. 
Aris went to the kitchen for ice for her face. When she did not see 
any, she went next door to a neighbor's house and saw a gun on the 
refrigerator. She took the gun "for protection," and returned home. She 
said that she believed her husband's death threat, and that even though he 
was sleeping, she believed this to be a short respite from the beatings. 
She believed he would kill her when he woke up, or that he would hurt 
her very badly. She fired the gun several times, and ran from the house. 
Aris was convicted of second degree murder. Two jurors in her case 
are actively supporting her clemency bid, and the judge who sentenced 
her has reportedly stated that the victim "was a jackass who is better off 
dead,,,40 and that he would not oppose a grant of clemency to Aris. 
e. COMMUNITY ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS 
1. The California Coalition for Battered Women In Prison 
In nearly every state in which women have sought clemency, a sup-
port group has formed to aid the petitioners' efforts.41 In Baltimore, the 
39. Cooper, Deadly Defense, supra note 16. 
40. See id. 
41. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (citing sources reporting that clem-
ency drives are underway in over twenty states). However, Ohio Governor Celeste 
initiated the review procedure of his own accord. See Ohio Governor Grants 25 
Abused Women Clemency, CmCAGO TRm., Dec. 22, 1990, at 1 ("in light of [the 
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House of Ruth and the Domestic Violence Task Force of the Public Jus-
tice Center assisted petitioners and prepared dossiers on prisoners, ulti-
mately requesting clemency for twelve women, eight of whose sentences 
were commuted.42 Prisoners at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute 
in Framingham formed a group called Battered Women Fighting Back! in 
1989 as a weekly support group for battered women in that prison. A 
facilitatoru1rotJLJlm"outside" . helped farm . .th.e group, wu ~~ 
SoCia! Justlcefor Women provides -eauCiinonru-arid support servfces.<13 Iii 
addition, individuals from various community organizations are seeking to 
change the Massachusetts law of self-defense and to secure clemency for 
the prisoners on whose behalf they work. 44 In New York, a group of 
reform-oriented criminal justice organizations and women's groups has 
banded together to urge Governor Mario Cuomo to release battered wom-
en who "pose no risk to public safety .'t4S 
In California, a diverse group called the California Coalition for Bat-
tered Women in Prison, with meetings in northern and southern Califor-
nia, formed to assist the petitioners. The Coalition has been described as 
"[o]ne of the state's hottest venues for pro bono [work].,,46 The Co-
alition formed in August of 1991, after the prisoners sent the clemency 
petition letter to Governor Wilson. In response to the petition letter and 
requests from individual inmates over a number of years, members of 
agencies working with battered women and with prisoners with children 
met to discuss strategies for helping battered women in prison.47 
Ohio Supreme Court decision allowing expert testimony at trial, Celeste] reviewed the 
records of over 100 women in prison for killing or assaulting a spouse or male com-
panion"). 
42. Clemency Update, DoUBLE-TIME, supra note 14, at 5-6. 
43. LIsA SHEEHY, MEuSSA RElNBERG AND DEBORAH KIRCHWEY, COMMUTATION 
FOR WOMEN WHO DEFENDED THEMsELVES AGAINST ABUSIVE PARTNERS: AN AD-
VOCACY MANUAL AND GUIDE TO LEGAL IssUES 2 (1991) [hereinafter HLS MANUAL] 
(reporting that eleven Massachusetts prisoners identified themselves as battered women, 
six of whom are at MCI-Framingham) (on file with author and available from the 
National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women). 
44. Eight petitions for commutation of sentence have been under consideration by 
Massachusetts Governor William Weld since February 14, 1992, Domestic Violence 
Day in Massachusetts. Kristof, Trials, supra note 9. 
45. Spencer, Legislators Seek Release, supra note 9. The group consists of the 
Correctional Association of New York, the state chapter of the National Organization 
for Women, and other groups. In addition, the New York Women's Foundation sent a 
letter to Governor Cuomo urging the release of incarcerated battered women. The let-
ter was signed by 750 supporters. Id. 
46. Richard Barbieri, Women's Movement: A Coalition's Attempt To Win Freedom 
For Battered Women Who Have Killed Their Spouses Is Becoming One Of The Hot-
test Venues For Pro Bono, THE REcORDER, Mar. 23, 1992, at 12 [hereinafter 
Barbieri, Women's Movement]. See also Barbieri, Push for Clemency, supra note 15. 
47. Telephone Interview with Minouche Kandel, California Coalition for Battered 
Women in Prison, supra note 19. 
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Advocates from northern and southern California met at an initial 
"roundtable discussion."48 These volunteers realized that the two-page 
clemency petition letter would not carry the cause and created the Coali-
tion to assist battered women incarcerated for defending themselves.49 
The Coalition now has more than 150 active members who come from 
legal services organizations, public interest law firms, private law firms 
(iachldiBg.~ puwtiJiQ11ers-1-so law ~ls~ ll!ld Kov~t~eIlCies. 
Througfdts pro bono ana petition reView committees, the Coalition 
tries to meet the legal needs of the prisoners.S1 The pro bono committee 
recruits and trains advocates to represent petitioners in preparing petitions 
and supplemental materials. The petition review committee serves a 
"quality control" function. By reading every petition, this committee 
hopes to avoid presenting directly conflicting assertions and over-broad 
generalizations regarding battered women and seeks to curb the tempta-
tion to rely too much on the battered woman syndrome as a "disease." 
Thirty-four petitions, prepared by Coalition advocates and containing sup-
porting material, have been fIled with Governor Wilson. 
The Coalition's prison liaison committee seeks to identify battered 
women in prison for killing batterers. Members of this committee dis-
tributed a questionnaire, contacted women, and tried to build a rapport 
with social workers and others within the prison. They have done this to 
ensure the ongoing identification of and contact with battered women in 
prison. This committee also tries to ensure smooth relations with prison 
officials and arranges for visits between the petitioners and advocates. 
The Coalition also serves as a focal point and source of information 
for the media and supporters. Its media committee was formed initially to 
garner positive media coverage of the clemency issue. It appears, how-
ever, that the petitioners themselves learned a valuable lesson from the 
group clemencies in Maryland and Ohio.S2 In those states, criticism was 
sharp, especially in Maryland. In that state, a barrage of criticism fol-
48. Roundtable Discussion on Strategies to Assist Battered Women in Prison, Min-
utes from Meeting 3 (Aug. 7, 1991) (organized by advocates from Legal Services for 
Prisoners with Children, Battered Women's Alternatives Legal Advocacy Program, San 
Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, California Alliance Against 
Domestic Violence, and the California Women's Law Center). 
49. Telephone Interview with Minouche Kandel, California Coalition for Battered 
Women in Prison, supra note 19. 
50. There has been vast pro bono legal and technical support from the law firms 
of Heller, Ehrman, White and McAuliffe; Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher; Latham and 
Watkins; Cooley Godward Castro Huddleston and Tatum; Pillsbury, Madison and 
Sutro; and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom. 
51. This description of the Coalition seeks to explain the scope of the community 
effort on behalf of the California petitions. For a detailed resource on forming a 
clemency group to aid battered women in prison, see HLS MANuAL, supra note 43. 
52. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
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lowed a few days of relatively favorable commentary after Governor 
William Schaefer commuted the sentences of eight women,53 and this 
criticism resulted in a decision to be more cautious in future grants of 
clemency. The California petitioners have sought as much public support 
as possible in advance of the decisions and have aggressively sought 
press coverage. Both the group of petitioners and the Coalition have 
received a great .deal. of~n 
'TIieCoalition has continued to operate beyond th~f1nitial round of 
petitions and will probably continue to represent California's battered 
women in seeking grants of clemency after Governor Wilson's grants or 
denials of clemency in these cases. 
53. See, e.g., Naylor, Schaefer Releases Fears, supra note 4; Fern Shen and 
Howard Schneider, Freedom in a Divided World; 8 Maryland Women Who Killed 
Mates To Be Released Amid Debate Over Their Deeds, WASH. PoST, Feb. 21, 1991, 
at Bl; David Simon and William F. Zorzi, Jr., Schaefer Commuted Sentences Without 
All The Facts, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 17, 1991, at lA; David Simon and William F. 
Zorzi, Jr., Case Histories Reveal Troubling Questions About Circumstances of the 
Crimes, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 17, 1991, at 6A; Killing the Enemy: Clemency to Bat-
tered Wives Who Killed Their Husbands Causes Controversy in Maryland, NAT'L 
REv., Apr. 29, 1991, at 13 (''The push for clemencies which often turn out to be 
unwise and unjust . . . suggest a national delusion . . . [m]oral revulsion quickly 
mutates into an irrational crusade, fueled by unfalsifiable allegations"). 
Especially excoriating was the editorial, The Gov Blunders Again, supra note 4 
(claiming the governor had been duped by the advocacy group House of Ruth and 
that the women released were dangerous criminals who belonged behind bars). But 
see Baum, Backlash, supra note 7 (quoting Maryland Parole Commissioner Paul Da-
vis, who defended Governor Schaefer's review procedure). 
54. See Richard Barbieri, Coalition's First Success Was a Mixed Victory, THE RE-
CORDER, Mar. 23, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Barbieri, Mixed Victory]; Barbieri, Push For 
Clemency, supra note 15; Barbieri, Women's Movement, supra note 46; Baum, Back-
lash, supra note 7; Boubion, supra note 16, Cooper, Deadly Defense, supra note 16; 
Cooper, Coalition Flourishing, supra note 26; Candy J. Cooper, Legal System Defeats 
State's Battered Victims, S.F. EXAM., Aug. 31, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Cooper, Legal 
System Defeats State's Battered Victims]; Candy J. Cooper, Fighting Back: Prison 
Network Forming Statewide, S.F. EXAM., Aug. 31, 1992, at A9 [hereinafter Cooper, 
Fighting Back]; Candy J. Cooper, Juror Was Tainted By Peer Pressure; Woman Ad-
mits She Should Have Stood Up to Judge, Jurors, S.F. EXAM., Aug. 31, 1992, at A9 
[hereinafter Cooper, Juror Tainted]; Patt Morrison, Legislators Listen to Women Who 
Killed; Jurisprudence: The Officials Visit a Prison for Hearings on Whether Battered 
Wives Who Murdered Their Abusive Husbands Belong Behind Bars, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 
18, 1991, at A3 [hereinafter Morrison, Legislators Listen]; Cruel and Unendurable 
Hell, S.F. EXAM., Sept. 6, 1992, at A15 (editorial calling on Governor Wilson to 
review the sentences of all twenty-one petitioners); Gross, supra note 16; Paterno, 
supra note 23. 
The Coalition has also been the subject of radio and television reporting, includ-
ing: KPIX Channel 5 News, ten o'clock news, Sept. 21, 1992; Daphne Brogden, 
KGO radio interview, Sept. 26, 1992; ABC, Good Morning America, Sept. 28, 1992; 
KPFA, You Can't Jail The Spirit, U.S. Political Prisoners, Women Who Kill in Self-
Defense, Jan. 31, 1992. 
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2. The Califorma Legislature 
A group of California legislators has also responded to the needs of 
battered women in prison. The California Assembly Women's Caucus, led 
by Jackie Speier (D-So. San Francisco), has taken a strong interest in 
battered women's issues. Members of the Women's Caucus, along with 
Assemblyman John Burton (D-San Francisco), who heads the Assembly 
-Pubfu: Safety Cllllllllillee, comhU:led a bearing at the prison in Frontera 
on September 17, 1991, to collect testimony from battered women in 
prison. 
Assembly members have expressed an interest in enacting legislation 
to reform the substantive law of self-defense. 55 The legislature has re-
formed the Evidence Code to provide for the admission at trial of bat-
tered woman syndrome expert testimony,56 has amended the clemency 
provisions of the Penal Code to allow the Board of Prison Terms to 
consider battered woman syndrome in making clemency recommendations 
to the governor,57 and has passed legislation requiring the Board of Pris-
on Terms to receive domestic violence training.58 Assembly members 
have also unsuccessfully sought to further reform the Evidence Code by 
proposing bills that would admit evidence of experiences of domestic vio-
lence victims in homicide cases. 59 One bill would require the admission 
of all relevant battering evidence.60 
In addition, Assemblyman Burton introduced a bill, later vetoed, that 
would have affected the clemency process itself.61 Finally, after a Janu-
ary 1992 meeting with the Women's Caucus, Governor Wilson agreed to 
allow inmates until April 17, 1992, to file supplemental materials and ap-
plications for clemency.62 He reportedly did so after Assemblywoman 
Speier told him, "You might as well not even bother," in response to the 
55. Morrison, Legislators Listen, supra note 54. 
56. AB 785, introduced by Jerry Eaves (D-Rialto), added section 1107 to the Evi-
dence Code. That section provides, in relevant part: 
(a) In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the 
prosecution or the defense regarding battered women's syndrome, in-
cluding the physical, emotional or mental effects upon the beliefs, 
perceptions or behavior of victims of domestic violence . . . . (b) 
Expert opinion testimony on the battered women's syndrome shall not 
be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability is unproven. 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1992). 
57. See infra notes 371-72 and accompanying text. 
58. See infra notes 378-79 and accompanying text. 
59. See infra notes 374, 386, 413 and accompanying text. 
60. See infra notes 385-86 and accompanying text. 
61. See infra notes 388-410 and accompanying text for description of proposed 
legislation. 
62. FACf SHEET, supra note 17, at 1. 
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governor's representation that the Board of Prison Terms had at its dis-
posal only the official record on which to base clemency recommenda-
tions.63 
II. SELF-DEFENSE AND 
THE BATTERED WOMAN "SYNDROME" 
NQt all kiJfu!g~~stID'e_mm!~_~d ~3~_~s DCJt_ t:eqtlire:tbat 
all killings committed in defense of self be prosecuted. The substantive 
law definitions applied in self-defense instructions should be flexible 
enough to permit battered women to explain their actions in the situations 
in which they are most likely to act to protect their own lives. This sec-
tion sets forth the requirements of the law of self-defense and examines 
the way in which these requirements may deprive a battered woman from 
prevailing on the affirmative defense. Many women are convicted despite 
credible claims of self-defense. This section examines some of the factors 
influencing the trials of battered women. Finally, I argue that battered 
woman syndrome should not be the controlling factor in determining 
whether a battered woman received a fair trial and whether she merits a 
commutation. Instead, testimony regarding other theories and explanations 
for a battered woman's reasonable self-defensive action should be admit-
ted at trial and considered in a clemency review. 
A. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE 
Generally, a homicide is classified as first- or second-degree murder 
or as voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.64 Homicides committed 
without unlawful intent may be deemed excused65 or justified.66 A suc-
cessful assertion of self-defense is a justification; it is a complete defense 
to a homicide charge and results in acquittal.67 Under ''traditional'' self-
defense law, a person who has killed another and who seeks to assert 
self-defense has the burden68 of showing that she had a reasonable fear 
63. Cooper, Deadly Defense, supra note 16. 
64. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988) (also codifying the offense of 
vehicular manslaughter); 40 AM. JUR. 2D, Homicide § 54, at 348 (1968) [hereinafter 
40 AM. JUR. 2D]. 
65. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 195 (West 1988). 
66. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 196, 197 (West 1988); WAYNE R. LAFAVE 
AND AUSTIN W. SCO'IT, JR., CluMINAL LAW § 5.7(a), at 454, § 7.1(a), at 605 
(1986); 40 AM. JUR. 2D § 110, at 405. 
67. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1988); LAFAVE AND SCO'IT, supra 
note 66, §§ 5.7 and 5.7(a), at 454-55 and § 7. 11 (a), at 665; 40 AM. JUR. 2D § 110, 
at 405. 
68. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n.28 (1975) (holding that 
even though a criminal defendant may not be assigned the burden of persuasion in 
negating an element of a crime - in that case the absence of heat of passion on a 
murder charge - he may be required to meet a burden of production on his claim). 
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that she was in imminent danger of suffering unlawful bodily hann.69 
She must have responded with only the amount of force necessary to 
counter the threatened hann;70 deadly force is sanctioned only in re-
sponse to the use or imminent use of deadly force.71 In addition, she 
must not have been the aggressor, and in some jurisdictions she must not 
have had an opportunity to retreat.72 Despite its apparently categorical 
See also Cal. Penal Code § 189.5 (a): 
Upon a trial for murder, the commission of the homicide by the de-
fendant being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitiga-
tion, or that justify or excuse [the killing], devolves upon the defen-
dant, unless the proof on the part of the prosecution tends to show 
that the crime committed only amounts to manslaughter, or that the 
defendant was justifiable [sic] or excusable [sic]; 
OillO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (A) (Baldwin 1992): " ... The burden of going 
forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense [defined as a defense involving 
an excuse or justification], and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused." 
In California the section assigning the burden of proof to defendant has been 
read to assign only the burden of producing evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable 
doubt as to the matters of excuse and justification. People v. Frye, 7 Cal. App. 4th 
1148, 1154-55 (1992). 
69. LAFAVE AND Scorr, supra note 66, § 5.7-5.7(d), at 454-59. 
The standard most jurisdictions use to assess the reasonableness of the fear is an 
objective standard. That is, ''the apprehension of danger and belief of necessity . . . 
must be . . . such as a reasonable man would, under all the circumstances, have 
entertained. 40 AM. JUR. 2D § 154, at 443. However, several states explicitly provide 
for a subjective standard. fd. at 443. See also Elizabeth Schneider and Susan B. Jor-
dan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or 
Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 149, 155 n.53 (1978), reprinted in Wo-
MEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES, THEoRY AND PRACTICE I, 16 (Elizabeth Bochnak ed., 
1981) [hereinafter Schneider and Jordan, Representation] ("In fact, the standard gener-
ally applied is an amalgam of both a subjective and objective test It includes the 
individual's perception of both apprehension and imminent danger from the 
individual's own perspective, but involves an objective view by the jury of these 
circumstances"). See also Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths 
and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 385 
(1991) ("In most jurisdictions the standard of reasonableness against which the neces-
sity of a defendant's act is measured explicitly includes consideration of the charac-
teristics and history of the defendant on trial; her acts are measured in the light of 
her own perceptions and experience"). See infra notes 98-113 and accompanying text 
for discussion of the impact of an artificially objective standard in battered women's 
homicide trials. 
70. LAFAVE AND Scorr, supra note 66, § 5.7(b), at 455. 
71. Deadly force is defined by LaFave and Scott as force ''which its user uses with 
the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury to another or which [s]he knows 
creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to the other." fd., § 5.7(a), 
at 455. 
72. The duty to retreat varies by jurisdiction. The majority rule is that a person 
need not retreat when attacked; a person may stand his or her ground and use deadly 
force to defend against impending danger of death or serious bodily harm. GnLESPIE, 
supra note 30, at 77; Maguigan, supra note 69, at 450-51; Elizabeth Schneider, Equal 
Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. 
22 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:1 
nature, the basic premise of the affmnative defense is that when an indi-
vidual has "no opportunity to resort to the law for [her] defense, [she 
may] take reasonable steps to defend [her]self from physical harm.,,73 
B. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLYING THE SELF-DEFENSE CONSTRUCT 
TO BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 
The self-defense construct may fail battered women who kill when 
the· requirements .er inifuulefice . and necessary -force are· rigidly applied74 
and when the standard for judging their actions is artificially objective.7s 
More abstruse rules, such as the duty to retreat or the co-tenant exception 
to the "castle doctrine,"76 may result in convictions in jurisdictions that 
have adopted those rules.77 
L. REv. 623, 633 (1980) [hereinafter Schneider, Equal Rights] (citing LaFave and 
Scott and stating that a substantial minority require retreat). 
73. LAFAVE AND SCOTI, supra note 66, § 5.7(a), at 454. 
74. Much has been written on the subject of the inadequacy of the self-defense 
construct and its application to battered women. Cynthia Gillespie examines the vary-
ing requirements of self-defense law and recounts numerous cases in which the law 
failed women who had defended themselves in remarkably confrontational situations. 
GILLESpm, supra note 30. Gillespie maintains that three areas of self-defense law 
operate to ensure convictions of battered women who kill: the definition of immi-
nence, the rule requiring retreat, and the requirement of "sufficiently serious harm" 
(the equal force or proportionality requirement). [d. at 50, 87. But see Maguigan, 
supra note 69, surveying over 200 reported appellate court decisions addressing the 
cases of battered women who killed husbands or lovers, asserted self-defense, and ap-
pealed claimed errors by the trial court. Maguigan concludes that most of the women 
convicted actually acted in confrontational situations, and that substantive criminal law 
definitions are, or could be, sufficient to allow battered women to prevail on self-
defense claims, but that trial judges unfairly applied these definitions, depriving wom-
en of fair trials. [d. at 385, 405, 432. 
Professor Cathryn Rosen has argued that any mistakes regarding the "existence of 
the triggering condition" (i.e. the unlawful aggression that stimulates a woman's per-
ception that she is about to suffer imminent bodily harm) must negate a justification 
defense. Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense, Correcting A Historical Ac-
cident On Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REv. II, 21 (1986). In 
addition, she argues that mistakes regarding the proportionality (i.e. the amount of 
force necessary) or the necessity itself (i.e. the imminence) must also prove fatal to a 
justification defense. [d. Instead, she advocates a return to the common law distinction 
between justification and excuse and argues that self-defense should be an excuse. 
[d. at 18. When framed as excuse, Rosen argues, the defense could lead to acquit-
tals because it "focuses on the actor's subjective perceptions," and could lead to a 
conclusion that "due to internal or external pressure, she was not morally blamewor-
thy." [d. at 22. 
75. Maguigan, supra note 69, at 412-13 (the standard used may affect whether a 
defendant gets a self-defense instruction at all, and it affects the admissibility and 
scope of "social context" evidence as well as the use of the female gender pronoun 
in jury instructions); GILLESpm, supra note 30, at 93 ("[J]urors are invited - indeed 
obligated - to substitute their judgment for hers in a situation that most of them can 
barely imagine being in and seldom understand"). 
76. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. 
77. GILLESpm, supra note 30, at 77-78, 187-88. Gillespie claims that the exception 
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Until recently, most writers analyzing and criticizing the convictions 
of battered women who kill argued that the law itself was a male pre-
rogative.78 Their claims were easily supportable; our society has con-
doned the use of force by men in situations in which women have not 
been afforded the same entitlement.79 In the mass of scholarly writing 
and media reporting that has accompanied the women's self-defense work 
moveIIleJ.l!,80n~ly_all~tics_ ~f the results inn~e~tw~lIleJ!'s cases 
assumed that the· same traOttional tegal construct that naCl allowed men to 
defend themselves was simply too narrow to account for the cases of 
battered women who kill. 81 
to the castle doctrine - an exception that requires retreat in one's own home - is 
most frequently applied in domestic violence cases. ld. at 82-83. See infra notes 139-
147 for discussion of application of retreat rules in California 
78. See id. at 78-79; Phyllis Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women 
Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 121, 126 (1985); Schneider 
and Jordan, Representation, supra note 69; Elizabeth Schneider, Describing and 
Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Bat-
tering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 198 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider, Describing 
and Changing]; WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES, supra note 69, at 43 (describing the 
construct as a "male v. male" model). But see Maguigan, supra note 69, at 385-86 
(suggesting that the construct is flexible enough in all its elements to accommodate 
the battered woman's experience but that judges unfairly interfere with the woman's 
right to present the self-defense claim to the jury). 
79. Paramour laws (by statute and case law), prevalent in the last century and earli-
er in this century, permitted a man to kill another man he caught in flagrante delicto 
with his wife, or who had committed a rape upon his daughter. See Schneider and 
Jordan, Representation, supra note 69, at 153-54; 40 AM. JUR. 2D § 123, at 415. The 
modem law is that, absent a statute, there is no recognition of a complete excuse for 
homicide, and the presence of adultery will only reduce the offense to manslaughter. 
40 AM. JUR. 2D § 123, at 415. Three states - Texas, New Mexico, and Utah -
still had such laws on their books as late as 1973. Peter Bonventre, Lucy Howard 
and Sylvester Monroe, The Right to Kill, NEWSWEEK, Sept. I, 1975, at 69. 
In addition, men have been able to use deadly force to repel forcible sodomy. 
Although women have long had a common law right to defend themselves with dead-
ly force in confrontational situations where rape was just about to be committed, the 
case of Inez Garcia illustrates the attitudes of judges and jurors in attempting to 
prevent a self-defense claim in a situation that was not immediately confrontational. 
Inez Garcia was raped by two men. They told her they would return and rape her a 
second time and knew where she lived. Inez walked into the street with a rifle to 
search for and confront the men; she found one, and when he made a movement 
toward her, she shot him. Rosen, supra note 74, at 34. At her first trial the judge 
repeatedly said, in front of the jury, "Rape has nothing to do with this homicide 
prosecution." Schneider and Jordan, Representation, supra note 69, at 155. In addition, 
a juror in her first trial, interviewed after Garcia was convicted at the trial, stated, 
"You can't kill somebody for trying to give you a good time." [d. at 154. 
80. Professor Schneider uses the term "women's self-defense work" to describe the 
movement on behalf of women "to overcome sex-bias in the law of self-defense and 
to equalize treatment of women in the courts." Schneider, Describing and Changing, 
supra note 78, at 197 n.9. The name comes from the Women's Self-Defense Law 
Project, founded in 1978 by the Center for Constitutional Rights and the National 
Jury Project. ld. at 195 n.3. 
81. See Maguigan, supra note 69, at 382-83 (asserting that nearly all writers uncrit-
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Cynthia Gillespie, drawing upon the historical development of self-de-
fense law, stated: 
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that [in England at common 
law when the defense of self-defense began to take root] all of 
these judges were male, as were the jurors and most of the crimi-
nal defendants brought before them. Their cases involved the 
sorts uof-sitnations-men--were-:apt to::get them_selYe~ inro~-1lftd· ~ 
excuses or defenses they offered were those that made sense . . . 
in terms of acceptable or understandable masculine behavior.82 
Gillespie notes that the law of self-defense, from the rough environ-
ment of medieval England to the rugged American frontier, was intended 
to apply either to the sudden violent attack, as in a robbery on a rural 
road,83 or to a barroom brawl, where two willing participants slug it out 
with mutual consent. 84 In contrast, battered women are recipients of uni-
lateral physical assaults,8S often stretched over hours and days and con-
tinued at random for years or even decades. Gillespie astounds the reader 
with stories of numerous self-defensive actions taken by battered women, 
mostly during such unilateral assaults, for which they were convicted of 
murder. 86 
She argues that both women and men must have the right to take a 
life in order to save their own lives.87 However, she argues against a 
separate law for men and women and states that we do not need laws for 
battered women separate from everyone else.88 She instead calls for eas-
ically accepted two basic and incorrect assumptions: that battered women who kill do 
so in nonconfrontational situations and that existing self-defense law is too narrow to 
result in acquittals). 
82. GILLESPIE, supra note 30, at 35. 
83. ld. at 39 ("It was this medieval world of castles and swordplay, highwaymen 
and rough and ready peasants with daggers in their belts that was reflected in the 
common law of self-defense that the English colonists brought with them to 
America"). 
84. 
Where two men ... [or two women] mutually enter a physical fight, 
there are many ways for one to signal to the other that he, or she, 
wants to de-escalate the proceedings. He can back away, smile, make 
conciliatory gestures, say he doesn't want to fight, offer to buy his 
adversary a drink and talk . . . , apologize . . . or concede. 
ld. at 78-79. See also David L. Faigman, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-
Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 U. VA. L. REv. 619, 621 (1986) 
("Typically, the term 'self-defense' conjures up images of a defender who, backed 
against a wall and facing imminent death, strikes out at the last moment to kill the 
attacker"). 
85. GILLESPIE, supra note 30, at 78. 
86. ld. at 1-30. 
87. ld. at 50, 182. 
88. ld. at 182. 
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ing the definition of imminence and incorporating a subjective element 
into the standard against which a person's actions are measured when she 
acts in self-defense.89 Gillespie also urges abandonment of the re-
quirement of equal force and the exception to the "castle doctrine."90 
Professor Holly Maguigan directly challenges whether the substantive 
law of self-defense is inadequate to render just results in the trials of bat-
tered women wllQ.kill.9\ She.~ _~ ~ ~ iIl<ked. elements. at 
tifal tliatprevent a woman from rrgettirigto the jury-..92 and that other-
wise operate to account for the seemingly unjust results93 in trials where 
women who defended themselves in confrontational situations were nev-
ertheless convicted. However, Maguigan fmds fault not with the self-
defense construct but with trial and appellate court judges who apply it 
unfairly.94 She also criticizes the lack of procedural (rather than substan-
tive or evidentiary) rules, which may deprive women of the opportunity 
to assert self-defense at all.9S Lastly, she exposes the patently incorrect 
assumption that most battered women who kill do so in 
89. Id. at 185-90. Professor Maguigan argues, based upon her empirical study, that 
each of these suggestions is already the "majority rule" in American jurisdictions. 
Maguigan, supra note 69, at 385-86. Accepting that they are, Gillespie has still illus-
trated the need for change in the minority of jurisdictions that adhere to the stricter 
interpretations of these substantive law definitions. 
90. See infra notes 134-47 and accompanying text 
91. Maguigan, supra note 69. 
92. Maguigan defines "fair trial" as "getting to the jury," which includes: 
(1) the content of the instruction on substantive criminal law defini-
tions of the elements of self-defense, (2) the admissibility of evidence 
about the context of the defendant's act and the instructions to the 
jury on the relevance of the evidence, and (3) the procedural rules 
defining the quantity and quality of evidence a defendant must pro-
duce to be entitled to a self-defense instruction. 
Id. at 406. 
93. Maguigan enumerates several such elements, including 
[T]he interplay of sex, race, and class bias in the courtroom, prevail-
ing attitudes about family violence in the community from which the 
pool of potential jurors is drawn, the quality of the lawyering on each 
side, and the resources available in the form of money, expert wit-
nesses, trial consultants, and investigators. 
Id. at 406 n.93. 
94. Id. at 432-37. 
95. Maguigan states that the rules outlining when a woman is entitled to a self-
defense instruction are ''the single most important determinant of a defendant's ability 
to get an instruction on self-defense." Id. at 439. She states that judges have enor-
mous power to make outcome-determinative decisions in cases involving battered 
women defendants; this power includes the ability to decide whether to allow the jury 
even to consider whether a woman acted in self-defense. Id. In addition, she main-
tains that appellate courts are unlikely to reverse decisions made by trial judges in 
jurisdictions where the trial judge is allowed to make credibility determinations regard-
ing the threshold evidence brought forward by the defendant Id. at 441. 
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"nonconfrontational" situations (i.e. sleeping man, or ''burning bed" kill-
ings, contract killings, and killings in which a woman was the aggressor 
after a definite lull in the violence).96 
Maguigan tests the claims that the objective standard, the definitions 
of imminence and proportionality, and the rules of retreat work to deprive 
battered women of fair trials. Instead, she finds that the majority of juris-
dictions~~ t1e~Jlefmi~ that should allow ~ed WOnren to 
present their c[afuis successfu1fY.w Theron-owing anafyslsof California 
case law considers these claims. 
C. SUBSTANTIVE LAW DEFINITIONS AND THEIR IMPACI' IN CALIFORNIA 
ON THE TRIALs OF BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 
1. The Objective Standard and Its Application to 
Battered Women Who Kill 
Because the law of self-defense imposes the requirement that a killing 
in defense of self be reasonable, a jurisdiction must apply some standard 
against which to measure the claim. Maguigan argues that the standard 
applied by the majority of jurisdictions to assess reasonableness is often a 
test combining objective and subjective features.98 She argues that this is 
so even in jurisdictions that claim they use an "objective" standard.99 
The highest courts of New York and Washington clearly stated their 
objective tests in two of the most famous cases allowing the jury to con-
sider circumstances peculiar to the defendants.loo The New York court 
96. Id. at 388-401. 
97. Id. at 385-86 
98. Id. at 409-12. 
99. Id. at 409-10. 
100. The cases were those of Bernard Goetz, the New York "subway vigilante," 
People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986), and Yvonne Wanrow, a defendant in 
an early, successful women's self-defense case, State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 
(Wash. 1977) (en banc). 
The Goetz jury was instructed with New York's two-part "objective" test, stated 
by Maguigan as follows: 
[F]irst, the jury must decide whether the defendant actually and hon-
estly believed in the necessity of using deadly defensive force; second, 
the jury must decide whether a reasonable person in the defendant's 
circumstances, including his or her history with the decedent and his 
or her perceptions, would so believe. This test is not appreciably 
different from a test characterized as "subjective" by the Supreme 
Court of Washington in State v. Wanrow. 
Maguigan, supra note 69, at 409-410 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
The "subjective" test in State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (1977), was formulated 
as follows: 
[T]he justification of self-defense is to be evaluated in light of all the 
facts and circumstances known to the defendant, including those 
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in the trial of Bernard Goetz allowed the jury to consider "the circum-
stances facing the defendant," including "any-pnor experiences- he 
had."101 The jurors were able to consider prior experiences Goetz had 
had with others, not just with the men he shot, in determining whether 
the defendant's conduct conformed to the "hypothetical reasonable per-
son."I02 Even though such a standard allows the jury to consider the 
_ facts and circlllllstances within the general ex~rience of the defendant, 
-~the jufy 18 stiH1lSkecf loU tteteriiiiiie objeeti~ely if the actiOri, gi~en those 
facts and circumstances, was reasonable. This finding requires more than 
that the defendant actually and honestly believed in the necessity of using 
self-defense, which is the "subjective" prong of New York's standard. 
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Wanrow lO3 stated clearly 
that its test was "subjective," and it took pains to state that the objective 
test "applicable to an altercation between two men" is inapplicable to 
women. I04 It stated that, "All of [the] facts and circumstances should 
have been placed before the jury, to the end that they could put them-
selves in the place of the [defendant] .... In no other way could the 
jury safely say what a reasonably prudent man similarly situated would 
have done."IOS However, such a test is still objective, because it re-
quires the jury to fmd more than that the defendant actually perceived 
danger of imminent harm. The jury must still decide if a reasonably 
prudent "man" would have so acted, but it may consider the more subjec-
tive elements of the defendant's knowledge and experience. 
The Goetz and Wanrow courts applied settled law to the cases before 
them, 106 cases whose facts required considering individual circumstances 
known substantially before the killing 
All of these facts and circumstances should have been placed before 
the jury, to the end that they could put themselves in the place of the 
[defendant], get the point of view which he had at the time of the 
tragedy, and view the conduct of the [deceased] with all its pertinent 
sidelights as the [defendant] was warranted in viewing it. 
Id. at 555-56. 
The court also held that the jury must consider the circumstances known to the 
defendant in order to "mak[e] the critical determination of the degree of force ... a 
reasonable person in the same situation ... seeing what [s]he sees and knowing 
what [s]he knows, then would believe to be necessary." Id. at 557 (citations omitted). 
101. See Maguigan, supra note 69, at 410 (emphasis added) (quoting the record from 
the trial of Bernard Goetz). 
102. Id. 
103. State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en bane). 
104. Id. at 558. 
105. Id. at 556. 
106. See id. at 555 ("[T]he jury ... was directed to consider only those acts and 
circumstances occurring 'at or immediately before the killing ... ' This is not now, 
and never has been, the law of self-defense in Washington"); Goetz, 497 N.E.2d, at 
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in order to determine accurately, and therefore fairly, how the "hypotheti-
cal reasonable person" would have acted. Such tests are neither subjec-
tive, nor are they the absolutely objective, traditional reasonable man test. 
Maguigan argues that such hybrid tests are employed in the majority of 
jurisdictions.!07 In order to assess fairly whether a battered woman's act 
of killing was reasonable a jury can - and should be permitted to -
judge her acticln "o~tively," while still taking into account the full set 
of crrclIffiSfilnces lrnown -miler, itiCiudingtbe -history of abuse.u.-
In California, "perfect self-defense requires both subjective honesty 
and objective reasonableness and completely exonerates the accused. 
Imperfect self-defense requires only subjective honesty and negates malice 
aforethought, reducing the homicide to voluntary manslaughter."H19 The 
objectively reasonable prong requires considering whether a "reasonable 
person in the same circumstances would have had the same perception 
and done the same.""0 Despite the words "in the same circumstances," 
California's test has been read narrowly. The defendant in People v. Aris 
is one of the California petitioners. Her case, along with that of Valoree 
Day,!l1 confmns that California's objective test is not like those of New 
York and Washington and does not take the full set of circumstances 
known to the defendant into account when determining if her fear of 
imminent harm is reasonable. Instead, only the circumstances as they ap-
peared to the reasonable person, or to the court, will be considered. 
The Day court cited Aris with approval for the proposition that bat-
tered woman syndrome is not relevant to show objective reasonable-
ness. 112 However, in two separate parts of the discussion following that 
holding the court stated that battered woman syndrome was necessary to 
allow the jury to objectively analyze a battered woman's claim of self-de-
52 ("[An argument that an objective element precludes a jury from considering prior 
experiences] falsely presupposes that an objective standard means that the background 
and other relevant characteristics of a particular actor must be ignored. To the con-
trary, we have frequently noted that a determination of reasonableness must be based 
on the 'circumstances' facing a defendant or his ·situation .... (citations omitted». 
107. Maguigan, supra note 69, at 409. 
108. Rosen maintains that "[the] theory of individualization, as applied by feminists 
to self-defense, is nothing more than a subjective standard of reasonableness." Rosen, 
supra note 74, at 32 n.121. She says the subjective test is one that asks, "Would a 
reasonable person in defendant's circumstances have believed the [threatened] force 
was ... necessary and immediate?" ld. This is the same test that New York and 
California call objective, although each applies it differently. 
109. People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1186 (1989). 
110. ld. (emphasis added). See also 20 CAL. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 302, at 455 
(1985) [hereinafter 20 CAL. JUR. 2D] (the conduct of the deceased must have been 
such as would be likely to produce a fear of death or serious bodily injury in a 
reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances). 
111. People v. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405 (1992). 
112. ld. at 414. 
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fense when deciding upon issues other than whether her fear was reason-
able.1l3 It is not a far step to instruct a jury that it may consider bat-
tered woman syndrome evidence (or evidence of a history of battering) 
when deciding whether a woman had a reasonable fear of imminent 
harm. Indeed, such an instruction would be mandated by logic and com-
mon sense. 
2. Dttes lrmninent Mean Imminent, or Does it Mean Immediate? 
Maguigan also found that the definition of "imminence" used by the 
majority of jurisdictions permits the jury to consider all the circumstanc-
es, including past events, surrounding the defendant's action."4 This 
broader definition allows the jury to make a fairer appraisal of the con-
text of the woman's action. The other definition of imminence, correctly 
recognized as an immediacy rather than an imminence requirement, 115 
restricts the jury's focus on the defendant's act to "the particular instant 
of the defendant's action.,,116 
The choice of definition makes a powerful difference, as illustrated 
by the case of California petitioner, Brenda AriS.ll7 The jury deliberated 
about whether Aris was in imminent danger. One juror, Cheryl 
McGlocklin, felt that "imminent" meant "something you feared, such as 
when the weatherman says a tornado is sighted .... It doesn't mean the 
tornado is going to hit where you are, but the newscast says you're in 
imminent danger." 118 The judge disagreed. When the jury asked for 
113. [d. at 416 (it would have "assisted the jury in objectively analyzing Appellant'S 
claim of self-defense by dispelling many commonly held misconceptions about bat-
tered women [that] a prosecutor may exploit in arguing to the jury"), 419 ("Frequent-
ly, conduct appears unreasonable to those who have not been exposed to the same 
circumstances. Fortunately, most people are not ... abused. It is only natural that 
people might speculate as to how they would react and yet be totally wrong about 
how most people in fact react"). 
114. Maguigan, supra note 69, at 449. 
115. Maguigan states that the various state courts are not consistent in their defi-
nitions of imminence and immediacy. Maguigan, supra note 69, at 414 n.119. Some 
states, such as California, use the word "imminent," when in fact the test focuses on 
immediacy. 
Gillespie suggests changing the self-defense construct to allow a more flexible in-
terpretation of imminence that includes "eas[ing] a bit ... [the] present interpretation 
by most courts as meaning 'immediate.'" GILLESPffi, supra note 30, at 185. She sug-
gests that judges could easily define the term for juries in a way "that distinguishes 
it from 'immediate' and allows a broader time frame than the usual strict definition." 
[d. at 187. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "imminent" as "[i]mpending threat-
eningly, hanging over one's head; ready to befall or overtake one; close at hand in 
its incidence; coming on shortly." OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 685 (2d ed. 1989). 
116. Maguigan, supra note 69, at 414. 
117. People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1184-85 (1989). See supra notes 38-40 
and accompanying text. 
118. Cooper, Juror Tainted, supra note 54. 
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clarification of the term, it became clear to the judge that several of the 
jurors haa· consulted dictionaries to discern the meaning of tile word 
"imminent." According to McGlocklin, the judge glared at her and asked 
her, "Did you look up the word imminent in the dictionary? Didn't I 
instruct you not to do any research on your own?,,119 She said she saw 
the judge "run down the main hall and return with a Webster [sic] dictio-
nary.,,)20 The judge then polled the jurors individually, and McGlocklin 
proimSCd to abide &y- llie jUdge' ~iBSWctiOB:-----m---~ the jury en 
the legal meaning of the term, according to McGlocklin, as "immediately, 
staring you in the face, without a doubt it's going to happen right 
now.,,121 She felt that "once he gave us his definition it was no longer a 
jury case; he decided the case."I22 Aris was convicted of second-degree 
murder. McGlocklin, one other juror, and defense counsel were all in 
tears when the verdict was read, and a male juror was slumped down in 
his seat with his hand over his face. Other jurors who had had doubts 
gave in once McGlocklin did. 123 
The appellate court stated that its decision on Aris' s claim of error re-
garding the trial court's instruction on imminence "also affects our ruling 
on the trial court's refusal to instruct on perfect self-defense and the 
harmlessness of the exclusion of the expert testimony."I24 The issue 
was therefore extremely important (and the denial fatal) to the 
defendant's ability to receive instructions on "perfect" self-defense, the 
only justification resulting in complete acquittal. The defendant was enti-
tled only to prove "imperfect" self-defense, that she acted with an honest 
but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. However, the jud-
ge's instruction imposed the strict imminence definition upon that defense 
as well. Once the jury determined that Aris did not act in fear of "imme-
diate" harm, they convicted her of second-degree murder. 
In its opinion, the appellate court stated that it agreed with ''the 
judge's scholarly review of the leading cases,")2S and went on to dis-
cuss "the immediacy of the imminence requirement in California.,,'26 It 
119. [d. 
120. [d. 
121. /d. The instruction given was: 
Imminent peril . . . means that the peril must have existed or ap-
peared to the defendant to have existed at the very time the fatal shot 
was fired. . . . [T]he peril must appear to the defendant as immediate 
and present and not prospective or even in the near future. An immi-
nent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with. 
People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1187 (1989). 
122. Cooper, Juror Tainted, supra note 54. 
123. [d. 
124. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d, at 1186. 
125. [d. at 1187. 
126. [d. at 1188. 
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cited two cases from the late 1800s and a case from the earlier part of 
this century that spoke of the right to self-defense in the very manly 
situations that self-defense law was developed to address.127 The court 
went on to say that this deflnition of imminence reflects "the great value 
our society places on human life." The court analogized Aris's action to 
imposing the death penalty on the abuserl28 and stated that the law 
would "not even partially excuse [her action] unless more than merely 
tnreatS-aoo:-a-hlstory· oFpast·aSsawtS·{wereT·HfjOl'le<tnt29 
The trial and appellate courts relied on California precedent drafting 
and approving of the instruction on imminence. Yet the deflnition of 
imminence is nothing more than a judge-made rule of common lawl30 
reflecting a policy determination regarding the right of self-defense. 131 
The appellate court interpreted the requirements of self-defense as rules to 
ensure the protection of the life of the batterer (in Aris's case a man who 
had beat her continuously and severely for over ten years).132 The court 
127. The court cited People v. Scoggins, 37 Cal. 676, 683-84 (1869): 
A person whose life has been threatened by another . . . may rea-
sonable infer, when a hostile meeting occurs, that his adversary in-
tends to carry his threats into execution . . . . The philosophy of the 
law on this point is sufficiently plain. A previous threat alone, and 
unaccompanied by any immediate demonstration of force at the time 
of the rencounter [sic], will not justify or excuse an assault, because it 
may be that the party making the threat has relented or abandoned his 
purpose, or his courage may have failed, or the threat may have been 
only idle gasconde, [sic] made without any purpose to execute it. 
Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d, at 1187-88. 
128. 
The criminal law would not sentence to death a person such as the 
victim in this case for a murder he merely threatened to commit . . . 
it follows that the criminal law will not even partially excuse a p0-
tential victim's slaying of [him] unless more than merely threats and a 
history of past abuse is involved. 
Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d, at 1188. 
129. Id. 
130. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Fonnalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation 
of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179 (1987) (comparing a 
judge's latitude to make policy considerations in interpreting common law rules with 
his or her strict duty to dispatch legislative intent in interpreting statutes). 
Posner argues that common law is a collection of concepts, such as negligence, 
good faith, etc., that serve as major premises, with the facts of the case supplying the 
minor premises. Id. at 182. He states, "Obviously, the choice of premises is critical, 
and that is where public policy comes in." Id. He argues that treating major premis-
es (i.e. rules of common law) as "self-evident" has led to inefficient decisions by 
legal formalists who were "uncritical of [their] premises." Id. at 182-84. 
131. See ill. at 182 (''The reason [to apply common law principles] has to be trace-
able to some notion of policy rather than just be the result of arbitrary personal pref-
erences . . . or some other thoroughly discredited ground of judicial action"). 
132. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d, at 1189 ("[B]atterers of women, even though they de-
serve punishment for their acts of battery, nevertheless are entitled to the same pro-
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wrote that the defendant should not be excused when she could have 
moved out of the state to live with her aunt or left her abusive husband 
and refused to take him back. 133 Aris had repeatedly left her husband 
and returned to him for a variety of reasons, some involving threats 
against the lives of herself and her family. The court should have rec-
ognized that the policy behind self-defense is also to protect the life of 
~~ \\'110 _has_ a ~~ollab~ fear ()f death or serious bodily injury. It 
niaythefihave Deefi morewmmglO-coDsider timt-ttre califoIDia llniiredI-
acy requirement may be inadequate to render justice in cases where a bat-
tered woman, because of the history of abuse, reasonably perceives vio-
lence that is not immediate but is nonetheless imminent. 
3. The Rule of Equal Force in California 
Maguigan maintains that the rule of "equal," "like," or "proportional" 
force does not exist. 134 Instead, she argues that the overwhelming ma-
jority of jurisdictions do not prohibit resort to a weapon against an un-
armed aggressor. The majority rule - for male and female defendants -
is that the force must be reasonably necessary to repel the threatened dan-
ger. 13S In California, the rule is reasonable force, defined as "only so 
much force as is necessary to repel the attacker"I36 and the amount of 
force a "reasonable person would employ under similar circumstanc-
es.,,137 
4. The Duty to Retreat and Exceptions to the Castle Doctrine 
In some jurisdictions the victim of an actual or imminent attack must 
retreat to a position of safety, if possible. If the attack continues after 
tection of their lives by the law that is afforded to everyone else . . . . The law 
cannot allow her to shoot her husband instead of, as was the case here, inconvenienc-
ing her out-of-state aunt by moving in with her or leaving her husband and fIrmly 
refusing to take him back"). 
133. [d. 
134. Maguigan, supra note 69, at 417-19 (the "overwhelming majority of 
jurisdictions . . . does not prohibit resort to a weapon against an unarmed aggres-
sor"). Gillespie recounts several disturbing cases in which the rule of equal force was 
apparently applied to convict women who fought back using weapons against unarmed 
assailants. Gll..LESpm, supra note 30, at 51-67. See also id. at 185 (Gillespie suggests 
abandoning the equal force rule yet notes that it is "already on its way out"). See 
also supra note 74, discussing, inter alia, the perception that the rule of proportional 
force presents difficulties in applying the traditional construct to battered women's 
cases. 
135. Maguigan, supra note 69, at 418-19. Maguigan stated that the proportional force 
rule was an issue on appeal in "only" ten percent of the cases analyzed in her study, 
and half of those were affirmed because "courts found that excessive force was mani-
fested by the woman's continued use of the weapon once the decedent was disabled." 
[d. at 419. 
136. 20 CAL. JUR. 2D § 306, at 459. 
137. [d. 
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such a retreat, the victim may employ deadly force in self-defense. The 
majority of American jurisdictions do not impose upon a victim a duty to 
retreat before employing deadly force in self-defense.138 Even in those 
jurisdictions that do impose a duty of retreat, the "castle doctrine" re-
lieves a person of that duty when he or she is attacked in his or her own 
home. 139 Gillespie notes, however, that in the single instance in which 
women most need to defend themselves (in the home against an abusive 
mate), courts in some jmisdictions haVe fashioned an exception to the 
castle doctrine. These courts hold that a woman must retreat when at-
tacked in her own home by a co-tenant. 140 In addition, some courts 
have held that there is also a duty to retreat even if the person is not a 
tenant but has been invited or has implied permission to come and 
gO.141 
Maguigan reports that in retreat jurisdictions most courts apply the 
castle doctrine to eliminate the duty to retreat when defendants are at-
tacked in their own homes. She states that some retreat jurisdictions do 
not apply the castle doctrine when the attack was by a cohabitant, but 
that the duty to retreat arose in "only a minority" (twelve percent) of bat-
tered women's cases on appeal.142 It is debatable whether more than ten 
percent of battered women's cases (that reach trial and appeal) is a "mi-
nority" worth discarding. If estimates are correct on the number of bat-
tered women who kill in self-defense each year, even twelve percent is an 
appreciable number. Legislatures should remove this "absurd and totally 
irrelevant question of who had a right to be on the premises" and instead 
consider whether a woman "was in fact trying to defend herself."143 
However, in California a person need not ever retreat when attacked 
with deadly force. She may not only stand her ground,l44 she may even, 
when necessary to secure life or freedom from great bodily injury, pursue 
the attacker. 145 From that follows the rule that a person is never under a 
duty to retreat out of her house to avoid violence, even when a retreat 
might safely be made. l46 
It is important to note that Maguigan' s empirical research identified 
the flexibility of the substantive law definitions in the majority of juris-
dictions, not all. Such flexibility fails to help women who happen to de-
fend themselves in a jurisdiction that lacks one or several of the more ac-
138. See supra note 72. 
139. GILLESPIE, supra note 30, at 82, 187-88. 
140. Id. at 83-84, 187-88. 
141. Id. at 84-85. 
142. Maguigan, supra note 69, at 386, 419-20. 
143. GILLESPIE, supra note 30, at 87. 
144. 20 CAL. JUR. 20 § 310, at 454. 
145. Id. § 312, at 466-67. 
146. Id. § 311, at 466. 
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commodating definitions. This is evident from the California Day and 
Aris cases, where the strict objective test and the strict deftnition of im-
minence both operated to ensure conviction. 147 Maguigan notes that 
states with combinations of a strict objectivity test and an immediacy 
requirement, such as California's, also have the highest threshold require-
ments that battered women defendants must meet iIi introducing social 
---eonte~t evidence of battering at an. which she notes operates_~tly 
-as substantive law definitions ana instructions in-preventing battered 
women from receiving a fair trial. l48 Valoree Day defended herself in a 
situation that was not only confrontational but was truly terrifying.149 In 
Brenda Aris's case, several members of the jury would have acquitted 
her, or at least would have found on a lesser charge, with a true defIni-
tion of imminence, rather than immediacy. ISO Until all jurisdictions rec-
ognize that the more flexible definitions are within the law, and until the 
courts or legislatures in every jurisdiction mandate application of the 
"majority" rules, battered women will continue to be convicted at unfair 
trials, reaffirming the traditional self-defense construct as "a law for 
men."1SI In many cases in which women fight back in extremely con-
frontational situations, juries will continue to convict women of murder or 
manslaughter. Because of the trial judge's discretion and misapplication 
of the legal construct, battered women will continue to undergo unfair 
trials. Lastly, there are factors unrelated to substantive criminal law deft-
nitions that prejudice the trials of battered women who kill.IS2 It is be-
yond the ability of legislators and judges to correct these biases, even if 
they defme the law more fairly. For all these reasons, executive clemency 
continues to be a forum of last resort - a necessary forum in which a 
battered woman can still argue the merits of her defensive action. 
D. SOCIAL AND POLmCAL FACfORS AND THEIR IMPACf IN CALIFORNIA 
ON TIlE TRIALS OF BATIERED WOMEN WHO KILL 
A district attorney has discretion to decide whether, and at what level, 
to charge a woman who has killed her alleged batterer; a district attorney 
can decline to bring any charges when the killing is justified. The fact 
that a killing has occurred does not make the act a murder. Since murder 
147. See supra notes 109-13, 117-33 and accompanying text. 
148. Maguigan, supra note 69, at 415 n.123. 
149. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405 (1992). 
150. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text. 
151. See GILLESPIE, supra note 30, at 31-49 (surveying the development of the de-
fense of self-defense and concluding that the American law of self-defense adopted 
from England retained the "sudden attack" and ''fight between equals" rationales that 
appear to serve men well). 
152. See supra note 93. 
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is defined as killing with malice aforethought, m the decision to prose-
cute a woman for murder is both a discretionary evaluation and a prelimi-
nary legal conclusion that she acted with that intent. 
District attorneys may base their decisions on an unreasonable fear 
that deciding not to prosecute will lead to an unprecedented rash of hus-
band-killing. For instance, prosecutors assailed the granting of clemencies 
in9hio~ __ ~1aJl4 ~bestowffig JL "licegse !2 kill.: I54 ]:>ellPis 
Walkins, TnnhoUlrCounty-proseciltor·aiidpreslaenl of The Ohio Prosecut-
ing Attorneys' Association, feared that, "Now, instead of going to the 
courts or getting a divorce, these women will think, 'Maybe I'll kill him.' 
Taking a human life is not something we want to promote."1SS 
Prosecutors are presented with the same difficulties that the male self-
defense construct poses for others. They distrust a woman's assertion of 
self-defense when they believe her fear of death or bodily harm is not 
sufficiently imminent. "Sleeping man" cases are especially subject to such 
skepticism. Michael Sweet, executive director of the 2,500-member Cali-
fornia District Attorneys Association, has said, "If she kills him in his 
sleep, did this woman really have reason to fear for her life at that mo-
ment? If she's so convinced he's going to kill her, why doesn't she 
leave?"ls6 Ohio prosecutor Watkins stated, ''When the victim is killed 
while he is sleeping, battering is not a proper self-defense claim. Our 
concern is that in the future we're going to get a lot of women claiming 
to be battered. In our view, it is not a proper defense to murder."JS7 
As a result, prosecutors are likely to bring charges even when they 
believe the equities favor a reduced sentence. Suffolk County, New York, 
district attorney James M. Catterson, Jr., stated, "When you have a life 
taken, there has to be some punishment. But it may be punishment with 
sensitivity and understanding."ls8 Even such a well-intentioned view ig-
nores the fact that when a life has been taken in self-defense, punishment 
should not be meted out, even punishment "with sensitivity and under-
standing." 
People react to the cases in which the batterer is sleeping with such 
categorical statements. Although it may still be reasonable for a battered 
153. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988). 
154. See, e.g., Wilkerson, Clemency Granted to 25, supra note 9 (quoting Dennis 
Watkins, president of the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association). 
155. Ill. 
156. Boubion, supra note 16. An Alameda County district attorney believes it was 
proper to prosecute Harriette Davis, a battered woman, because he believed she was 
not in "imminent danger at the time of the shooting." Barbieri, Push for Clemency, 
supra note 15. 
157. Ill. 
158. Michael Slackman, Guilty of Killing, She Got Lenience; 1st U Case Allowing 
"Battered" Syndrome, NEWSDAY, Dec. 12, 1991, at 3. 
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women to kill a batterer when he is sleeping, depending upon the cir-
cumstances as they appear to her, most women who kill batterers do not 
kill them while they are sleeping.1S9 The tendency to generalize with 
such statements evinces a bias against self-defense in situations in which 
women kill abusive husbands. 
In addition, some district attorneys will manipulate social stereotypes 
and myths-in ~ tG- -get a conviction. Tonnderstand how easy it is to 
win convictions in these cases, one only need read-the facts of sevefaI 
cases and see the resulting verdicts of OOt- and second-degree murder. 
One prosecutor, during the trial of a seventy-two-year-old battered woman 
(one of the California petitioners, now seventy-seven), portrayed the 
woman as the abuser. She had been abused severely for more than five 
decades. Because of her tough and abrasive demeanor, and the fact that 
her anger was palpable during testimony, the jury did not believe she 
would have accepted more than fifty years of abuse. In that case, the 
prosecutor turned the myth that all battered women are docile to his 
advantage. l60 She was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing 
her husband. She stated that he appeared to be going for a gun kept 
under the bed, which she had just knocked out of his hand. 161 He had 
threatened to kill her, and she stabbed him during a confrontation - that 
is, during a battering incident. She had repeatedly left her husband over 
the course of five decades of marriage, returning out of fear, love, and 
because she was a devout Catholic who did not believe in divorce. 162 
Prosecutors may also try to discredit histories of abuse that come in 
during trial. Despite the fact that police found one of the California peti-
tioners bruised, scratched, and with her false teeth missing, Michael 
Przytulski, a San Diego prosecutor, tried to establish at trial that her 
bruises came from a car accident, that she removed her teeth herself, and 
that the fresh scratches on her back "could have been self-inflicted."163 
One prosecutor, in a case in which there was a history of abuse and four 
court orders enjoining a husband from confronting his wife, argued that 
the killing was premeditated because four months before the killing the 
woman had bought the gun with which she defended herself.l64 
Jurors and courts are also susceptible to arguments that blame the 
woman. 16S In the Dayl66 case the prosecutor tried to portray the de-
159. See supra note 96 and accompanying text 
160. Cooper, Legal System Defeats State's Battered Victims, supra note 54. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. See Paterno, Legacy of Violence, supra note 23. 
164. Laura A. Kiernan, Battered Women Use Their Fear as a Defense, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 16, 1988, at N1. 
165. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. 
166. People v. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405 (1992). 
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fendant as the aggressor, stating that "it's Valoree and Steve in the ring 
again.,,167 He also argued that, "[iJf it had been that bad, if she was re-
ally the innocent victim, if she didn't want any part of this, if it wasn't 
mutual, she could have easily left."I68 
Prosecutors may also decide to bring charges when cases are ''winna-
ble."I69 Whether a case based largely on circumstantial evidence is win-
nable ~eperu!son\Vhe~_ajlf~lltor C!lJl ma.lre the ~Ilds. Qf ar~~ 
described iIllhetwo California petitionefS~ cases and in the Day case. 
Since many of the killings occur when only the batterer and defendant 
are present, at home, and at night, 170 witnesses are rare; thus, many cas-
es are entirely circumstantial. Yet prosecutors charge many women who 
kill batterers with first- or second-degree murder, the stiffest charges, sug-
gesting a confidence that they can win a conviction.171 Such prosecuto-
rial zeal - ostensibly on behalf of "the people" - suggests that it is 
necessary to educate prosecutors on domestic violence issues or to en-
courage some kind of scrutiny over charges filed against battered women. 
Advocates for battered women are wary, though, of alienating district 
attorneys. In other contexts they seek to form an alliance, such as in 
urging the prosecution of men who batter women and the vigorous en-
forcement of men who violate restraining orders. California prosecutor 
Sweet admits that prosecutors embrace some aspects of battered woman 
syndrome when prosecuting a batterer but challenge the syndrome when 
it aids a woman defendant.172 In addition, as battered women's support 
groups become more active and society becomes more responsive to the 
widespread problem of violence against women, the hope is that battered 
women and batterers will get the protection and help they need.173 With 
the proper kind of information, the case histories of horrific beatings we 
see today will be avoided or stopped in their inception. Finally, a number 
of plea bargains offered to battered women who kill may be motivated by 
a desire to not prosecute at higher levels. Many such plea offers are 
167. [d. at 416. 
168. [d. 
169. See GILLESPIE, supra note 30, at 19, 205. 
170. [d. at 79-80, 213. 
171. See id. at 205 (quoting Dr. Lenore Walker in stating that in all but one of the 
ninety-six cases in which she had testified, the defendant was charged with first de-
gree murder). See also ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BAlTERED WOMEN KILL 11 (1987) 
(according to FBI statistics, women are more likely to be charged with first- or sec-
ond-degree murder for killing men than are men who kill women). 
172. Boubion, supra note 16. 
173. See Sheryl Y. McCarthy, Domestic Violence: A Common Tragedy, MOUNT 
HOLYOKE ALUMNAE Q., Winter 1991, at 7 (reporting that increased public awareness 
has resulted in more progressive state laws to protect women and reporting the one-
million-dollar judgment that Sandra Firth, an Idaho woman, received against her 
batterer of ten years). 
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accepted. 174 
Beyond the attitudes of prosecutors, which reflect both political and 
social undercurrents influencing battered women's cases, the jurors at a 
trial also have social biases. A potent social force exerted on the trial 
process is denial - by the judge, jurors, and prosecutors. The denial may 
be individual, as when battered women in the trial process do not identify 
. with -the defendant or it may--.be..a cultural deni.al ot the level of violence 
against women in our socIety. t1S TrnOifional notions of appropriate rote 
behavior and the complacent acceptance of violence against women can 
influence how the jury and judge view the incidents that are admitted at 
trial. 176 
Probably the most disturbing social phenomenon is the lack of pro-
tection and support that battered women have received.177 The irony of 
this abandonment is highlighted when the jury asks the question, legally 
irrelevant to a self-defense claim in California, "Why didn't she leave?" 
One notable example of the older attitude of police handling of domestic 
violence incidents involves the case of Roxanne Gay, widow of Philadel-
phia Eagles defensive lineman Blanda Gay. She stabbed him to death in 
December of 1976, after a long history of abuse. Reports show she called 
police on several occasions, but police merely asked her husband to walk 
around the block to cool off - and on one occasion ended up talking 
about football with him.178 
174. Many women charged with killing abusive partners choose to plead guilty to a 
lesser charge, either because of naivete or the desire to get the process over with as 
soon as possible, or the battered woman's state of mind at the time. HLS MANuAL, 
supra note 43, at 149 (citing a study of battered women incarcerated at the Ohio 
Reformatory for Women, and BROWNE, supra note 171, at 163). A vast majority of 
women (seventy-two to eighty percent) are either convicted at trial or plea-bargain. 
Clemency for Battered Women, DoUBLE-TIME, supra note 9, at l. Accord Jane O. 
Hansen, System Often Rebuffs Women, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 26, 1992, at Al (citing 
Georgia Commission on Gender Bias in the Judicial System study, prepared for Geor-
gia Supreme Court, which found that although women rarely strike back against abus-
ers, when they do kill their batterers eighty percent are convicted of or plea bargain 
to charges of murder or manslaughter). 
175. See Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining The Issue 
Of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. I, 10-19 (1991). 
176. See Susan E. Eisenberg and Patricia L. Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 
22" Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 138, 138 (1977) [hereinafter Eisenberg and 
Micklow, Catch-22] ("[a] serious acknowledgement that wife-beating exists challenges 
the institution of marriage and intrudes on societal notions of privacy"). 
177. See generally, DEL MARTIN, BATIERED WIVES (1976); Eisenberg and Micklow, 
Catch-22, supra note 176 (providing full historical review of the right to punish a 
wife and surveying the modern reluctance of society to protect battered women and to 
recognize the widespread problem of wife abuse); Schneider and Jordan, Representa-
tion, supra note 69, at 15l. 
178. Jerrold K. Footlick and Elaine Sciolino, Wives Who Batter Back, NEWSWEEK, 
Jan. 30, 1978, at 54; Myra Macpherson and Jane Freundel, Wives Accused in Slaying 
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A study sponsored by the Justice Department's National Institute of 
Justice, conducted in Minneapolis in 1981-82, was the nation's "first 
controlled experiment in the use of arrest [to alleviate domestic violence 
disputes]." The study found that violence is twice as likely to recur in 
households where police try to mediate a dispute than where a suspected 
attacker is arrested. 179 Then-police chief Anthony Bouza of Minneapolis 
attributed traditional reluctance to arrest batterers to the absence of legis-
la60ri fuat-wOuld allOw office.IsiU~nnSdelIreallor arrests -Without 
having witnessed the event. lSO Other studies have also confIrmed that 
arresting a batterer following an abusive act dramatically reduces the 
frequency of abuse. 181 In addition, since police have started enforcing 
tougher policies on domestic violence and since shelters and other refuges 
have been available, the rate of women killing their partners may be de-
creasing. 182 
Until society responds adequately to the desperate situations of bat-
tered women, the killing of women by battering husbands will continue. 
Women will continue to defend themselves against the violent onslaughts 
experienced at home. Prosecutors who fail to understand battered 
women's actions as reasonable will continue to prosecute and to twist sto-
ries to win convictions. Defense counsel for battered women must contin-
ue to bring battering histories before the judge and jury at trial to show 
their clients' actions were reasonable. Until the legislative and judicial 
equalization of self-defense law is achieved, and until battered women 
receive the intervention they deserve, executive clemency continues to be 
a necessary forum for achieving justice in our system. 
E. RETIllNKING THE BATIERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
Lenore Walkerl83 should be lauded for her hard work in bringing 
the experiences of battered women defendants into the courtroom. Her re-
search and advocacy, along with the drama of the cases in which expert 
opinion testimony has been presented, have spurred considerable legal 
Turning to Self-Defense Pleas; Battered Wives and Self-Defense Pleas, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 4, 1977, at AI. 
179. Arrest May Be Dete"ent in Domestic Violence, Study Shows, N.Y. TIMEs, May 
30, 1984, at C4. 
180. Id. 
181. See NATIONAL WOMAN ABUSE PREvENTION FRomer, The Criminal Justice 
System's Response to Domestic Violence, in DoMESTIC VIOLENCE FACT SHEETS (Mar. 
1992) (Bureau of Justice statistics indicate arrest reduces future abuse by as much as 
sixty-two percent). 
182. See Grossfeld, "Safer" and In Jail, supra note 32 (reporting that such killings 
are down twenty-five percent, citing testimony of psychologist Angela Browne before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Dec. 1990). 
183. See infra notes 190-203 and accompanying text for description of Walker's re-
search in exploring and defining the battered woman syndrome. 
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research and commentary .184 Media attention has focused the public on 
the issues surrounding the conditions under which battered women kill 
when they act in self-defense. The movement seeking to introduce bat-
tered woman syndrome testimony and the ensuing dialogue over its use 
have spurred law reform efforts, public debate, and the clemency move-
ments now underway in many states to release battered women from 
prison. Yet this energy may best be utilized to achieve changes in self-de-
fense law that do Dot stress lielplessness.·1'his seCtion 5ets fefth some 
theories that may prove more effective in showing that a battered 
woman's action was reasonable and in dispelling the various myths and 
inaccuracies inherent in the public discourse over battered women who 
kill. 
1. The Expanding Syndrome 
Courts, legislators, and journalists repeatedly lump nearly all aspects 
of a battered woman's psychology and experience together and call the 
resulting "package,,18S the battered woman syndrome. l86 It is impor-
tant to be specific, however, when discussing the syndrome. It is only 
one of many possible approaches that can explain why a woman's self-
defensive action is reasonable. It should not be confused with the com-
bination of social and economic pressures and emotions that operate to 
184. See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 196 n.5 (listing 
dozens of scholarly publications treating women's self-defense issues, many examining 
and applying the battered woman syndrome). See also Sharon Allard, Rethinking Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S LJ. 191 
(1991); Rocco C. Cipparone, Jr., The Defense of Battered Women Who Kill, 135 U. 
PENN. L. REv. 427 (1987); Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense 
Claims, 67 OR. L. REv. 393 (1988); Maguigan, supra note 69; Mahoney, supra note 
175; Victoria Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome. 
Self-Defense. and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REv. 545 (1988); David McCord, 
Syndromes, Profiles. and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility 
of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REv. 19 
(1987), Rosen, supra note 74; Jill S. Talbot, Is "Psychological Self-Defense" a Solu-
tion to the Problem of Defending Battered Women Who Kill?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. 
REv. 1527 (1988). 
Maguigan was prompted by the assumptions underlying the scholarly commentary 
on battered woman syndrome and women's self-defense work to conduct a research 
project and empirical analysis lasting over two years and surveying and tabulating 
over 200 cases and numerous articles. See Maguigan, supra note 69. 
185. Crocker, supra note 78, at 150 (stating that the battered woman syndrome ste-
reotype treats the information within the battered woman syndrome as "a package to 
be bought or not, rather than as evidence about the defendant's reasonableness"). 
186. See supra note 26 (reporters' inaccurate account of California Coalition's accep-
tance of petitioners' cases, stating they accepted them because they met the require-
ments of the ''battered woman syndrome"). Even Elizabeth Schneider states, "Battered 
Woman Syndrome can also include a description of the psychological impact of the 
common social and economic problems which battered women face." Schneider, De-
scribing and Changing, supra note 78, at 202-03. 
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keep a woman in a harmful relationship. Or at the least, if experts are 
relying on psychological and non-psychological evidence together, they 
should clearly state which behavior is consistent with the battered woman 
syndrome as a psychological behavioral model, and which behavior is 
simply consistent with the experience of many battered and non-battered 
women. 
Nearly every type of expert testimony on battered women - includ-
ing opiniolls -aiRt-tIieui1ei thafilO- nOi- rely umi tlitdlattered womansyn-
drome research of Lenore Walker - has been confused with the original 
battered woman syndrome theory, so that practically all explanations for a 
battered woman's behavior, whether social, economic, psychological, or 
affective in nature, are suddenly "syndromic." This creates confusion and 
is an unprincipled use of the battered woman syndrome "label." One 
harmful effect of this mislabeling may be the exclusion of non-psycho-
logical evidence when a judge rules that no information on the "syn-
drome" will be admitted,181 thus excluding expert testimony on other 
factors that would explain the woman's acts as reasonable. 
This section seeks to alert clemency advocates and others to the pos-
sible limitations of using (or overstressing) expert testimony on battered 
woman syndrome in the preparation of petitions for clemency. Obviously, 
each case is different, and some facts fit the model well while others do 
not establish the "syndrome" as a viable explanation for a woman's 
self-defensive acts. Clemency decisions are inherently discretionary and 
judgmental, and not usually subject to judicial or legislative review.188 
A determination that a woman does not suffer from the battered woman 
syndrome's characteristic "helplessness" and "passivity" could result in 
denial of her petition for pardon or commutation if the decision-maker 
has been conditioned to look for tell-tale signs of battered woman syn-
drome. 
In addition, California courts must now admit relevant expert opinion 
testimony on battered woman syndrome by statute, at least in criminal 
trialS. I89 The California clemency effort - and others across the coun-
try - should not be seen as a "one-shot" effort to cure unjust results per-
ceived to have occurred only because a woman did not introduce expert 
opinion testimony on the battered woman syndrome at trial. Clemency in 
battered women's cases should be used as long as necessary to correct 
unjust results when battered women who kill abusers are convicted de-
spite the fact that they acted in self-defense. 
187. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text. 
188. See infra notes 333-34, 350-58 and accompanying text for discussion of chal-
lenges to grants of clemency. 
189. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1992). 
42 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:1 
2. The "Actual" Syndrome 
Most of the cases that have considered the admissibility of expert 
testimony have focused on the research of Lenore Walker, the main re-
searcher on the battered woman syndrome. l90 In many cases courts have 
heard the testimony of Walker herself.191 
Battered woman syndrome. as formulated by Walker, is a combina-
tion of tWothemtes - ttrecycle~ofuvi()leilceand leariled ltelPIessftess -
that attempts to describe why women endure repeated physical and psy-
chological abuse at the hands of spouses or partners. l92 
The cycle of violence theory posits that abusive relationships follow a 
pattern, beginning with a "tension building phase," which erupts into an 
"acute battering incident" and is followed by "loving contrition." The 
cycle repeats itself.193 This theory is used at trial to explain that "al-
though [the killing] may have occured [sic] during a period of relative 
calm, the defendant was reasonable in her belief at the time of the act 
that the man presented her with a threat of imminent harm."I94 
The learned helplessness aspect of the battered woman syndrome 
theory is offered to explain that many battered women do not leave and 
that therefore a woman was not unreasonable in her failure to leave. l9S 
A woman has no duty under the law to leave a relationship at some un-
specified time before a battering incident that precipitates a killing. 196 
190. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 207. 
191. 
In the ninety-six cases of battered women who have killed or serious-
ly hurt their abusers, almost all in self defense, I have been successful 
in introducing evidence of battered women [sic] syndrome through ex-
pert witness testimony at the trial of thirty-three cases and in the 
sentencing phase of thirty-two cases. In four cases the prosecutor 
dropped the charges . . . . In four other cases the testimony was not 
admitted. The remainder either have not yet come to trial or would 
not have benefited from such testimony. 
Lenore Walker, A Response to Elizabeth M. Schneider's Describing and Changing: 
Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 223, 224 [hereinafter Walker, A Response]: 
It is unclear whether the thirty-three and thirty-two cases figures represent the 
same cases and what effect the testimony had on the disposition of the cases. 
192. LENORE WALKER, THE BATIERED WOMAN 55-70 (1979) (describing the cycle 
of violence) [hereinafter WALKER, BATIERED WOMAN] and LENORE WALKER, THE 
BATIERED WOMAN SYNDROME 95-104 (1984) (describing the cycle of violence and 
learned helplessness) [hereinafter WALKER, SYNDROME]. 
193. WALKER, BATIERED WOMAN, supra note 192, at 55. 
194. Faigman, supra note 84, at 626. 
195. [d.; Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 201-02 (courts ad-
mit expert testimony to address the question, among others, of why an abused woman 
failed to leave the relationship). 
196. GILLESPIE, supra note 30, at 81 (stating that the duty to retreat has "nothing 
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However, failure to leave the relationship is unfortunately a key question 
in the jury's mindl97 and one that prosecutors seize upon in making ef-
fective arguments to juries. Jurors are susceptible to suggestions that bat-
tered women liked the abuse,198 brought it on themselves,l99 or exag-
gerated the danger they faced. After all, the woman had survived many 
severe beatings in the past.200 For these reasons, learned helplessness 
theOl)' is offered to coUIlteJ." the prejudice a:&ainst a woman who did not, 
for w~atever reason, teave1lerl1lIDsive llHlm. In ne-v-etopmg this aspect of 
the syndrome, Walker adapted the research of Martin Seligman201 on 
dogs who "learned" they were helpless after repeated exposure to electric 
shocks.202 The dogs failed to exert any control at all over their sur-
roundings. Walker posited that the effect of battering on women is that 
"over time, [these acts] produce learned helplessness and depression as 
the 'repeated batterings, like electric shocks, diminish the woman's moti-
vation to respond. ",203 
3. Criticisms of Battered Woman Syndrome 
Expert opinion testimony on battered woman syndrome has been the 
main issue considered on appeal in cases in which women have been 
convicted of killing abusers.204 The rapidity with which appellate courts 
have admitted the testimony has allowed little time for consideration of 
whether its admission at trial is in the best interests of women defendants 
asserting self-defense. 
Many of those representing battered women who kill have competing 
views on the wisdom of using the battered woman syndrome. Trial attor-
neys and others recognize the need to include women's voices in court in 
whatsoever to do with the question of why [she] didn't leave the relationship"). 
197. Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 72, at 629. 
198. [d. 
199. [d. 
200. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 201. 
201. See Martin Seligman, Steven Maier, and James Geer, Alleviation of Learned 
Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J. ABNORMAL PsYCHOL. 256 (1968). 
202. WALKER, SYNDROME, supra note 192, at 86. In addition to learned helplessness, 
the third stage of the cycle, loving contrition, has been used to explain why a woman 
would stay. WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 192, at 65-70; WALKER, SYN-
DROME, supra note 192, at 96. 
203. WALKER, SYNDROME, supra note 192, at 87. 
204. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 200, 196-97 nn.7, 10, 
201 n.27 (lists of appellate cases addressing the issue of admissibility of battered 
woman syndrome expert opinion testimony). For the first California appellate case to 
address the issue of admissibility of battered woman syndrome evidence, see People 
v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178 (1989) (one of four issues on appeal; the court held 
that expert opinion testimony is admissible but exclusion at Aris's trial was harmless 
error). In California such evidence is now admissible by statute. CAL. EVlD. CODE 
§ 1107 (West Supp. 1992). 
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order to educate the judge and jury about the prevalence of domestic 
violence and the ways in which women respond to the onset and con-
tinuation of such violence.2O!I Most agree that expert testimony of some 
kind is necessary.206 Underlying the criticism, however, is the notion 
that there are several modes of coping with battering. The learned help-
lessness that battered woman syndrome hypothesizes is only one expla-
natkm. S€w~ ~thc>rs also. qu~stio~ the application of. the battered 
woman synCfrometcf women of color . .m 
(a) The failure of learned helplessness to prove its points about 
reasonableness and the failure to leave 
Elizabeth Schneider, a prominent women's self-defense litigator and 
professor,208 has noted that the focus on learned helplessness, through 
the introduction of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome, 
actually undercuts the woman's claim that her fmal act of self-defense 
was reasonable.209 Other commentators agree.210 In fact, the act of kill-
ing highlights a fundamental theoretical inconsistency: if the woman is so 
helpless, why did she kill? If one relied on the actual results in the 
Seligman dog tests, one would not expect any assertion of control by the 
battered woman.2l1 Perhaps it is the women who are dying who have 
205. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 197-98. 
206. Professor Mahoney argues that ''we need more, not less" expert testimony, 
despite her acknowledgment that the battered woman syndrome may tend to stereotype 
battered women. Mahoney, supra note 175, at 42. Expert testimony regarding evidence 
of her theory, separation assault, see infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text, could 
be extremely useful in helping a jury understand the power dynamic in a battering 
relationship and the potential violent response a woman faces if she chooses to leave. 
207. See generally, Allard, supra note 184. See also Mahoney, supra note 175, at 30 
(citing Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REv. 581, 612-13 (1990»; Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 216 
n.l46 (citing Barbara Hart, in a letter to Schneider, Nov. 30, 1984). 
208. Schneider was co-counsel for Yvonne Wanrow, State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 
(1977) (Washington State Supreme Court case holding that Washington's objective 
standard for measuring reasonableness should incorporate subjective elements, allowing 
the jury to take into account how a reasonable woman in all the circumstances would 
have acted in defending herself, see supra notes 103-08 for discussion of Wanrow) 
and co-counsel for amicus curiae in State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (New Jersey 
Supreme Court case holding battered woman syndrome expert testimony admissible). 
209. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 199, 221. 
210. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1430, 1433 
(1990) (book review of GILLESPIE, supra note 30) (stating that women who arm 
themselves and kill their husbands are hardly the "helpless creatures" that battered 
woman syndrome depicts them to be); Rosen, supra note 74, at 15 ("there is an 
inherent inconsistency in arguing that a person whose perceptions are altered by a 
psychologically identifiable syndrome is nonetheless reasonable with regard to that 
syndrome"). 
211. See Faigman, supra note 84, at 640-41 (arguing that from the actual results of 
the Seligman dog tests and "from a theoretical perspective one would predict that if 
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the syndrome and not the ones who are killing. 
In addition, Schneider argues that the syndrome resounds with the 
same sex stereotypes that women's self-defense work has sought to over-
come.212 She argues instead that a woman's ability to act as a rational 
agent should play a large role in her defense.213 
Commentators have offered reasons other than learned helplessness 
to exp~_\Vh)' w~~y in .~. ~l~on!i!!P-s_~y have .llO!ed 
tirar- commonly· experienced . social, n economic, -ana emoUofiat pressures 
explain why women remain in abusive situations.214 Women may stay 
in battering relationships because of family concerns, economic dependen-
cy, security, religious or personal values, or a lack of perceived alterna-
tives. In addition, both the prevalence of violence against women com-
mitted by partners21S and the common lack of support for battered 
battered women suffered from learned helplessness they would not assert control over 
their environment; certainly, one would not predict such a positive assertion of control 
as killing the batterer"). 
212. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 197. See also Crocker, 
supra note 78, at 136-37; Mahoney, supra note 175, at 4 (stating that "expert testi-
mony on battered woman syndrome and learned helplessness can interact with and 
perpetuate existing oppressive stereotypes of battered women''). 
213. 
Expert testimony which emphasizes or is heard to emphasize only 
battered women's helplessness or victimization is necessarily partial 
and incomplete because it does not address the crucial issue of the 
woman's action, or her agency in a prosecution for homicide -
namely, why [she] acted .... Our explanation of the reasonableness 
of their claims [must] take both their victimization and their agency 
into account 
Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 221. 
214. Crocker, supra note 78, at 134-35 (stating that several reasons exist for a bat-
tered woman's reluctance to seek help: the lack of response on the part of law en-
forcement officials to calls for help, the increased danger a woman faces after calling 
police, the inability or unwillingness of friends or family to provide shelter, and the 
embarrassment of a failed marriage); Faigman, supra note 84, at 622, 643-45 (arguing 
that courts should admit the history of violent abuse, as well as empirical evidence of 
economic and social factors); Mahoney, supra note 175, at 20-21 (arguing that in 
addition to denial, pregnancy and family attachments also explain why women stay); 
Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 78, at 203 (police and courts' failure 
to protect battered women; lack of a job, child care, adequate housing and services; 
isolation; shame; and the illusion that he will change all account for her staying). 
215. In the United States a woman is more likely to be assaulted, injured, raped, or 
killed by a male partner than by any other type of assailant NATIONAL WOMAN 
ABUSE PREVENTION PROJECT, General Facts About Domestic Violence, in DoMESTIC 
VIOLENCE FAC!' SHEETS (Mar. 1992) (citing A. Browne and K.R. Williams, Resource 
Availability for Women at Risk: Its Relationship to Rates of Female-Perpetrated Part-
ner Homicide (paper presented at the American Society of Criminology annual Meet-
ing, Nov. 11-14, 1987, Montreal, Canada». Research suggests that wife-beating re-
sults in more injuries that require medical treatment than rape, auto accidents, and 
muggings combined. Id. (citing E. Stark and A. Flitcraft, Medical Therapy as Re-
pression: The Case of Battered Women, REALm & MEDICINE 29-32 (SummerIFall 
Ii 
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womenZ16 support the conclusion that most battered women stay.217 
Another sobering explanation for a woman's failure to leave is the 
level of violence perpetrated against women after they leave abusive 
mates. Professor Martha Mahoney has argued for a recognition of "sep-
aration assault,,,Z18 which she dermes as an "assault on a woman's body 
and volition [in which her partner] seeks to block her from leaving, re-
~_JQ!'Jl~. de~ or forcibly e~the separation."Z19 Although 
Mahoney argues that battered -woman syndrome-amt leanreJheqJIessriess 
are relevant, she notes that "[l]earned helplessness is in essence a theory 
of deficiency at perceiving exit.,,220 Separation assault, on the other 
hand, "confirms the difficulty of exit" and "supports that aspect of bat-
tered woman's [sic] syndrome which emphasizes the woman's reason-
ableness and the normal character of her reaction to violence.,,221 
Mahoney argues that separation assault exposes battering as a power 
struggle222 and that society's failure to acknowledge this species of vio-
lent assault against women reflects a deep-seated cultural denial of the 
severity of battering in order to protect the institution of marriage.223 
This is the sort of denial and misconception that must be eradicated at 
trial. Juries must understand that leaving has enormous consequences 
because it refutes the power dynamic that the batterer needs and has 
come to expect. Jurors and judges must be shown that women are not at 
fault, much less guilty, for not leaving under the possibility of such vio-
lence. Thus, Mahoney's theory of separation assault, and its manifestation 
in women's lives, fear of reprisal, offer an alternative reason why women 
remain in battering relationships. 
It should be noted as well that even a battered woman may deny that 
she is battered, and she may not leave because she denies the gravity of 
her situation. This denial can explain inconsistent statements, previous 
denials of abuse, or statements that seek to minimize the level of abuse. 
This perceived negative aspect of denial, together with the positive aspect 
1992)). The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported in 1986 that thirty percent of 
female homicide victims were killed by husbands or boyfriends, while only six per-
cent of male homicide victims were killed by wives or girlfriends. Id. (citing FEDER-
AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN TIlE UNITED STATES (1986». 
216. See supra notes 177-82, 214 and accompanying text. 
217. See Crocker, supra note 78, at 135 (a battered woman's response in not leaving 
is "molded by the passivity in which women have been trained. A battered woman 
who does not leave . . . , seek help, or fight back is behaving according to societal 
expectations"); Mahoney, supra note 175, at 15. 
218. Mahoney, supra note 175, at 5-6. 
219. Id. at 6. 
220. Id. at 81. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 5-7. 
223. Id. at 10-19. 
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of self-respect, combine to make "women reject an image of degradation 
and incapacitation.,,224 
Other experts have also suggested broader bases for testifying about 
the perceptions of battered women, especially in their fmal acts of vio-
lence.22S Julie Blackman, a psychology professor and expert witness, 
describes several categories of change that occur in battered women.226 
_ First she observed psychological traits that she termed learned helple§s-
----=- riesS.227 ShealS()ooserved a ~ toIef8ilCe. for CogftitivemconSlsteft-
cy.'022S This tolerance for cognitive inconsistency, like Mahoney's ac-
knowledgment of denial, allows a woman to express two seemingly logi-
cally inconsistent ideas alongside one another and "grows out of the 
fundamental inconsistency of a battered woman's life: that the man who 
supposedly loves her also hurts her."229 For instance, a woman may 
claim that the batterer only hits her when he is drunk, yet she may then 
describe beatings when he was not drunk. Blackman stated that such 
inconsistent statements could be interpreted as poor memory or a bungled 
attempt to be deceptive.230 They may also indicate denial. The battered 
woman may claim initially that she was never battered then testify to 
battering incidents at trial. Or she may never have admitted to herself that 
she was a battered woman. Blackman also observed a coping mechanism 
in which battered women focus their energies on survival because of a 
reduced perception of altematives.231 
Although these three findings - learned helplessness, cognitive in-
consistency, and an inability to perceive options - suggest impairment, 
the fourth category of change she observed was an increased ability to 
"rate" the tolerability or survivability of episodes of violence.232 A bat-
tered woman learns to rate the violence by developing detailed knowledge 
of her partner's violence and the continuum on which it exists.233 
224. Id. at 25. 
225. Julie Blackman, Potential Uses For Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward The Repre-
sentation Of Battered Women Who Kill, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 227 (1986). 
226. Id. at 227 n.1. 
227. Id. at 228. Blackman states that women may experience depression and "psy-
chological changes that cause them to believe that they are unable to control what 
happens to them, and in particular that they are unable to stop the violence." 
228. Id. (citing J. Blackman, Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives on Violent and 
Non-Violent Intimate Relationships (1980) (unpublished paper presented at the 1980 
American Psychological Association Annual Meeting, on me with Blackman». 
229. Id. at 228-29. 
230. Id. at 229. 
231. Id. (maintaining that battered women "survive in and cope with abusive rela-
tionships by minimizing the severity of the violence they endure and minimizing the 
need to respond"). 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
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Blackman argues that the level of violence experienced by battered wom-
en who kill is remarkably severe and frequent compared to those battered 
women who do not kill, and "they know what sorts of danger are familiar 
and which are novel. ,,234 Although Blackman still identifies her obser-
vations as a "syndrome,,,235 she argues that the fourth category is evi-
dence not of impainnent but of an enhanced capacity, an affirmation of 
the ~.~ the need to act. 236 
--
AlIlheSe tlieones ana criticisms recognize tIlattearnoo l1:etpres-sness- is 
not the only explanation for a woman's decision to stay. She may in-
stead be staying for a variety of social and cultural reasons, out of fear of 
reprisal for leaving, or because she has learned to be a survivor. Advo-
cates, and those who will be deciding clemency petitions, should learn to 
look as much for these signs as they look for evidence of helplessness in 
answering their questions about battered women's actions. 
(b) The failure of the battered woman syndrome to protect 
all battered women 
It has been noted that the focus on the battered woman syndrome and 
its manifested characteristics may actually deprive some severely battered 
women of the "privilege" of asserting self-defense because in some way 
they do not fit the stereotypical passive, submissive syndrome model.237 
Particularly disturbing are the cases in which a defendant has resisted or 
tried to resist violence in the past. Courts may accept such resistance as 
evidence that rebuts her "status" as a battered woman.238 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 228, 229. 
236. Id. at 229. 
237. Crocker, supra note 78, at 144, 149. 
238. See id. at 144 n.6 (Crocker describes the following cases, among others: State 
v. Denny, 55 P.2d 111 (Ariz. App. 1976) (defendant intentionally ran into husband 
with car); Mullis v. State, 282 S.E.2d 334 (Ga. 1981) (court held simply that exclu-
sion of expert testimony was proper where the evidence indicated that the defendant 
had the ability to fight back, as demonstrated by her repeated defense of herself 
against her husband's attacks); Strong v. State, 307 S.E.2d 912 (Ga. 1983) (defendant 
threatened to kill husband); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981) (court ruled 
that evidence that the defendant had once stabbed her boyfriend with a knife during 
an encounter in which he kicked her, held a knife to her throat, and threatened to 
kill her, was admissible to refute "the battered wife defense," casting doubt on wheth-
er the defendant had "most frequently react[ed] with passivity"); People v. Powell, 
424 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Tompkins Co. Ct 1980) (prosecution witness testified that defen-
dant stated she wanted to kill deceased); State v. Norris, 279 S.E.2d 570 (N.C. 1981) 
(defendant previously shot husband in self-defense); State v. Kelly, 655 P.2d 1202 
(Wash. 1982) (appeals court allowed evidence that defendant had threatened a neigh-
bor and pounded on the house and her husband's car when he locked her out of the 
house as rebuttal evidence ''bear[ing] on whether the defendant is a battered woman"); 
Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981) (defendant once threatened husband with 
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The inclination of courts to view the battered woman syndrome as a 
standard to which women must conform and to exclude evidence because 
the woman is not a "good" battered woman realizes some of the fears of 
early critics and recent writers. These value judgments are also possible 
in executive clemency review. The negative ramifications of overstressing 
the syndrome and its stereotypic elements should be considered before 
relying too mucIJ. on the battered Won:um syndrome as an argument for 
c1emency. 
(c) A novel scientific theory: Passing the test without making 
the grade? 
In addition to the theoretical inconsistency of learned helplessness, the 
methodology of the research has been questioned.239 This criticism fo-
cuses on the research methods of the most prominent researcher and ex-
pert witness, Lenore Walker. 
Professor David Faigman, an advocate of the use of social science 
data in the law, has criticized the courts' reluctance to scrutinize the data 
at trial and the failure of commentators to do so in their writingS.240 He 
examined the methodology underlying both the cycle theorf41 and the 
theory of learned helplessness242 and concluded that the research was 
not yet sufficiently developed to warrant the use of expert opinion testi-
mony as evidence in self-defense cases. Faigman maintains that "it is a 
mistake to use one theoretical construct to describe all women who are 
victims of domestic violence."243 
Many appellate courts have ruled that expert testimony on battered 
woman syndrome is admissible when the requirements, including 
acceptablility of methodology, for admitting expert testimony are demon-
shovel; his response was to beat her about the head, neck, and shoulders with a pair 
of work boots). 
239. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 84. 
240. Id. at 630 n.56 (discussing cases in which courts "deliberately eschew" an ex-
amination of research methodology). Faigman states that, ''The validity of the evidence 
on battered woman syndrome has received little critical attention in either the court-
room or the legal literature . . . . Commentators have wholly neglected the empirical 
flaws of the research." Id. at 630-31. 
241. Faigman notes five "methodological and interpretive" flaws: the use of leading 
questions; influence of experimenter expectancies; failure to place the three stages of 
the cycle into a time frame; failure to demonstrate empirically the link between the 
cycle and the "cumulative terror"; and Walker's conclusion that her findings establish 
the existence of a distinct behavioral cycle. Id. at 637-39. 
242. Faigman noted three flaws in the learned helplessness methodology: the failure 
to conduct tests of statistical significance and the reliance on seemingly minute differ-
ences in scores; the failure to interview a control group of women not in battering 
relationships; and the fact that Walker's subjects had never in fact killed anyone. Id. 
at 642. 
243. Id. at 644. 
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strated.~-'lIld~p_urts~v~ remanded cas§ totrial co~ to_ determine if 
the expert met the standards of the court. A few trial courts excluded 
testimony because the expert had failed to establish general acceptance of 
the methodology used in the particular studies he or she was relying upon 
as a basis for the proffered expert testimony. 245 
These criticisms of Walker's methodology may be close to moot be-
-GatlSe of the overwhelming number of jurisdictions in which her work has 
been accepted.
u 
EmptncaIcriticism is useful, however,u in helping to 
change the focus from a paradigm model to a more practical view that 
realizes that the experiences of battered women, and not a psychological 
profile that may not apply to all battered women, can explain their ac-
tions.246 It may also spur additional research to meet the criticism. 
These criticisms help focus attention on the situations of women who 
act reasonably in self-defense but for whose actions the battered woman 
syndrome is simply not a viable explanation. As stated, the battered 
woman syndrome research and advocacy has also been beneficial. But 
such a single psychological paradigm may be inadequate to explain why 
so many battered women kill batterers in defense of themselves and their 
children. 
244. See, Dyas v. U.S., 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C. App. 1976) (discussing three-part 
test for admissibility of expert opinion testimony on novel scientific theories: that the 
subject matter be so distinctly related to some science as to be beyond the ken of 
the average juror, that the witness have sufficient skill, knowledge or experience in 
the area to aid the trier of fact, and that the state of the pertinent art have advanced 
to allow a reasonable expert opinion to be given); Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 
App. 1910). See also Ibn-Tamas v. U.S. (I), 407 A.2d 626, 635-39 (D.C. 1979); 
Terry v. State, 467 So.2d 761, 764-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Borders v. State, 
433 So.2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hawthorne v. State (I), 408 So.2d 
801, 805-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 
1981); People v. Minnis, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217-18 (Ill. 1983); State v. Hodges, 716 
P.2d 563, 568-69 (Kan. 1986); State v. Anaya (I), 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1984); 
State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364. 469-73 (NJ. 1984); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 
358, 362-63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Wash. 
1984). 
245. Ibn-Tamas v. United States (11), 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); Hawthorne v. State 
(Ill), 470 So.2d 770, 773-74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
246. But see Mahoney, supra note 175, at 42 (arguing that expert testimony on the 
syndrome is "correct" because women's stories are brought into court in a way that 
is "descriptively true of many women" and that the syndrome can be a "tool . . . to 
explain women's experiences"). 
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m. THE CLEMENCY POWER, PUNISHMENT, 
AND THE POTENTIAL OF CLEMENCY AS 
A TOOL FOR ACHIEVING JUSTICE 
51 
A. TROUBLING QUESTIONS ABOUT CLEMENcy's ROLE IN OUR SYSTEM 
OF PuNISHMENT 
~-
Clemency is usually relief imparted after the judicial system has run 
its course, although one may be pardoned even before being formally 
accused or convicted.247 The use of the clemency power to set aside 
convictions or release convicted prisoners thus questions basic assump-
tions underlying our criminal justice system. Have the traditional safe-
guards that ensure justice - prosecutorial discretion, trial by jury, and 
appellate review - failed to render just results in so many battered 
women's cases? Are the sentences of these women fair under the law, or 
has society failed to protect one of its constituent groups through the 
law? Is it proper for the executive to remedy the "excesses of the judicia-
ry and the legislature,,248 through his or her executive power of clemen-
cy? 
The propriety of the institution of clemency is usually questioned fol-
lowing unpopular uses of the power.249 Even though some uses of the 
247. KATIiLEEN DEAN MooRE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PuBuc INTER-
EST 5 (1989) (such as Gerald Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon in 1974). See also 
infra note 329 (regarding George Bush's recent pardon of Caspar Weinberger, his 
former Secretary of Defense, who had been indicted but not yet tried in the Iran-
Contra scandal). 
Pre-conviction pardons are not improper legally, as the federal clemency power 
has been interpreted extremely broadly: 
The power thus conferred is unlimited [except in cases of impeach-
ment]. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be 
exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceed-
ings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judg-
ment. This power . . . is not subject to legislative control . . . . The 
benign prerogative of mercy reposed in [the President] cannot be fet-
tered by any legislative restrictions. 
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866). 
248. Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 Omo 
ST. L.J. 655, 659 (1992) [hereinafter Kobil, Do the Paperwork]. 
249. MOORE, supra note 247, at 217 (Sen. Walter Mondale sought to introduce leg-
islation limiting the pardoning power after President Gerald Ford pardoned former 
President Richard Nixon). Legislators in Ohio sought to restrict the power of the 
governor in that state after the unpopular commutations of eight death sentences at 
the close of fonner Governor Richard Celeste's term. Kobil, Do the Paperwork, supra 
note 248, at 658-59. And prosecutors have argued that clemency in battered women's 
cases ignores the trial court's finding and is an improper use of the governor's pow-
er. See supra note 4. 
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clemency power engender fierce criticism, provisions for its use exist in 
every judicial system in the world except China's.2S0 The clemency 
power serves as a powerful and necessary tool in an imperfect and all-
too-human system of justice. As a result, rather than questioning whether 
the power is consistent with our system, we should ask how the power 
can best be used to augment our system of justice.251 
An executive, in granting clemency. should ensure that justice is 
done. He or she-Should do-sa-bY corlsldetlng dieoties (,f-purusJiiiierit mro 
justice that account for the debt paid by the prisoner, her moral blame-
worthiness, society's interests, and notions of fairness. Two theories of 
justice, retributivism and utilitarianism, 252 provide support for justifying 
executive acts of clemency in battered women's cases, answering the 
charges of those who believe that a governor should not "legislate away 
what a jury has found."253 
At trial, jurors and judges must decide whether a particular killing is 
a crime and, if so, what punishment the offender deserves. The idea that 
people "ought to get the punishment they deserve" is known as 
retributivism.2S4 Those who adopt this view believe that defendants 
should receive punishment only if they are morally blameworthy and 
have gained an unfair advantage over others through the commission of 
their acts. Retributivists begin from the premise that society's law are 
250. Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 575. See also infra notes 311-17 for a 
discussion of the development of the clemency power. 
251. Professor Kobil argues that executive clemency is a "powerful but necessary 
check on legislative and judicial branches that permits the governor to correct miscar-
riages of justice that would otherwise be without a remedy." Kobil, Do the Paper-
work, supra note 248, at 695. But he has argued elsewhere that the clemency power 
should be exercised in a principled manner, most effectively through a "bifurcated" 
clemency process that allows an impartial board to make '1ustice-enhancing" grants of 
clemency, while the executive could retain the power to make "justice-neutral" grants 
of clemency. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 622. 
252. A full discussion of theories of punishment is beyond the scope of this article. 
For a more complete consideration of retributive justice, see IMMANuEL KANT, THE 
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENfS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
(1965); MOORE, supra note 247; GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987). For works on the 
principle of utility and its application to punishment, see JEREMY BENlHAM, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1948); JEREMY 
BENlHAM, OF LAws IN GENERAL (1970); JEREMY BENlHAM AND THE LAW: A SYM-
POSIUM (George Keeton and George Schwarzenberger eds. 1948); DAVID LYONS, IN 
THE INTEREST OF THE GoVERNED (1978). 
For a discussion of theories of justice in general, see GEORG WILHELM 
FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILoSOPHY OF RIGIIT (1942); KAREN LEBACQZ, SIX 
THEoRIES OF JUSTICE: PERsPECTIVES FROM PHILoSOPIDCAL AND THEoLOOICAL ETmCS 
(1986); JOHN RAWLS, A THEoRY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
253. See supra note 4 (noting reaction of Ohio prosecutor to the grant of clemency 
in Ohio by Governor Richard Celeste). 
254. MOORE, supra note 247, at 92-94. 
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agreed-upon rules to limit the freedom of individuals so that one person 
may not gain an unfair advantage by upsetting a fair apportionment of 
rights and duties.25s A defendant deserves the sentence imposed by so-
ciety to restore the balance upset through the gain of her unfair advantage 
when she meets the retributive requirements of liability and moral 
desert.256 As applied to battered women who kill, a retributive analysis 
that considers legal and moral blameworthiness and a fair balance of 
rights-aruI dUtIes juStifies Clemency~1.5T - -
For most people, however, concerns in addition to desert inevitably 
play a role in the determination of whether a sentence is just. Professor 
Daniel Kobil argues that retributivist principles are central to our system 
of criminal justice, but so too is the idea that justice is fairness.258 He 
defmes justice as "fairness under the law that renders each person her 
due,,259 and states that retributive principles should not be the "sole 
guideposts in clemency decisions."260 In addition to notions of fairness, 
utilitarian considerations (the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people) strongly indicate that clemency for battered women is appropri-
ate.261 
The following analysis of battered women's cases and clemency is 
largely derived from applying the pardon theories of Professors Moore 
and Kobil to the cases in which battered women kill. Depending on the 
facts of the various cases, most battered women's actions should fit into 
one or more of the categories that justify executive clemency. 
Since punishment should be meted out only when deserved, it would 
follow that clemency should be granted only when deserved.262 In addi-
tion, society's welfare and interest should be considered in granting clem-
ency. Governor Wilson should recognize that most of the women in the 
petition group do not deserve to be incarcerated for their acts. Commuta-
tions of their sentences, or pardons, are proper and may be mandated by 
the failings of that system. 
255. Id. at 93, 142-43. 
256. Id. at 122-26, 142-43. 
257. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 579 (citing MOORE, supra note 
247, at 94-95). See infra notes 263-92 for full retributive analysis. 
258. Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 581. 
259. Id. at 582. 
260. Id. at 581. 
261. Justice Holmes' statement that clemency, "[w]hen granted ... is the determi-
nation of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by in-
flicting less than what the judgment fixed," recognized the utilitarian aspects of the 
clemency power. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (emphasis added). 
262. MOORE, supra note 247, at 89. 
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1. A Retl ibutivist Analysis 
Some retributivists do not see any place for pardons within a theory 
of justice based upon deserved punishment.263 Others see no irony in a 
principled exercise of the clemency power to correct injustice.264 
Moore has argued that granting clemency becomes "a duty of justice 
_Jhat fol1ows from the principle that punishment should not exceed what is 
deserved. "26' She argues that because retributivist theory has been· so 
successful in ending the "rehabilitation model" of sentencing266 and 
punishment, a retributive theory of pardon is now essential to account for 
cases in which pardon is justified.267 
Moore's retributivisf68 theory of pardons would mandate a pardon 
when a convicted person is not at all "liable to punishment."269 She ar-
gues that grants of clemency are justified when a person is liable to pun-
ishment for her acts but is not morally blameworthy.27o Innocence, ex-
cusable crime, and justified crime indicate the absence of moral 
263. ld. at 90 ("[The] profligate use of pardon[s)" spurred ''the great retributive 
theory of Immanuel Kant."), 28 (Kant's theory of punishment mandates, in an ideal 
state. a categorical moral obligation to punish those who have committed crimes). See 
also KANT. supra note 252, at 99-108. 
264. See also Kobil, Do the Paperwork, supra note 248, at 697 ("Inasmuch as re-
tributive concerns substantially underlie our system of justice, I believe that standards 
which focus on whether the offender deserves the punishment imposed would be 
helpful in assessing whether clemency is appropriate, although rehabilitative principles 
may also be deemed relevant"). 
265. MOORE, supra note 247, at 12 (emphasis added). 
266. This influence can be seen in the new federal sentencing guidelines, adopted in 
1984, ending indeterminate sentencing, a part of the rehabilitative model of punish-
ment. ld. at 61, 67-72. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL 2 (1993) (In enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Con-
gress sought, in addition to achieving uniformity and proportionality of sentences, "to 
avoid the confusion and implicit deception that arose out of the pre-guidelines sen-
tencing system which required the court to impose an indeterminate sentence .... "). 
267. MOORE, supra note 247, at 10. See also Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, 
at 611 ("[The new guidelines] have created an increasing need for clemency as a 
means of remitting punishment in a principled and consistent fashion"). 
268. There is a distinction between "legal retributivism" and "moral retributivism": 
legal retributivists argue that a person's punishment is deserved because of the act he 
or she has committed - because he or she has gained an unfair advantage over law-
abiding citizens; moral retributivists argue that a person's deserved punishment is best 
decided based upon what kind of person she is, whether she has morally deserved a 
certain punishment, and whether she is or is not morally reprehensible. MooRE, supra 
note 247, at 11, 94-95. I combine the elements of both approaches in this discussion. 
269. Liability is "measured by the degree to which an act actually upsets a fair 
apportionment of rights and duties." ld. at 145. ''Liability, as defined by legalistic 
retributivism, is a necessary condition for punishment. In the absence of liability, of-
fenders must be pardoned." ld. at 97. 
270. ld. at 95. 
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blameworthiness in an act and justify the use of the clemency power.271 
In addition, adjusting a harsh sentence to comport with a prisoner's de-
served sentence is justified, 272 although the conclusion that a sentence is 
unfairly disproportionate may not address the blameworthiness of the 
actor. 
(a) Substantial doubt in the integrity of theconvic~ 
Moore includes under innocence false convictions and convictions in 
which the defendant was incapacitated in some way,273 thus reducing 
her blameworthiness. Although some battered women have been acquitted 
of killing their husbands or lovers on insanity defenses,274 mental inca-
pacity defenses are not endorsed by litigators,275 and women may end 
up in a hospital for longer than they would have been in jail.276 In ad-
dition, it does the goals of feminist self-defense work no service to argue 
for clemency on grounds of insanity unless, of course, that particular peti-
tioner was insane at the time. Most women who killed and are now ap-
plying for clemency were not appropriate candidates for such defenses. 
Although learned helplessness has also been interpreted as incapacity, 
it has been offered primarily to explain why a woman stays in an abusive 
relationship. Learned helplessness does not address the issue of a 
woman's capacity when she acts in self-defense; as a result, it does not 
affect her blameworthiness. To the contrary, the act of killing shatters the 
"learned helpless" mold. 
More helpful in this regard is Kobil's argument that when there is 
substantial doubt of guilt a sentence should be remitted.277 Factors cast-
ing doubt on guilt include "new evidence, information suppressed at tri-
al . . . or any other reason that seriously undermines . . . confidence in 
the integrity of the judicial determination [of guilt].,,278 Prosecutorial 
zeal, unwarrantedly stiff charges, and unfair self-defense laws all impugn 
271. Id. at 97. 
272. Id. at 98 (this is consonant with the retributivist ideal that a punishment should 
not exceed what is deserved). 
273. Id. at 132, 131-41. 
274. See FAITII McNULTY, THE BURNING BED (1980) (describing Francine Hughes' 
case, in which she killed her sleeping husband and was acquitted on an insanity 
plea). 
275. See Rosen, supra note 74, at IS, citing Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 72, 
at 638 (result of insanity or diminished capacity defense could lead to civil incarcera-
tion); Schneider and Jordan, Representation, supra note 69, at 159-60 (writing in 
1978, "Today, an impaired mental state defense should be considered only as a last 
resort, with full awareness of its social implications"). 
276. See id. (the implications of succeeding on an impaired mental state defense in-
clude the possibility of mandatory or discretionary commitment to a mental facility). 
277. Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 624. 
278. Id. at 624-25. 
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the integrity of the system under which battered women are tried. In 
addition, the refusal or inability of jurors to recognize the reasonable 
nature of a battered woman's response to a fear of imminent harm un-
dermines the integrity of the determination of guilt itself. Viewed in this 
way, the sentences of many battered women should be remitted. Al-
though there may not be doubt that the killing occurred and that she did 
i~ there may beJegi!imate doubt as to her guilt on the criminal charge. 
-- - - - -- -------- --- ------ - - -- - ---
(b) Excusable acts 
Defendants who commit crimes that have no tangible or intangible 
gains may be excused from punishment by executive clemency. Crimes 
with no tangible gain include unsuccessful attempts and "repaired 
crimes.,,279 The unsuccessful attempt rationale does not apply to bat-
tered women who kill. The repaired crimes principle, however, is relevant 
to determining their deserved punishment. At the same time, it highlights 
the controversy in these cases. Arguing that the man's death corrects past 
wrongs may seem like vigilante justice. Indeed, those arguing that bat-
tered woman syndrome is dangerous fear that it allows "a private right to 
impose the death penalty.,,280 
However, we should not shrink from applying the repaired crimes 
principle in battered women's cases merely because they involve 
death.281 These cases are more difficult than the innocuous theft of an 
umbrella, for example.282 However, the reality is that any practical in-
quiry into whether an offender's act repairs a past wrong will focus on 
difficult cases, even those involving death. 
Under retributive theory, a battering husband gains an unfair advan-
tage over his victim every time he batters her. He acquires the tangible 
gain of domination and power and the intangible gain of the freedom to 
disregard the laws against battery, assault, rape, and attempted murder, 
among others. The woman who kills in self-defense is removing those 
advantages unfairly won by the batterer, gained over years of abuse. 
279. [d. at 144-51. 
280. See Naylor, Schaefer Releases Fears, supra note 4 (quoting Jon Scully of the 
conservative Washington Legal Foundation). See also People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 
3d 1178, 1188 (1989) (court claimed even partial justification on defendant's claim of 
self-defense would amount to a right to impose the death penalty on an abuser). 
281. Commentators may shy away from this justification. For example, Kobil has 
stated that a battered woman's clemency case may be justified retributively because of 
a diminished psychological CUlpability or because her sentence is unduly harsh. Kobil, 
Do the Paperwork, supra note 248, at 678-79. While each of these may also be justi-
fications, they are not the only ones. 
282. Moore describes the case of mutual theft of umbrellas by C and D, in which 
the second theft both repairs the crime of the first theft and leaves the first thief 
with no tangible gain. MooRE, supra note 247, at 147. 
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Governors, in deciding clemency petitions, may validly apply the 
repaired crimes justification to the cases of battered women who kill 
without endorsing vigilante justice. The cases before the governor, and 
the majority of cases in which battered women kill, are confrontational. 
When a woman acts in aggression and is successful in killing her batterer 
it is not the deliberate and cold-blooded act of vengeance many suppose. 
She~ts ~ sa.ve her own life. The wo~ herself ~ not d~sioll­
ately decide me- wittreparrthe-pasr-crtmesby -murdenng net oanerer, 
although that is the result. In other words, even if repairing past wrongs 
is not her motivation, it may still be her justification. 
Once we accept the realities under which battered women act, we can 
decide whether a battered woman morally deserves no punishment based 
upon her act. We may instead decide that her act does no more than 
restore a fair apportionment of rights and duties. The key is that her right 
is to defend herself, and her duty is to do so only when she has a subjec-
tively reasonable fear of imminent (using the broader definition) bodily 
harm. The conclusion must be that a battered woman has not won a 
tangible gain, or that her tangible gain (being free of the batterer) is no 
more than what she has suffered over years of violent or cruel abuse. 
(c) Morally justified acts 
Clemency may be deserved when the petitioner's act was illegal but 
not immoral.283 For purposes of this part I will adopt the view of many 
that the killings by battered women are not legally justified under the law 
as it stands. However, this assumption does not foreclose the conclusion, 
upon review by the clemency board or governor, that the act was not 
morally justified. There are areas in which ''the law and morality can fail 
to coincide.,,284 
Many battered women do not deserve punishment because their acts 
were morally justified. Even if self-defense law has not sufficiently 
evolved to allow women to defend themselves legally when they most 
need to, it does not follow that a woman may not morally do so. The law 
of self-defense itself grew out of a custom in England in which common 
law courts, despite accepting in principle that claims of self-defense were 
justifications for some killings, would convict the defendant and direct 
her to seek a pardon from the king.28S This practice continued frequent-
283. /d. at 157. Moore addresses mercy killings and conscientious objector situations 
under her theory of justified crimes. [d. at 155-65. However, her recognition that an 
illegal act is not necessarily an immoral act is relevant to cases in which battered 
women kill their abusers. 
284. /d. at 155. 
285. See GILLESPIE, supra note 30, at 33 (describing the ancient case of Alice of 
the Assize of Northumberland, and the general practice of dutifully convicting and 
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ly until the law of self-defense and other doctrines of justification were 
incorporated into the substantive criminal law.286 In addition, grants of 
clemency have been used to void valid convictions arrived at under valid 
but unpopular laws.287 These practices indicate that there have long 
been situations in which society at least accepted, if not approved of, 
moral actions that were not in conformance with inadequate or unpopular 
laws. 
-When a -nattered woman is Iumidly-Iustmea in aeleoomg liefSeII,SIle 
has done nothing wrong and deserves no punishment. Moore considers an 
act "morally justified" if it is "an act that would be performed by a mor-
ally courageous person correctly evaluating all conflicting demands."288 
Such a definition appears close to the test for reasonableness in self-de-
fense. However, it is not necessarily as constrictive because the governor 
or clemency board member is not bound by strict rules of precedent 
narrowly defining the "correct," and therefore justified, action. To fairly 
appraise whether a battered woman's act was justified, the person making 
that determination should consider whether a morally courageous person 
in those circumstances, knowing what she knows, would have performed 
the same action, evaluating all conflicting demands. Such an inquiry 
could well result in a fmding that the actions of many battered women 
may be justifiable in a moral sense, regardless of whether they are justifi-
able under strict interpretations of substantive criminal law terms. 
In addition, Kobil has stated that battered women's clemencies may 
justly be based on the diminished culpability of the offender.289 Else-
where, Kobil has stated that diminished mental capacity (in addition to 
disproportionate sentence or substantial doubt as to guilt) would support 
clemency.290 It is more helpful to focus on the culpability, as Kobil has 
done, rather than the capacity of the battered woman when she acts. 
sentencing those who killed in self-defense and instructing the convicted to appeal to 
the king for a pardon). This custom was later codified in the Statute of Gloucester 
of 1278, which remained law for over 300 years; the statute required trial and con-
viction in cases where a killing resulted from accident or self-defense. but the con-
victed party was encouraged to apply to the King for a pardon. ld. 
286. See MOORE. supra note 247, at 223 (citing the United States pardon attorney, 
who stated that, "We have seen that the law of insanity. of self-defense. of compul-
sion and the improved treatment of the juvenile offender started from the practice of 
pardoning in cases where the strict application of the law seemed undesirable"). 
287. ld. at 158 (stating that numerous pardons were granted under Prohibition laws. 
when offenders were deemed to have broken the law but not to have done anything 
wrong). 222-23 ("anecdotal accounts . . . make it clear that, in some general areas of 
the law, presidents and governors are not satisfied with the job the laws are doing"). 
288. ld. at 161 (citing Kent Greenawalt, Vietnam Amnesty: Problems of Justice and 
Line-Drawing. 11 GA. L. REv. 1. 9 (1976». 
289. See supra note 281. 
290. Kobil. Do the Paperwork. supra note 248. at 697. 
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Because many. oLthe factors that e][.-R.lain why a WOII1.1lD stays are relevant 
to her capacity to leave and not to her capacity to defend herself, it is 
more fruitful to consider whether she is morally culpable in acting to 
defend herself. Because most battered women who kill do so out of a 
fear, reasonable or unreasonable, of imminent bodily harm or death, their 
culpability is diminished even if their actions do not conform to the re-
_quirements. of the substantiv~Jaw definitions ofiliat jurisdiction.~ __ _ 
(d) Correcting unduly harsh sentences 
It has been argued that women receive harsher sentences for killing 
their husbands in self-defense than men receive for killing wives or girl-
friends in battering incidents or in rage.291 A full empirical study should 
291. Women who kill their abusers receive stiffer sentences than men who kill their 
wives. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BAlTERED WOMEN KILL 11 (1987) (FBI statistics 
indicate men are less lieldy to be charged with first- or second-degree murder for 
killing a woman they have known than are women who kill a man they have known; 
women who are convicted receive longer sentences); ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 
9 (1980) (for lesser offenses sentences are roughly equal, but for more violent offens-
es women receive harsher sentences); NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DoMESTIC VIO-
LENCE, NEWSLETIER 12 (Winter 1989) (abusive men who kill partners serve an aver-
age of two to six years; women who kill partners serve an average of flfteen years). 
See also Hansen, supra note 174 (women charged with homicide have fewest prior 
convictions of any other class of offenders but are more likely to serve longer sen-
tences than men who kill those with whom they are intimate). 
In Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 590 N.E. 2d 681 (Mass. 1992), the jury appar-
ently struggled with the facts of the case and returned a verdict of manslaughter only 
to have the judge sentence the defendant severely. Despite the apparent planning and 
violent nature of the killing, the jury returned a manslaughter verdict, but the defen-
dant received the maximum sentence - flfteen to twenty years. See supra notes 31-
32 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of this case. Grimshaw had a clem-
ency hearing in Massachusetts in December; no decision has been made as of publi-
cation. Telephone Interview with Stan Grossfeld, reporter, The Boston Globe (Dec. 19, 
1992). 
Women's bails also tend to be high, even though they are unlikely to commit 
new crimes or leave the area, and they seldom have a criminal record. See HLS 
MANuAL, supra note 43, at 23 (citing Sarah Buel, An Integrated Response to Family 
Voilence: Effective Intervention by Criminal and Civil Justice Systems (1990), in HAR-
VARD LAW SCHOOL BATTERED WOMEN'S ADVOCACY FRomer TRAINING AND RE-
SOURCE MANuAL 61 (1991». Notable is the case of Gladys Gonzales, supra note 14 
and accompanying text. Despite having no prior arrests and having two children and 
her family in the area, she was held on bail for fourteen months and eventually sen-
tenced to forty years in prison, the stiffest sentence for murder in Dlinois. Gonzales 
petition, supra note 14. She subsequently received a grant of clemency from Dlinois 
Governor James Thompson. Id. 
A possible explanation for stiff sentences may be a planned nature of a killing 
(both Grimshaw and Gonzales recruited others to assist them) or the use of a weapon 
against a man armed with his flsts but without what a court would usually defme as 
a deadly weapon. See Kathy Fair, Equal Rights a 2-Edged Sword for Female Cons, 
HOUSTON CHRON., May 7, 1989, at 36-A (quoting captain Janice Wilson in 
Gatesville, Tex., who asserts that the disparity may arise because a woman almost 
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be undertaken in California to detennine if there is disparate sentencing 
between men and women prisoners, particularly in cases in which the 
defendant stood accused of killing a lover or spouse. It is a just use of 
the executive clemency power to adjust disproportionate sentences; remit-
ting or reducing the sentences to an equal level would both make a 
strong statement and be consistent with retributive theory. 292 
L A Utilitarian Analysis 
Utilitarians argue that the business of government is to promote the 
happiness of society, which it does by outlawing actions that cause 
harm.293 In refonning or disabling criminals, the state provides for the 
security and happiness of its citizens294 and deters other criminal, thus 
preventing more unhappiness (to society) than it causes (to the incarcer-
ated criminal).29S Generally, the utilitarian weighs only the gain to soci-
ety of punishing the individual. Concerns of desert are irrelevant, and 
punishment is not justified merely because a person has committed a 
crime. 
Moore states that a strict utilitarian theory, such as Jeremy 
Bentham's, would prohibit the exercise of pardon in a utilitarian system 
of justice. Utilitarians believe that a legal system should not make excep-
tions to rules, for in the consistent application of punishment lies the 
benefit to society of general deterrence.296 However, some utilitarians 
have argued that additional utilitarian considerations should serve to rebut 
the prima facie obligation to punish that arises from conviction itself.297 
Yet even Bentham considered factors that would justify the use of the 
clemency power "where punishment does more harm than good."m 
always uses a knife or gun, where a man may use only his hands). But see 
Grossfeld, supra note 32. He reported on the case of P.E. Allen, a woman serving 
eight to fifteen years for manslaughter for killing her boyfriend with a curling iron as 
her attacked her. ld. He beat her and threatened to throw her television on her. He 
then stormed out and waited by the front door. She made herself busy, curling her 
hair. When he came back to the apartment, he assaulted her again. She spun around 
and stabbed him six times with a sharp-ended hair iron. Telephone Interview with 
Stan Grossfeld, reporter, The Boston Globe (Dec. 19, 1992) (recounting a personal 
interview with Allen). 
292. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 628 (noting that former California 
Governor Pat Brown considered equality of sentences the most important factor in 
clemency decisions, although no systematic review of sentencing was undertaken dur-
ing his administration). 
293. MOORE, supra note 247, at 36. 
2940 ld. 
295. ldo 
296. ldo at 38-39. 
297. ld. at 39-40 (quoting S.I. Benn, a twentieth-century utilitarian, who argued that 
the obligation should be "defeated" by other utilitarian considerations). 
298. ld. at 41. 
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Those situations include: where punishment would not be effective in 
deterring crimes, such as when a person is incapacitated; where punish-
ment is excessive because no harm has occurred, a greater harm was 
avoided, or the harm can be fully repaired; where punishment is needless, 
such as where education would prevent further crimes; and where pun-
ishment would cause harm greater than the harm of not punishing.299 
As Moo!e put it, "For Uti1itarian.s. tb.e jllJniSllment ~s notha"eto fit 
me crime, nor does it nave to fit the criminal. The punisbmenr must fit 
only the needs of society.,,300 For many of the reasons discussed in the 
last section, battered women should be granted clemency from a utili-
tarian perspective. 
(a) Deterrence 
Incarceration of battered women probably serves only the goal of 
specific deterrence. Even then the effectiveness of incarceration as op-
posed to other means of intervention is questionable. Most of these wom-
en are fIrst offenders who killed in desperate attemps to save their lives. 
They are not marauding, cold-blooded killers and rapists likely to "at-
tack" again. Further, a condition of clemency could be the requirement 
that a formerly battered woman participate in group and individual coun-
seling or perform community service at a battered woman's center, both 
of which are likely to result in a formerly battered woman gaining the 
support and education she needs to be able to prevent future battering 
relationships. This less-expensive "diversion" program would probably be 
as effective in deterring future killings of abusive men as is incarceration. 
(b) Greater harm avoided 
A killer does not deserve punishment in a utilitarian model of justice 
when a harm greater to society has been avoided as a result of the kill-
ing. In deciding what the greater harm is, we must identify the criteria by 
which we will measure that harm. A proper utilitarian would exclude all 
moral considerations and considerations of desert, yet purely economic 
considerations are insufficient.30t The greater-harm inquiry should focus 
299. [d. at 40-41. 
300. [d. at 41. 
301. For instance, it is possible to weigh the intellectual or economic productivity of 
the deceased against that of the survivor and conclude that society would have been 
better off economically had the abuser survived (if he is a wage-eamer, important 
scientist, or philanthropist) rather than the defendant (if she is unemployed, untrained, 
uneducated, or on public assistance). On the other hand, we may decide that it is 
more harmful to society if the abuser vanquishes (if he is marginally productive, or 
uneducated, or on public assistance) than if the victim died (having been a successful 
and productive member of society, now leaving two children wards of the state). 
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on the happiness or peace of mind Jbat results from the knowledge that 
rational acts will be given the protection of law. 
It is a greater harm that an innocent recipient of cruel or violent 
abuse should die because she takes such abuse without fighting back than 
that a cruel abuser should die because the victim defended herself. Utili-
tarians are concerned with the happiness of the citizens of the state. That 
ha~ss_maj' come from the
u 
knowledge -that~J~w wi11 protect them 
when they act reasonably in self-defense. The legal construct -m self-de-
fense as a matter of law reflects this utilitarian value.302 This justifica-
tion entails a value judgment as to which harm is greater, but to favor the 
innocent victim over the the batterer is not an unprincipled judgment. 
(c) Needless punishment 
The punishment in many battered women's cases may be too se-
vere.303 Many women who kill partners do so only after long histories 
of violent abuse. We can prevent a greater harm to society through inter-
vention and education without requiring punishment that is expensive and 
removes a woman from her family and from the opportunity to be a 
productive member of society. 
(d) Punishment causes greater harm 
Incarcerating women who have already suffered causes greater harm 
to society than placing them in alternative programs, such as diversion, 
community service, or counseling programs. Women who are imprisoned 
are separated from their children, with all the attendant social costs of 
separation. That is, children lose the guidance and love of their mothers 
and perceive them as criminals against society. If they have no other 
family members, they may need to be placed with state agencies, bur-
dening society economically and the children psychologically. In addi-
tion, incarceration removes from society a potential worker (whether in 
the workforce or raising children at home) who otherwise would have 
added to overall productivity. Instead, the taxpayer pays more than twenty 
thousand dollars per year to keep her in prison.304 
All these factors strengthen the retributive justifications and indicate 
that for the benefit of society battered women in prison who pose no 
302. See Rosen, supra note 74, at 27 (the encouragement of intentional homicides in 
self-defense reflects the view that such killings are not harmful to society and may be 
beneficial). 
303. See supra note 291. 
304. See Ways and Means Committee Analysis, fiscal predictions, hearing on AB 
2373 (as amended Mar. 12, 1992) (Apr. 8, 1992). See infra notes 398-410 and ac-
companying text (discussion of AB 2373, the clemency commission legislation). 
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further risk to society can be set free consistent with notions of justice 
and fairness. 
B. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CLEMENCY POWER30S 
Clemency is generally defined as "kindness, mercy, forgiveness, le-
niency; usually relating to criminal acts.,,306 Although clemency in-
cludes the po\V~!~O grant reprieves307 and amnesty,308 ~mency is 
usUally extellded· to ~ViClOO individtl8ls In·· tile -rorm Of a .. paraon- Or 
commutation of sentence. A pardon is an executive action that mitigates 
or sets aside punishment for a crime, releases an offender from entire 
punishment, and reinstates her civil liberties.309 Commutation,3lO in 
the criminal law context, is the shortening of a sentence to time served or 
the substitution of a jail term for a death sentence in a capital case. It 
does not relieve the offender of liability or reinstate her civil rights. 
The ability of rulers to pardon was reflected in the earliest legal 
codes,311 in the Bible,312 and in Roman law and the early common 
305. A full discussion of the historical development of clemency is beyond the scope 
of this article; for a thorough and engaging treatment of the uses and abuses of the 
executive power, including its ancient roots and historical uses, see Kobil, Mercy 
Strained, supra note 3, and sources cited therein. 
306. The term is often used to describe the acts of a governor of a state when he 
or she commutes a death sentence to life imprisonment or grants a pardon. BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 252 (6th ed. 1990). Clemency is also generally defined as "mild-
ness or gentleness of temper, as shown in the exercise of authority or power; mercy, 
leniency." OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 309 (2d ed. 1989). Often the term pardon is 
used in a general sense, meaning all acts of clemency, including pardon, commutation, 
reprieve, amnesty, and a fifth category, remission of fines. See Kobil, Do the Paper-
work, supra note 248, at 660. 
307. A reprieve is a temporary relief from or postponement of execution of criminal 
punishment or sentence (a stay). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 306, at 1302. 
308. Amnesty is defined as "a sovereign act of forgiveness for past acts, granted by 
a government to all persons (or to certain classes of persons) who have been guilty 
of crime . . . generally political offenses . . . often conditioned upon their return to 
obedience and duty within a prescribed time." Id. at 82-83. See also Burdick v. Unit-
ed States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915) (amnesty is usually bestowed upon those convicted of 
political offenses); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152 (1877) (amnesty is for-
getfulness; pardon is forgiveness). 
309. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 306, at 1113 (citing Verneco, Inc. v. 
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 219 So. 2d 508 (La. 1969) and State ex reI. Herman v. 
Powell, 367 P.2d 553 (Mont. 1961». 
310. Commutation is "an alteration, a change, or a substitution; the act of substi-
tuting one thing for another." Id. at 280. 
311. It was reflected in one of the earliest written legal codes, the ancient Babylo-
nian law, the Code of Hammurabi, written no later than the seventeenth century B.C. 
HANs JOCHEN BOECKER, LAW AND TIlE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN TIlE OLD 
TEsTAMENT AND ANCIENT EAST 68, 106-07 (1980) (if a husband forgave and par-
doned his wife for adultery, the king could pardon his subject, the man who com-
mitted adultery with the wife; otherwise, the two adulterers were bound and thrown 
into the river). 
312. Cain slew Abel, and was banished, but through the mercy of God was spared 
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law of England, when more than 200 offenses carried the penalty of 
death.313 During this time, the ability to pardon was seen as an intense 
source of political and financial power.314 By the end of the Enlighten-
ment, abuse of the pardoning power had serious consequences. m Eigh-
teenth-century philosophers rebelled against the unprincipled, arbitrary, 
and corrupt use of clemency,316 which overwhelmingly was granted not 
Oft. ~ of (~and mercy but ~. for JXl1itica1,personal, 
and fiilaridaI gam: . --
Kobil noted that many clemencies of early United States presidents 
were granted to benefit the public or "serve the public good."3\7 Yet in 
the contemporary United States, vestiges of the historically arbitrary, 
corrupt, and political nature of clemency persist. For instance, in political 
campaigns office-seekers have made promises to release or not release 
certain individuals, thus serving themselves rather than the public 
good.3lS 
At the beginning of the 1992 presidential campaign, Arkansas Gov-
ernor Bill Clinton rejected the clemency bid of Ricky Rector, a brain-
damaged murderer on death row in Arkansas.3t9 Rector shot a police 
officer and then shot himself in the head, resulting in severe brain dam-
age after a prefrontal lobotomy. 320 Clinton denied clemency to Rector 
his life. Genesis 4:8-16 (King James). Barrabas, a convicted murderer, was set free to 
the Jewish people during Passover. John 18:38-40 (King James). 
313. MooRE, supra note 247, at 14-17; Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 585-
89. 
314. MooRE, supra note 247, at 17-19 (noting that although pardons were "freely 
given," they were not given for free). See also Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, 
at 588. 
315. The Reformation was largely spurred by the papal sale of indulgences, and in 
England a political struggle raged for centuries over the right to exercise the pardon-
ing power. MOORE, supra note 247, at 22. 
316. Montesquieu argued that in a republic there could be no pardon, because the 
"power to punish rested with the people, and a pardon would unjustifiably tamper 
with their decisions." Id. at 24 (citing CHARLEs DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE 
SPIRIT OF LAwS (1900». Blackstone argued there was no place in a democracy for 
pardons; and they were abolished in France during the French Revolution and for ten 
years afterward. Id. 
317. Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 592-93 (citing cases of large pardons 
related to the Pennsylvania whiskey rebellion and under the Alien and Sedition Act). 
318. See id. at 573 (citing 20120: Why Not Wilber Rideau? (ABC television broad-
cast, Apr. 14, 1989) (discussing former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards' refusal to 
release a rehabilitated prisoner because of a campaign promise to a victim of the 
incarcerated man». 
319. Clinton: "There Might Be More Executions If Elected," UPI, Mar. 29, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file. 
320. Linda Diebel, Admirers Say He's "Very Bright," the Right Man for the Times. 
Critics Call Him "Slick Willy," the Consummate Yuppie. But Why, When He's On the 
Verge of Becoming U.S. President, Are People Still Wondering: Who is Bill Clinton?, 
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because he believed that the prisoner did not fall below the federal stan-
dard for mental incompetence.321 The denial was controversial, and 
Rector's lawyers asserted the prisoner had the mental capacity of a 
"drugged up three- or four-year 0Id.,,322 Clinton has long stated that he 
personally supports the death penalty for "cop killers, multiple murderers 
and drug kingpins" and has never commuted the sentence of a murderer 
on death roW.323 It is impossible to know whether he would have com-
muted the ~ ~erneIlci Of Itector if 1Ie had DOt--beeir vUtnenible to at-
tacks by Republicans during the campaign. He has reportedly stated that 
his stand on the death penalty will "pre-empt the type of Republican 
attacks that weighed down the campaign of [former Democratic presiden-
tial candidates]. ,,324 Clinton has commuted the life sentences of more 
than forty murderers not on death row,32!5 and it has been noted that his 
use of the clemency power has fluctuated with his political losses. It is 
believed that he lost his initial re-election bid for governor of Arkansas in 
part because of his failure to set death sentence dates quicldy enough to 
allow executions to proceed, as well as for his commutation of the nu-
merous life sentences.326 After Clinton won re-election the following 
term, he granted clemency rarely and expeditiously set execution 
dates.327 After former President George Bush lost his re-election bid, 
several Republican politicians urged him to pardon all Iran-Contra sus-
pects, a position unthinkable a mere week earlier.328 And in December 
TORONTO STAR, Oct 25, 1992, at F1. 
321. See George E. Jordan, Clinton & Crime: Supports Capital Punishment as Sign 
of Toughness, NEWSDAY, May 4, 1992, at 3. 
322. Diebel, supra note 320. 
323. Jordan, supra note 321 (Clinton has never granted a petition for clemency for a 
murderer sentenced to death); Tamar Lewin, Vast Discretion for Governors in Deci-
sion on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMEs, May 20, 1992, at A14 (stating Clinton maintains 
he is personally in favor of the death penalty); Convicted Cop Killer Executed After 
Governor Bill Clinton Denies Clemency, AGENCE FRANCE PREsSE, May 8, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file; Executed in Arkansas, WASH. TIMEs, 
May 9, 1992, at A2. But see Leslie Phillips, Adwatch, USA TODAY, Oct 8, 1992, at 
llA (asserting that Clinton commuted seventy death sentences, including nineteen 
"midnight clemencies" at the end of his first term as a "lame duck" governor). 
324. Jordan, supra note 321. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. Of course, it is entirely consistent to view a political loss as a referendum 
on unpopular aspects of an elected official's term, and Governor Clinton may well 
have changed his outlook and behavior in response to unfavorable public sentiment 
regarding his former policy of inaction. 
328. See Dole Wants Probe of Prosecutor Walsh; He Calls Weinberger Indictment a 
Demo Ploy, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 1992, at A3 (Senate minority leader Robert Dole 
(R-Kansas) called on former President Bush to pardon all those involved in the Iran-
Contra scandals, including former Reagan administration Defense Secretary Caspar 
Weinberger). 
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of 199b Bush--nardon~ not onlyJl!!!.J9!1Der _c!ef~IlSL~tan',-<:aspar 
Weinburger, but also five others involved in wrongdoing connected with 
the Iran-Contra scandal.329 In California, former Governor Edmund (pat) 
Brown once refused the clemency bid of a murderer he was convinced 
had mental deficiencies because a key supporter of a piece of legislation 
on migrant workers, who held the swing vote that could have killed the 
_ legislation. strongly supported the execution 330 
Arbitrary,· politically motivated, or politically expedient uses of the 
clemency power seem unfair; they also do not promote justice within our 
criminal justice system. There are philosophical and theoretical reasons 
for this perception of unfairness,331 but more simply, most ordinary 
people probably believe that a review of one's sentence should be based 
on considerations of fairness and justice, rather than political expediency. 
When granted only for the benefit of the individual prisoner and for the 
benefit of the executive as politician, there is no consideration of justice 
or benefit to society, thus offending both retributive and utilitarian con-
cerns. 
Even though the clemency power has arguably been used arbitrarily 
and without much concern for justice or the common good,332 it has re-
mained in the sole discretion of the executive in almost every jurisdiction. 
Accountability comes only through the ballot box.333 The Supreme 
Court has declined to hold that the discretion inherent in executive clem-
ency is unconstitutionally arbitrary,334 at least in the context of capital 
329. David Johnston, The Pardons; Bush Pardons 6 in Iran-Contra Affair, Aborting 
a Weinberger Trial; Prosecutor Assails "Cover-Up," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at 
lA. 
330. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 608. 
331. 
Calculations of advantage to be gained - the pardoner's advantage or 
the offender's, advantages for society in general or for a political 
party in particular - are not good reasons [for pardoning] .... 
They invite the [executive] to use an offender as a pawn in a game 
not of the offender's own choosing. They lead to inequity between of-
fenders. They frustrate the justice system's already flawed effort to 
match punishment with blameworthiness. And they ... [allow] an of-
fender to leave his debt to society unpaid. 
MOORE, supra note 247, at 226-27. 
332. For a host of examples, see Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3. 
333. The clemency power has been so delegated except for a brief period in the 
early days of the United States, when early settlers vested the power in the state 
legislatures or in a legislative council that worked with the governor. See Kobil, Mer-
cy Strained, supra note 3, at 590, 604. However, the framers of the Constitution 
vested the federal clemency power solely in the executive. Susan E. Martin, Commu-
tation of Prison Sentences: Practice, Promise, and Limitation, 29 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 593, 593-94 (1983). 
334. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (plurality opinion). See Note, A 
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cases on petition for clemency. Thus, it seems clear from a constitutional 
and traditional perspective that the final decision of a governor in grant-
ing or denying clemency petitions is not subject to collateral attack on 
due process grounds and is therefore fmal and non-reviewable. In addi-
tion, the express delegation of the power to the executive seems to re-
solve any separation-of-powers problem in favor of the governor should 
the legislature attempt to provide for ~ns _~_~ifi.E:antly: ~ 
the -governor'S discretion or mandate- ctemeneyin particular cases or 
situations. 
The power of clemency in the federal and state governments resides 
primarily in the executive.33S In California, the clemency power is vest-
ed in the governor by the constitution336 and procedures are set forth by 
statute.337 The California Constitution explicitly allows the governor, in 
Matter of Ufe and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital Clemency Proceedings, 
90 YALE LJ. 889, 890 n.5 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Due Process Protection] (Gregg 
leaves unchanged the uncertain constitutional status of state clemency provisions not 
surrounded by due process protection). See also Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19 (1975) 
(state prisoner's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights not violated when a gover-
nor commutes a death sentence to ninety-nine years in prison, despite state appellate 
court's vacating death sentence, effectively resulting in a term of life imprisonment). 
335. The "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United 
States, except in cases of Impeachment," is vested in the President of the United 
States. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. In twenty-nine states, the power is vested 
solely in the executive, usually by state constitution. In the remaining states, the 
power is exercised either jointly by the governor and an administrative body or solely 
by an administrative body appointed by the governor. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, 
supra note 3, at 605. 
336. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8. 
337. Under California law, the Board of Prison Terms has long been authorized to 
report to the governor 
from time to time the names of any and all persons imprisoned in 
any state prison who, in its judgment, ought to have a commutation 
of sentence or be pardoned and set at liberty on account of good 
conduct, or unusual term of sentence, or any other cause which, in 
their opinion, should entitle the prisoner to a pardon or commutation 
of sentence. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801 (West 1982). See infra notes 371-72 and accompanying 
text for discussion of language recently added that specifically authorizes the Board of 
Prison Terms to consider "battered woman syndrome" in its recommendations for 
clemency. 
Penal Code section 4804 mandates that "[a]t least 10 days before the Governor 
acts upon an application for a pardon, written notice . . . must be served upon the 
district attorney of the county in which the conviction was had," and section 4806 
excuses such notice in cases of impending death or imminent release. 
Under the Constitution and the Penal Code, the governor must report to the leg-
islature each reprieve, pardon, and commutation granted, stating the pertinent facts and 
the reasons for granting it. In addition, he may not grant a pardon or commutation to 
a person twice convicted of a felony except on recommendation of the Supreme 
Court, four justices concurring. In the case of commutation, the governor must pro-
vide the name, sentence, date, reason for conviction, and reason for granting commu-
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the exercise of the power, to set "conditions the Governor deems prop-
er.'t338 Some state governors have issued detailed information and 
guidelines setting forth the factors that influence and guide their deci-
sions.339 Governor Wilson has issued no such guidelines. However, his 
response to the battered women who petitioned him340 provides some 
information on his views. In contrast to the view of Massachusetts Gover-
DOf Willimn Wekl w~ ~. j)f()yi<te ~ "~ G<Jv~rnor views 
commutation bOffi as an exttaoromary· remedy ana as an integral partot 
the correctional process,,,341 Governor Wilson has stated that he views 
clemency as a "rare and extraordinary" remedy based on "extreme and 
unusual hardship or innocence.',342 Governor Wilson's letter indicates 
tation. CAL. CONST. art. Y, §8; CAL. PENAL CODE § 4807 (West 1982). 
338. CAL. CONST. art. Y, § 8(a) provides: "Subject to application procedures provid-
ed by statute, the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems proper, may grant a 
reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in cases of impeachment." 
339. Massachusetts Governor William Weld has provided the following general infor-
mation: 
The Governor views commutation both as an extraordinary remedy and 
as an integral part of the corrections process. [Its] availability ... is 
not intended to serve as a review of the proceedings of the trial court 
or of the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. It is intended to serve 
as a strong motivation for confined persons to utilize available re-
sources for self-development and self-improvement and as an incentive 
for them to become law-abiding citizens and return to society. 
WllllAM F. WELD, COMMUfATION GUIDELINES AND PETmON 1 (Sept. 1991) 
[hereinafter WELD GUIDELINES] (on me with author). 
In order to guide the Advisory Board of Pardons in its review and recommen-
dations on petitions for clemency, Weld established a "uniform policy." It provides, in 
relevant part, that a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that she has made "exceptional strides" in self-development and self-
improvement and would be a law-abiding citizen. The petitioner may also show that 
she is suffering from a critical illness, that she has a severe and chronic disability, or 
that her continued incarceration would constitute gross unfairness because of the basic 
equities involved. Such basic inequities include a history of abuse suffered by the 
petitioner at the hands of the victim that significantly contributed to or brought about 
the offense. The guidelines also contain extensive requirements for notice (to district 
attorneys, victims, and their families), including a public notice requirement, and a list 
of required documentation. Id. 
340. Wilson Letter, supra note 6. 
341. Id. 
342. The letter reads, in relevant part: 
All . . . requests [for commutation] are referred to the Board of Pris-
on Terms for investigation . . . based solely on the written re-
cord . . . augmented by materials submitted by the applicant 
Since you allege your crime was the result of spousal abuse, it is 
important . . . to indicate how or if this information was presented at 
your criminal trial; whether it was raised on appeal; any facts miti-
gating your commitment offense; and, information concerning any 
Winter 1993) CLEMENCY FOR BA'ITERED WOMEN 69 
that he does not view the clemency power as a tool for adjusting sen-
tences to comport with desert or with society's interests in justice. The 
power has been used only twice in California since 1978.343 
However, the clemency power can also be used to correct unjust 
results in our criminal justice system.344 In battered women's cases -
cases in which social, legal, and political factors strongly influence the 
trials and verdicts - the clemency power serves as a necessary and pow-
erful tool fur ensunng· that justice is· done; 
C. POLmCAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BATIERED WOMEN'S CASES 
Clemency is inherently political.34s Yet it is also a personal deci-
sion. A governor acts based on all his or her beliefs and values in deter-
mining whether clemency should be granted. Governor Celeste of Ohio 
had been a longtime advocate for the rights of battered women, turning 
his Cleveland home into a battered women's shelter when he moved to 
Columbus to become governor in the mid-1970s.346 In granting clemen-
cy, Celeste doubted that the women would pose a continuing threat to 
society, and he cited previous abuse as a reason for granting clemency. 
He initiated the case reviews himself, directing his aides "to review the 
records of women convicted of violent crimes against spouses or compan-
ions that may have been brought on by physical abuse.,,347 
Ann Richards, the governor of Texas, recently signed two items of 
rehabilitative efforts in prison 
Normally, our office does not consider applications for executive clem-
ency for individuals currently under sentence except on grounds of 
either extreme and unusual hardship or innocence . . . [and] only in 
rare and extraordinary cases does a Governor commute a sentence, and 
then usually upon the favorable recommendation of the Board of Pris-
on Terms, the District Attorney and the sentencing judge. 
ld. at 1-2. 
343. See id. at 2 (stating that the power has been used only once since 1978 - in 
a case of innocence). However, in the spring of 1992, Governor WIlson commuted 
the sentence of Birdie Foley, a battered woman incarcerated for killing her abuser. 
Foley (represented by one of the Coalition advocates) had cancer of the esophagus 
and died two days later. Barbieri, Mixed Victory, supra note 54. Although the gover-
nor issued no reason for the grant, it is believed that this was an isolated instance, in 
keeping with the governor's policy of granting commutation in cases "of extreme and 
unusual hardship." See id.; Wilson Letter, supra note 6, at 1 (standard quoted from 
governor's letter to petitioners). 
344. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 571 (clemency individualizes sen-
tences and remits undeserved punishment). 
345. Note, Due Process Protection, supra note 334, at 893-94 (clemency addresses 
factors that courts are unable to consider in setting or reviewing sentences). 
346. Wilkerson, Clemency Granted to 25. supra note 9. 
347. ld. 
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legislation, one of which is the ''Texas Resolution," which requested the 
governor to use her authority to direct the Texas Board of Pardons and 
Paroles to investigate the cases of "all persons convicted [of crimes] 
which directly related to victimization by domestic violence.,,348 The 
Resolution and the second bill - an evidentiary bill providing for the 
admissibility of battered woman syndrome expert opinion testimony at 
trial - had been passed earlier but were vetoed by then-Governor Bill 
Clements m ~.WheiitlieY-came-befOre Rlcfurr(lS-iWo yeai'Slater ihe 
signed them, calling the laws "a great step forward."349 
The influence of personal beliefs and the existence of a sympathetic 
executive can account for such a switch in executive policy as occurred 
in Texas. But a sympathetic executive acting on personal beliefs can 
engender a political backlash as well. Governor Celeste was on his way 
out of office when he granted clemency to the battered women in Ohio. 
He was modestly rebuked for granting clemency in these cases.350 How-
ever, on January 10, 1991, four days before leaving office, he granted 
clemency to eight people on death row, including all four women on 
death row. 351 The ensuing flurry of criticism was unprecedented. The 
new governor, George Voinovich, a supporter of capital punishment, 
immediately requested the newly elected Ohio attorney general, Lee Fish-
er, to "undo" the grants of clemency.3s2 Fisher challenged seven of the 
death penalty clemencies, along with four grants of clemency in non-cap-
ital cases, in court on the ground that Governor Celeste failed to follow 
348. Texas Concurrent Resolution 26, S.CR No. 26 (Apr. 26, 1991); Mark 
Langford, Resolution Calls for Review of Murder Cases Involving Battered Spouses, 
UPI, Mar. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis file, UPI library. See also infra notes 
396-405 and accompanying text for discussion of similar California proposal. 
349. Clemency Update, DoUBLE-TIME, supra note 14, at 5. 
350. Celeste was criticized by the media and prosecutors, many of whom claimed 
that the women were never abused or denied being abuse. See Kobil, Do the Paper-
work, supra note 248, at 679-80. See also Tim Doulin and Jill Riepenhoff, Clemency 
Decision Stirs Controversy, COL. DISP., Dec. 23, 1990, at lA; Mother Blasts Celeste 
for Freeing Son's Killer, UPI, Dec. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI 
file. 
351. Kobil, Do the Paperwork. supra note 248, at 679-80. Although 105 prisoners 
were on death row, Celeste commuted the sentences of only eight, and six of those 
sentences were commuted to life in prison without possibility of parole. Id. at 680. In 
addition, he appeared to have used what Kobil would call '~ustice-enhancing" criteria 
in arriving at his decisions. He considered the mental capacity of the offender, length 
of time served, and the "perceived racial imbalance on Death Row." Id. Nevertheless, 
critics called the clemencies a "rupture of Ohio's system of justice." Id. at 683 (citing 
Killers Spared, COLUMBUS DISP., Jan. 14, 1991, at 8A). Celeste appears to have 
granted fewer clemencies to convicted murderers in his two terms than either of the 
prior two Ohio governors. 
352. Id. at 681. 
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statutory notice requirements.3s3 Those notice requirements were drafted 
by the legislature under its authority to make provisions regarding the ap-
plication for clemencies, as stated in the Ohio Constitution.3S4 Fisher 
won at trial and the grants of clemency were reversed.3SS The case is 
now on appeal and will almost certainly be appealed to the Ohio Su-
preme COurt.356 Although it was the death penalty cases and not the 
battered women's clemencies uthat were attacked, such political maneu-
vering is certainly· fOleseeable in battered WOmetn· mass ciemenCie-s.:m 
Other than such constitutional and statutory wrangling (which will be 
rare if the executive is cautious in his or her "excesses"), the only check 
on the exercise of the clemency power is electoral accountability.3s8 
Such accountability may be achieved directly by the public in the form of 
ouster by election or through the public's representatives, who may im-
peach for specific abuses. The statutory and constitutional provisions in 
California regarding clemency grant substantial discretion to the governor. 
The power is not limited by burdensome notice requirements or the re-
quirement that a prisoner serve a minimum number of years of his or her 
sentence before applying. As a result, Governor Wilson would not likely 
experience attack by fellow politicians, especially since the clemency bid 
is supported generally by many assembly members.3S9 He needs to wor-
ry only about a public backlash that would endanger his chances for re-
election. Such ouster for what the public believes is an abuse of the 
clemency power is not unprecedented. Governors have been impeached 
and indicted for corrupt pardoning practices,360 and they have lost re-
election bids for making unpopular clemency grants that were fully jus-
353. Id. at 681, 686-87. 
354. See id. at 686-89. But see MOORE, supra note 247, at 244 (noting that both 
Presidents Ford (in the Nixon pardon) and Reagan (when he pardoned FBI agents) 
failed to wait the required statutory minimum number of years before pardoning some 
prisoners during their presidencies). 
355. See Attorney General Applauds Decision on Commutations, UPI, Feb. 13, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI fIle. 
356. Telephone Interview with Daniel Kobil, assistant professor of law, Capital Uni-
versity Law School (Dec. 1, 1992). 
357. Although Governor Schaefer of Maryland was roundly criticized at the time of 
the clemencies, there has been no known organized opposition against him arising out 
of the grants. Telephone Interview with news desk reporter at The Baltimore Sun 
(Nov. 11, 1992). 
358. Note, Due Process Protection, supra note 334, at 894-95 and sources cited 
therein. 
359. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text, and infra notes 371-72, 378-79, 
and 385-88 and accompanying text for discussion of the legislature's response to the 
clemency bid. 
360. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 607 (discussing the impeachment of 
Oklahoma Governor J.C. Walton in 1923 and the indictment of Tennessee Governor 
Ray Blanton in the 1980s). 
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tified.361 Such political considerations could hamper the desire to grant 
clemency petitions. Indeed, California governors have done so rarely. 
Two institutions in society are potential sources of opposition to 
grants of mass clemency: district attorneys362 and the media.363 In 
California, Michael Sweet, the executive director of the California District 
Attorneys Association, says that prosecutors would probably oppose a 
"IIl9vement" for clemency in battered women's cases, but they would 
pro1)aDryiiotoppose individual grants of cleffiency after going Wmto ttre: 
facts and circumstances of each case.,,364 Prosecutors also assailed the 
granting of clemency en masse in Ohio and Maryland, voicing the con-
cern that women now had a "license to kill."36S However, at least one 
district attorney has expressed support for making commutation available 
to women who did not have the opportunity to present evidence of abuse 
at trial.366 
The media reaction is also difficult to gauge. According to Governor 
Celeste of Ohio, backlash is inevitable, and the negative reaction to a 
grant of clemency to battered women in Maryland could have been pre-
dicted.367 The backlash may come in the form of negative press cover-
361. See id. (discussing failed re-election bids of former Dlinois Governor John 
Altgeld, who pardoned wrongly convicted anarchists in the Chicago Haymarket labor 
bombing, and Ohio Governor Michael DiSalle, who commuted the death sentences of 
six individuals in the early 1960s). Although the justification of the pardon is debat-
ed, President Ford may have lost his re-election race against Jimmy Carter because of 
his pardon of Nixon. 
362. See supra notes 4, 154-64 and accompanying text 
363. See Baum, Backlash, supra note 7 (describing the "political pounding" Governor 
Schaefer of Maryland absorbed since granting eight battered women clemency; alle-
gations came from the media, prosecutors, and a formerly battered ex-wife of one of 
the victims. They accused the governor of doing a "sloppy job," although governor's 
aide says the media didn't know all the facts). See also supra note 53. 
364. Barbieri, Women's Movement, supra note 46. See also Barbieri, Push for Clem-
ency, supra note 15. 
365. See Many Battered Women; Ohio Governor Spares Convicted Murderers, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Jan. 12, 1991, at A15. See also supra notes 4, 155 (Ohio Prosecuting 
Attorneys' Association president, among others, fears women will now kill more in-
stead of seeking divorce). 
366. Middlesex County district attorney Thomas Reilly welcomed Massachusetts Gov-
ernor William Weld's alteration of his office's guidelines as they relate to battered 
women, supra note 339. Weld issued the new guidelines, saying they are a "recogni-
tion of the tragedy of the physical abuse of women which results in the homicide of 
a woman nearly every 22 days in Massachusetts." Frank Phillips, Weld Relaxes Prison 
Appeal By Battered Women, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept 27, 1991, at 17. See also Susan 
Diesenhouse, Women Driven to Kill Are Shown More Mercy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
1989, at AlO (reporting that the prosecutor in Kathleen Kaplan's case, see supra note 
14, believes it is "appropriate to look at the circumstances that drive her to the 
crime"). 
367. Phillips, Weld Relaxes Prison Appeal, supra note 366. 
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age, such as that endured by Maryland Governor William Schaefer.368 
To date, the California petitioners have garnered much positive media 
coverage, and there appears to be no vocal media opposition. 
D. THE GoVERNOR'S OPTIONS 
Governor Wilson should recognize that clemency, "properly exercised 
and freed of political pressures, represents an ideal vehicle for remedying 
-many--ef tile .p~ iiiliereDt·m fOOrl··5Ysfem of ciiminal jUstiee.u369 
Although the executive branch may well be ''the most logical choice to 
pursue refinement of the clemency power,,,370 Governor Wilson can and 
should share the political burden and risk of clemency decisions with the 
California Legislature and the Board of Prison Terms. This section de-
scribes some proposed legislation and makes recommendations regarding 
the legislation and other possible solutions. Governor Wilson has been 
responsive to legislation that aids battered women. However, he has re-
sisted some important language changes contained in evidentiary bills and 
has resisted any change in the distribution of responsibility and power in 
the clemency process. 
1. Board of Prison Terms 
Governor Wilson should give the Board of Prison Terms guidance as 
it begins to review battered women's cases with a view toward recom-
mending that petitions filed on behalf of battered women be granted or 
denied. The Board is now authorized by statute to make clemency rec-
ommendations to the governor generally, and it may specifically recom-
mend battered women's cases on account of battered woman syndrome. 
(a) Authorization 
Until recently, the Board of Prison Terms was authorized by Penal 
Code section 4801 
to report from time to time the names of . . . persons impris-
oned . . . who, in its judgment, ought to have a commutation of 
sentence or be pardoned and set at liberty on account of good 
conduct, or unusual term of sentence, or any other cause, which, 
in its opinion, should entitle the prisoner to a pardon or commu-
tation of sentence. 
The governor recently signed AB 3436, introduced by Assemblywom-
an Barbara Friedman (D-Los Angeles).371 This bill explicitly includes 
368. See supra notes 4, 53 and accompanying text 
369. See Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 613. 
370. Id. at 622. 
371. 1992 Cal ALS 1138, 1992 Cal AB 3436, stats. 1992 ch. 1138 (Deering's Adv. 
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battered woman syndrome as a cause the Board of Prison Terms may 
consider in determining that a prisoner is entitled to pardon or commuta-
tion of sentence. It amends Penal Code section 4801 to read, " . . . or 
any other cause, including battered woman syndrome, which, in its opin-
ion, should entitle the prisoner to a pardon or commutation of sen-
tence."372 
~ ~<l of Prison Terms luI.d the authority to consider the equities 
of batterecr women-'-s· caSes attalong urulerthemOre -general hmguage of 
the original section. However, the new language is a significant addition 
to the code. It suggests that the condition of battered women goes to the 
sentence deserved. Thus, commutation is seen less as an act of "mercy" 
than an act that corrects a fundamental injustice. 
The fact that the Board has been advised to take battered woman syn-
drome into account may be limiting, however. The Board must be trained 
to recognize the stereotypes suggested by battered woman syndrome373 
and its insufficiencies, and should not be constrained to recommend clem-
ency petitions only in paradigm cases. The Board should take into ac-
count the emotional, financial, and cultural reasons that may influence a 
battered woman's decision to stay. It should also be informed of theories 
that may explain her defensive act, such as the ability to rate violence or 
her perception that something in the threats or violence is different than 
before. It should not rely only on the psychological, or learned help-
lessness, aspect of battered woman syndrome. 
In addition, the bill as originally proposed included broader lan-
guage that also authorized the Board to consider experiences of victims of 
domestic violence. The language was dropped because of indications that 
the bill would not be signed if such "experiences" language were in the 
bill before the govemor.374 It remains to be seen how the Board will 
define "battered woman syndrome" and whether it will limit its inquiry to 
evidence included in its definition of battered woman syndrome because 
the "experiences" language was not contained in the final bill. 
On the other hand, the language does not necessarily constrain the 
Board. It may still go beyond a narrow definition of the battered woman 
syndrome in making clemency recommendations to the govemor.37S In 
Legis. Svc. 1992) (approved by the governor, Sept. 28, 1992). 
372. [d. 
373. See supra notes 212-13, 237-38, 378-79 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of stereotyping and see generally notes 204-46 for limitations of the battered woman 
syndrome. 
374. Telephone Interview with John Young, administrative assistant to Assemblywom-
an Barbara Friedman (Dec. 1, 1992). 
375. This may be one advantage to broad definitions of the battered woman syn-
drome, whose use was criticized supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. How-
ever, I maintain that it is best to use the battered woman syndrome label to refer 
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California both the Evidence Code376 and case lawn have allowed a 
broad interpretation of battered woman syndrome. The absence of the 
"experiences" language does not mean that the Board cannot consider 
factors beyond the classic formulation of battered woman syndrome, as 
Penal Code section 4801 has never been an exhaustive list of the grounds 
upon which the Board may base its clemency recommendations. Al-
.~. !lte. neW_~ P'l!PQ!1S ~_allo\.VJI1~~dn!()_~()~i~ .~ 
Woman··synorome--evlOeoce, it could have done so before, ana if is--not 
now limited to considering only syndrome evidence in battered women's 
cases. 
(b) Training 
With this more specific authorization in the Penal Code must come 
increased guidance and training. A second bill affecting the Board of 
Prison Terms may help curb the tendency to overstress only the psycho-
logical aspects of the battered woman syndrome. Jackie Speier CD-So. 
San Francisco), head of the Assembly Women's Caucus, proposed, and 
the governor signed, a bill requiring all commissioners and deputy com-
missioners of the Board of Prison Terms to receive initial training on 
issues specific to domestic violence cases and battered woman syndrome. 
This training would be mandatory for "all commissioners and deputy 
commissioners who conduct hearings to consider the parole suitability of 
prisoners or the setting of a parole release date ... 378 It is not clear from 
the wording of the statute that this includes all Board members who 
would be reviewing or have authority to review the cases of battered 
women who have petitioned for clemency.379 If the legislation does not 
specifically to the theory of learned helplessness and the cycle of violence as 
originally framed by Lenore Walker, supra notes 190-203. Battered women's advo-
cates should then continue to address the need to include in court the experiences of 
victims of domestic violence and all other relevant evidence tending to explain a 
woman's actions (including expert testimony not relying on the Walker formulation of 
battered woman syndrome). They should do so by advocating further modifications of 
the Evidence and Penal Codes, and by continuing to press for appellate review of 
unfavorable decisions that rejected arguments to modify the substantive definitions of 
self-defense law. 
376. See supra note 56 for the language of the Evidence Code provision defining 
battered woman syndrome for the purposes of admitting expert testimony in criminal 
cases. 
377. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405, 412-13 (1992) (accepting the contents 
of an affidavit as evidence describing battered woman syndrome, including descriptions 
of behavior that include the elements of battered woman syndrome as developed by 
Lenore Walker and including descriptions of behavior not contained in the Walker 
theory of battered woman syndrome). 
378. 1992 Cal ALS 296, 1992 Cal AD 2401, Stats. 1992 ch. 296 (Deering's Adv. 
Legis. Svc. 1992) (approved by the governor, July 22, 1992). 
379. The legislation does not clearly provide that all those reviewing clemency peti-
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cover all persons who will review petitions for clemency submitted by or 
on behalf of battered women who killed, such legislation should be 
passed clearly mandating such training. 
(c) Enabling guidelines 
It is unclear whether the Board of Prison Terms has ever recom-
llIelllJecJthata battered woman'~ sen.te1lCe be u commuted fer jUstice en 
hancing reasons. In addition, only one commutation has been granted in 
California since 1978. The power is used little in California and only in 
cases of "extreme and unusual hardship or innocence.'t380 It is thus no 
surprise that the Board of Prison Terms is not aided by more specific 
guidelines. The battered woman syndrome amendment to Penal Code 
section 4801 is helpful, but more is needed. 
In responding to the petitioners' letter, the governor stated, "Since 
you allege your crime was the result of spousal abuse, it is important . . . 
to indicate how or if this information was presented at your criminal trial; 
whether it was raised on appeal; any facts mitigating your commitment 
offense; and information concerning any rehabilitative efforts in pris-
on."381 
Now that the Board is expressly authorized to consider the battered 
woman syndrome, the governor should give the Board more guidance in 
considering the factors he listed in his letter.382 He should specify the 
level of importance to be attached to presenting the claim of battering at 
trial or on appeal. Relevant expert opinion testimony on battered woman 
syndrome is now admissible in all criminal trials by statute. It remains to 
be seen whether the inability to put syndrome evidence before the jury 
will be the most relevant question in recommending cases deserving of 
clemency, or even a major consideration. A woman may have had inef-
fective trial counsel,383 or the finder of fact may not consider the bat-
tions of battered women be trained in domestic violence issues and battered woman 
syndrome. See id. (mentioning only those who conduct hearings for the purpose of 
considering parole suitability). The digest of the bill states that the Board of Prison 
Terms consists of nine commissioners who set parole dates. Id. Such initial training 
for these nine would accomplish the desired goal of training those on the Board who 
would also decide clemency petitions. However, the Board is authorized to deputize 
others for the purpose of "hearing cases and making decisions." Id. Since the bill 
only mandates training for deputy commissioners who would consider parole suitabili-
ty, deputy commissioners appointed only to review battered women's clemency peti-
tions would not be required by law to receive the training. 
380. See Wilson Letter, supra note 6. 
381. Id. 
382. See Wilson Letter, supra note 6. 
383. Although the court in People v. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405, 407 (1992), held 
that a trial attorney's failure to offer expert testimony on battered woman syndrome 
may be ineffective assistance of counsel, the court in People v. Aris held that a trial 
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tered woman syndrome a viable explanation for her behavior.384 Judges 
and juries continue to convict despite facts that strongly indicate that a 
"confrontation" was underway and despite the introduction of expert 
testimony on battered woman syndrome. Admissibility of such evidence 
and appellate review should not be litmus tests. In addition, a history of 
abuse should be considered a mitigating factor, and the governor should 
idemif)r what "rehabilitation" means in_the context Df battered women 
who kill. 
The exercise of the clemency power in battered women's cases must 
be ongoing. This clemency drive should not be seen as a "one-shot" ef-
fort designed only to compensate battered women now incarcerated for 
their inability to present battered woman syndrome evidence at their 
trials. Governor Wilson must give his Board more guidance and ensure 
that the Board is trained initially and continually on battered women's 
issues to guarantee the Board's effectiveness in recommending clemency 
petitions for battered women who kill. 
2. The California Legislature 
Assembly members have proposed legislation that would modify the 
substantive law of self-defense38S and that would further modify the evi-
court's exclusion of such testimony was hannless error. People v. Aris, 215 Cal. 
App. 3d 1178, 1199-1200 (1989). Both courts held that evidence of battered woman 
syndrome was irrelevant to the objective prong of perfect self-defense. See supra 
notes 109-112 and accompanying text. Thus, a battered woman who offers expert 
testimony on battered woman syndrome or introduces past history of violent abuse 
may still not get a perfect self-defense instruction, and a jury may reject even an 
imperfect self-defense claim. 
384. See, e.g., supra note 238 (case holdings that prevented women from using the 
testimony because their actions kept them from being considered "good" battered 
women). 
385. Assembly member Gwen Moore (D-Los Angeles) introduced AB 591 last year. 
The bill included a provision that would have amended the Penal Code to add a 
fourth definition under the offense of manslaughter. In addition to voluntary, invol-
untary, and vehicular manslaughter, the legislation proposed that manslaughter also be 
defined as ''the unlawful killing of a human being when, at the time of the killing, 
the person who kills had an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend 
against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury." AB 591 (proposed, Feb. 19, 
1991). 
This bill did not make it through the legislature largely because of opposition by 
prosecutors, who recognized that the legislation would codify the California Supreme 
Court's decision in People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668 (1979). In that case, the court 
held that an honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense negates malice 
and reduces the offense to manslaughter. [d. at 674, 679. This principle is recognized 
in California as "imperfect" self-defense. See People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 
1186 (1989) (imperfect self-defense requires only subjective honesty and negates mal-
ice aforethought, reducing the homicide to voluntary manslaughter). 
The legislation was introduced to preserve the Flannel decision. In 1991, the 
California Supreme Court ruled that California law will not allow a reduction of 
78 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:1 
dentiary rules regarding the admissibility at trial of battering evi-
dence. 386 In addition, bills that specifically authorize the consideration 
of battered woman syndrome in deciding clemency petitions and that pro-
vide training, both directed at the Board of Prison Terms, were passed in 
1992.387 Finally, the head of the Assembly Public Safety Committee 
proposed legislation, discussed below, that would have removed the clem-
eIWS decision pr~!n J>attered .women's cases to a special commission 
formed for the purpose of reviewiiig -only battered women'Seases-. - -
(a) Proposals for review commissions 
Assemblyman John Burton introduced, and Governor Wilson vetoed, 
murder to nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter in cases of diminished capacity. Peo-
ple v. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d 1103, 1107 (1991). It stated in a footnote that "[the doctrine 
of imperfect self-defense] has no application to the facts before us, and we do not 
decide whether it has been affected by [California law abolishing diminished capacity 
and redefining malice aforethought]." 
Prosecutors opposed the legislation; such opposition may have helped, rather than 
hurt, battered women. The principle of imperfect self-defense is an existing nonstatuto-
ry definition of manslaughter; even so, it is not a good idea to codify an offense 
under which a good-faith belief in the necessity of self-defense is an element of a 
crime. If and when the California Supreme Court determines that no nonstatutory 
definitions of manslaughter may exist under California law, the legislation would be 
necessary and appropriate. It may be better for battered women (or other victims of 
domestic violence) to have the benefit of a nonstatutory self-defense claim that is 
judge-made and may be judge-refined. 
However, if the legislation must be passed, it would be more helpful to define 
"unreasonable" and to provide also that a jury may consider more individualized traits 
or special circumstances or knowledge in applying an objective reasonable person test 
to cases in which victims of domestic violence kill abusers. See Maguigan, supra 
note 69, at 410 (describing New York's two-pronged "objective" test, set out in Peo-
ple v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986), that allows a subjective appraisal of 
honest and actual belief and an objective appraisal by the jury of whether a reason-
able person in the same circumstances would have acted in the same manner). 
386. AB 591 would have amended Evidence Code section 1107 to allow the intro-
duction of evidence of "experiences of victims [of] domestic violence" in addition to 
evidence of the battered woman syndrome. AB 591 (proposed, Feb 19, 1992). This 
bill, which also proposed the creation of a new class of manslaughter, see supra note 
385, was never enacted. 
In addition, AB 591 would have mandated the admission at trial of all relevant 
evidence on battering. The proposed amendment would have provided: 
In any case in which a defendant charged with murder or manslaugh-
ter ... raises as a defense ... in order to establish [his or her] 
reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to defend 
against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, [the defendant] 
shall be permitted to offer relevant evidence . . . that the defendant 
had been the victim of acts of domestic violence . . . by the de-
ceased. 
AB 591 (proposed, Feb. 19, 1991). 
387. See supra notes 371-72, 378-79 and accompanying text. 
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a bill that would have influenced the clemency process by providing for a 
separate clemency board to consider battered women's petitions.388 
Legislators in other states have sought to initiate the review of bat-
tered women's cases. The earliest such attempt, the ''Texas Resolu-
tion,"389 appealed to the governor of Texas to use her authority to direct 
the review board in that state to investigate "the cases of all persons who 
pled to or were convicted of murder or manslaughter when the offense 
was -directlY-related 10- Victimization bY~llomeSrlc viOlence. »-390 The resO:-
lution provided, "Because of [unreasonable] standards of justification, 
victims who kill abusers in self-defense may nonetheless be convicted of 
or plead guilty to murder or manslaughter, even if the homicide occurred 
after years of well-documented abuse."391 It provided that the Texas 
Board of Paroles and Pardons review all convictions of murder and man-
slaughter, after trial or upon a guilty plea, to look for evidence of batter-
ing. Many of the women identified were then expected to file petitions 
for commutation or pardon. Approximately 130 women have been identi-
fied as potential candidates. Of those identified by the Board, approxi-
mately thirty-five have provided evidence of battering sufficient to allow 
consideration of their cases to go forward.392 It is estimated that approx-
imately 300 women are in Texas prisons on murder or manslaughter con-
388. AB 2373 (vetoed Sept. 30, 1992). 
389. Texas S.C.R. No. 26 (Apr. 26, 1991). See supra notes 348-49 and accompa-
nying text for discussion of the history of the Texas Resolution. 
In addition, legislators in New York debated an assembly resolution asking Gov-
ernor Mario Cuomo to investigate the cases of all women convicted of murder or 
other felonies related to domestic violence. It urged him to review the cases with a 
view toward recommending commutations and pardons. Spencer, Legislators Seek 
Release, supra note 9. The assembly later urged Cuomo to direct his state parole 
board to consider the release of a specific group of battered women who had been 
self-identified. See Vivienne Walt, Battered Women in Jail; Assembly Urges Clemency 
for 75, NEWSDAY, Mar. 26, 1991 at 3. The resolution passed without debate. [d. 
In both Texas and New York, authors or sponsors of the bills recognized that 
the measures were necessary because of the inability of women to present evidence of 
abuse at trial. See Walt, supra note 389 (quoting Helene Weinstein (D-Brooklyn». See 
also Langford, supra note 348 (quoting a release by the Texas Council on Family 
Violence). However, the Texas measure also stated that victims of domestic violence 
face harsh penalties because of "unreasonable standards of justification," thus ac-
knowledging that the standards for justified self-defense may themselves be a consid-
eration. See UPI, Oct. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file. 
390. Texas S.C.R. No. 26 (Apr. 26, 1991). See also Langford, supra note 348. 
391. See also UPI, supra note 389 (Oct. 8, 1991). 
392. Telephone Interview with Jordan Faires, Texas Council on Family Violence 
(Dec. 2, 1992) (of the thirty-five potential candidates, fourteen had been referred to 
the Board of Pardons and Paroles by the special five-person board that initially 
screens the applications; the remaining approximately 100 potential candidates have 
either not yet provided information or have provided relatively little information). See 
also UPI, Oct. 8, 1991, supra note 389 (as of late 1991 more than 100 women had 
been identified by state officials and twenty-five had applied for clemency). 
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victions.393 
The resolution also provided that prosecutors, judges, police, and 
victims' families be consulted prior to a clemency decision and be al-
lowed thirty days to comment on the clemency petition. Then, a special 
five-member panel would review the cases and makes recommendations 
to the full parole board. Under Texas law, the governor may not com-
mute the sentences of pri~rs except on a favorable recommendation 
from the Board of I'aroles and Pardons.394 
Although the resolution is not a formal enactment, the process rec-
ommended in the resolution has been instituted and the review of con-
victions is underway with all the safeguards provided for in the resolu-
tion. Governor Ann Richards has expressed a desire to avoid the prob-
lems of a "blanket" clemency.39s 
The bill introduced by California Assemblyman Burton provided 
instead for a special Commission on Prisoner Pardons and Commutations. 
The commission would have operated under the governor's office, and its 
members would have been appointed by the governor.396 
The final version of the bill presented to Governor Wilson did not 
provide that the commission actively investigate the cases in which the 
offense was directly related to victimization by domestic violence, al-
though the bill as proposed initially by Assemblyman Burton did.397 In-
stead, after amendment in the California Senate, the bill provided that the 
commission review cases of persons convicted of killing a batterer, who 
have applied for clemency, "for evidence of repeated ... physical, sex-
ual, or psychological abuse to the prisoner by the victim."398 The com-
mission would, after finding "evidence of repeated or continuous 
393. Telephone Interview with Jordan Faires, Texas Council on Family Violence, 
supra note 392. 
394. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11(b) ("In all criminal cases, except treason and im-
peachment, the Governor shall have power, after conviction, on the . . . recommen-
dation and advice of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, or a majority thereof, to 
grant reprieves and commutations of punishment and pardons . . . . "). 
395. See Puente, supra note 14. However, the resolution was far-reaching in that it 
also directed the Texas Youth Commission and the Texas Juvenile Probation Commis-
sion to identify children convicted of killing family members in defense of themselves 
or others against an abuser. Id. 
396. AB 2373 (vetoed, Sept. 30, 1992). 
397. Assembly Committee on Public Safety, Hearing on AB 2373 (as introduced, 
Mar. 3, 1992), at 1. 
398. AB 2373 (vetoed, Sept. 30, 1992). See also Kobil, Mercy Strained, supra note 
3, at 622 (Kobil has proposed a separate clemency commission. He stated, "It is 
neither necessary nor desirable to follow blindly in the tradition of the royal preroga-
tive and vest both of these aspects [justice-enhancing and justice-neutral exercises] of 
clemency entirely in the chief executive"). Kobil suggests a bifurcated clemency pro-
cess, allowing a neutral professional board to make "justice-enhancing" clemency deci-
sions. Id. 
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abuse,,,399 have made recommendations to the governor on whether the 
petition should be granted or denied. 
Groups opposed to the bill contended that the investigation procedure 
initially proposed (and followed in Texas) is an "outreach" review proce-
dure that is too costly and burdensome; they contended that the prison 
grapevine would inform women of the opportunity to submit clemency 
petitions.400 Th<>se _ votiMfor tlte bill. thus assumed that .. women would 
learn of the review process and then apply for Clemency, thus savrng the 
commission the initial task of reviewing all cases in which women were 
convicted of murder or manslaughter after killing husbands or lovers. 
However, such an "outreach" review process could be important to a fair 
and systematic review. It could be done with the assistance of battered 
women's advocacy groups, and the cost may well be offset by the sav-
ings of thousands of dollars spent on incarcerating women who are ap-
propriate candidates for executive clemency.401 
In addition, the legislation as amended provided that one prosecutor 
and one criminal defense attorney would sit on the panel, and all mem-
bers would receive training on issues specific to domestic violence and 
battered woman syndrome.402 It also provided that "due consideration 
shall be granted the interests of public safety in deliberations . . . ,'0403 
that the commission shall "evenhandedly review the evidence,'t404 and 
that family members of victims would be afforded the right to present 
oral testimony or submit written evidence.40S 
Governor Wilson vetoed the bill, apparently determining that a sepa-
399. AB 2373 (August 26, 1992), at 2. 
400. See Senate Committee on Judiciary, Hearing on AB 2373 (as amended, Mar. 
12, 1992) (June 16, 1992). 
401. The California Coalition for Battered Women in Prison, see supra notes 46-54 
and accompanying text, has developed a questionnaire and formed a committee to 
identify battered women in prison for killing abusers. Telephone Interview with 
Minouche Kandel, California Coalition for Battered Women in Prison, supra note 19. 
The Texas Resolution provided for the identification and investigation of cases by the 
Texas Board of Paroles and Pardons, in conjunction with the Texas Council on Fami-
ly Violence, a private non-profit advocacy group. See Texas S.C.R. No. 26 (Apr. 26, 
1991). Such an outreach review procedure will entail some financial cost in forming 
a review group, implementing the questionnaire, contacting potential candidates for 
personal interviews, and other administrative costs. However, the financial cost of 
identifying the women should not be a determinative factor. The cost estimated for 
operation of the clemency commission is $50,000 per year, a cost easily offset by the 
release of even three petitioners. See Ways and Means Committee Analysis, Hearing 
on AB 2373 (as amended Mar. 12, 1992) (Apr. 8, 1992) (cost of incarcerating each 
female prisoner for a twelve-month period is over $20,(00). 
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rate battered women's clemency decisipn Qrocess is @.und~irable in-
fringement on his exclusive authority. He stated: 
Section 8 of Article V of the California Constitution confers sole 
authority on the Governor to grant pardons and commutations on 
the conditions the Governor deems proper. I take this responsi-
bility very seriously, and I consider each case based on its own 
merits. This bill is unnecessary, UDder current law the Board of 
Prison Terms is authorized to bring to my attention the names of 
any life prisoners who are believed to deserve a pardon or sen-
tence commutation, again, based on the merits of the individual 
case. 
This bill would duplicate information I now obtain through exist-
ing sources and encroach on the authority exclusively reserved to 
the Governor by the constitution to exercise the power of pardon 
and commutation. My predecessors and I, as well as our succes-
sors, are unfettered in seeking information and counsel in the 
exercise of this important constitutional authority.406 
The governor's contention that the bill would duplicate information 
he already receives is questionable. Under current law, the Board of Pris-
on Terms is authorized "from time to time" to bring to the governor's 
attention the names of certain persons deserving of clemency.407 This 
bill would instead establish a separate commission to review a discrete 
class of convictions - those of battered women who killed, who were 
convicted, and who applied for clemency - and recommend action to the 
governor on each petition with credible evidence of a history of battering. 
Since the commission would report on all such petitions received from 
battered women who killed, it would go beyond the current authority of 
the Board of Prison Terms to report "from time to time" those cases 
deserving of clemency. 
No California governor has granted clemency for justice-enhancing 
reasons to a battered woman who killed an abusive mate.408 It appears 
that the Board of Prison Terms has never recommended to a governor 
that he pardon a woman because her sentence is contrary to notions of 
406. Governor Pete Wilson, Veto Message (Sept. 30, 1992). 
407. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1992). 
408. No grant of clemency appears to have ever been made to a battered woman in 
California other than to Birdie Foley, who had cancer of the esophagus and died two 
days later, in March 1992. See supra note 343. . 
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justice. The amendment to Penal Code section 4801409 advises the 
Board of Prison Terms that the discovery of battered woman syndrome 
evidence may warrant recommendation to the governor that clemency be 
granted. But Assemblyman Burton's bill would add a process that would 
ensure that women who killed and applied for clemency had a thorough, 
independent inquiry into their cases. For these reasons, the review com-
mission would be a new, or at least more. complete, . SOurce of iDfoI'mation 
for GovelllOl Wilson. .-.- . 
In addition, it is doubtful that the commission would encroach on the 
governor's authority. Since the bill does not provide that the 
commission's recommendations are binding, it would not be a more "fet-
tering" procedure than Penal Code section 4801, which already expressly 
authorizes the Board of Prison terms to make recommendations. The bill 
would merely provide that a separate commission, rather than the Board, 
review the cases. This fact alone should not make the clemency commis-
sion legislation any more constitutionally problematic than section 4801. 
However, if the Board of Prison Terms, instead of the separate com-
mission, were instructed to perform the same review and recommendation 
task for all women applying for clemency who had been convicted of 
murder and manslaughter, the same goals could be achieved. It is the 
special task of reviewing the cases for histories of abuse and making 
recommendations to the Governor that is important. 
A separate board, with a prosecutor and criminal defense attorney, as 
well as some members of the general public who are not affiliated with 
the Board of Prison Terms, constitutes a more independent commission. 
However, the desire is for substance, not merely form. If the Board were 
issued a mandate to perform the same functions as the proposed com-
mission the same goals could be achieved. 
The potential sharing of the political risks with such a separate, inde-
pendent commission should be valued, however. Kobil has argued for a 
separate clemency commission to evaluate and decide clemency petitions 
that involve justice-enhancing goals. Although he prefers removing the 
power to make justice-enhancing grants of clemency from the execu-
tive,410 it is not necessary to remove it entirely from the auspices of the 
executive branch. It is probably best to keep it there, but to add standards 
and principles to the review procedure, and to allow the governor to 
409. See supra note 371. 
410. Kohil, Mercy Strained, supra note 3, at 622-23 ("[J]ustice-enbancing clemency 
decisions would be made by a professional board that is independent of the political 
pressures which inevitably distort the decisions of elected officials"). Kobil suggests 
a "democratized" board, with representatives of the general public, philosophers, cler-
ics and those who have "traditionally 0 • 0 made up a large percentage of those incar-
cerated 0 0 • 0" Id. at 623. 
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appoint a professional board and adopt a policy of accepting as binding 
its recommendations, at least in cases involving justice-enhancing deci-
sions. 
At the same time, a mandate that is stronger than that proposed by 
the clemency commission would be ideal. Governor Wilson should in-
struct the Board of Prison Terms, or a separate commission independent 
of the BQard. to initiate the review of all murder and manslaughter con-
victions (mcl1.idfug those fonoWing a guilty plea) to look fur eVIdence of 
battering. Such evidence might reveal that a battered woman defendant 
perceived the necessity to defend herself against imminent bodily harm, 
even if she does not identify herself as a battered woman and does not 
submit a clemency petition clearly stating so. The Board or commission 
would then make clemency recommendations on petitions filed by women 
identified as potential candidates. 
Even if the governor neither issues a mandate to the Board nor forms 
a separate commission, the California Legislature could still adopt a reso-
lution urging the governor to direct the Board of Prison Terms to review 
the cases of all women imprisoned for killing abusive mates. Although it 
may not be acknowledged or acted upon, a resolution would still be a 
welcome statement of support. 
Governor Wilson seems to be asserting, in stating that the governor is 
"unfettered in seeking information and counsel in the exercise of [the 
clemency power]," that the power includes not just the final decision but 
all aspects of the process. It would appear, then, that any legislative 
enactments in California seeking to influence the process would be at-
tacked as an unconstitutional infringement of the governor's function. 
However, the state constitution already delegates decisions regarding the 
application process to the legislature and the granting of pardon and 
commutation to the executive. It is not certain that a commission - a 
vehicle for bringing more cases deserving of clemency to the governor's 
attention - would restrict his ultimate decision. The commission as 
proposed would operate somewhere between the application process and 
the final grant of clemency. In no way do its recommendations bind or 
even interfere with the governor's power. The bill proposing the commis-
sion did not attempt to deprive the governor of the authority to grant 
clemency. As the governor stated, the Board of Prison Terms theoretically 
has this authority already. 
(b) Important language changes to the Evidence Code 
Governor Wilson has been receptive to much battered women's legis-
lation. He signed the battered woman syndrome addition to the Evidence 
Code, the battered woman syndrome addition to the Penal Code, and the 
bill providing training in battered women's issues for the Board of Prison 
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Tenns.411 However, he must also be receptive to legislation that distin-
guishes between the battered woman syndrome and evidence of everyday 
social and economic pressures that operate to explain why women stay in 
battering relationships and ultimately perceive imminent bodily hann from 
their abusers. The legislature has included important "experiences" lan-
guage in recent proposed bills. 
Earlier versions of AB 3436, which Govemor Wilson eventually 
sigBetf and--whieh 1ltkIed batteieduwoman syndrome to 1he list Of causes ill 
Penal Code section 4801 authorizing the Board of Prison Tenns to rec-
ommend clemency, contained such language. It proposed that the Board 
of Prison Terms be able to consider battered woman syndrome and the 
experiences of battered women in recommending clemency. 
In addition, AB 591, the bill that would have codified the decision of 
the California Supreme Court in People v. Flannel,412 included language 
regarding the experiences of victims of domestic violence. That bill pro-
posed that Evidence Code section 1107, admitting expert opinion testimo-
ny on battered woman syndrome, be amended to include the following 
language: 
(a) In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible ... re-
garding experiences of victims of domestic violence, battered, 
ab~sed, or molested children's experiences, battered woman syn-
drome, or its equivalent resulting from the sequelae of the physi-
cal, emotional, or sexual abuse of a child, whether or not the 
sequelae are labeled a "syndrome," including the effects of 
physical, emotional, or sexual abuse upon the beliefs, perceptions, 
or behavior of victims of domestic violence, or child 
abuse .... 413 
The language in these bills pertaining to battered women was includ-
ed because of the perception that the battered woman syndrome may be, 
or has been interpreted to be, inadequate by itself to address the real-life 
experiences of many battered women who kill abusers. Such "experienc-
es" language would ensure that battered women are allowed to present 
their full stories to courts. The language would allow courts to consider 
testimony from experts regarding the economic, emotional, and social rea-
sons, including separation assault, that keep women in potentially harmful 
situations and ultimately lead them to defend themselves. Experts could 
testify to the developed sense of impending danger that battered women 
acquire, explaining for the jury why a woman has a reasonable belief that 
411. See supra notes 189, 371-72, 378-79. 
412. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text. 
413. AB 591 (proposed, Feb. 19, 1991) (emphasis added). 
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she is in particular danger at the time she acts in self-defense. 
Although the governor signed AB 3436, the final version of the bill 
did not include the "experiences" language because the governor indicated 
that he would not sign it containing that language.414 
Governor Wilson needs to do more to address adequately the con-
cerns of battered women already imprisoned for killing abusers. He 
should provide for. a sep~ commission to review the cases of battered 
women imprisoileafot kil1ingabusers. In ills-disCretIon, fre-roufdaoopi a 
policy of giving binding effect, or at least a strong presumption of cor-
rectness, to that commission's recommendations. The commission should 
be seen as a way to share the political risk inherent in deciding the peti-
tions, not as an infringement upon the governor's authority. The battered 
women's training that such a commission would receive pursuant to the 
Speier bill (or a separate bill requiring such training for all persons decid-
ing battered women's clemency petitions) would make it likely that bat-
tered women who petition for clemency get a fair and unbiased consider-
ation. With specific guidelines authorizing the recommendation of clem-
ency in situations in which the petitioner has killed an abuser, battered 
women will receive the principled forum that they deserve to correct the 
injustice of their prison sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
The law of self-defense in many jurisdictions still does not provide 
equal treatment for women. In California, narrow and inflexible defini-
tions and unreasonably objective standards operate to deprive women of 
the opportunity to present the affirmative defense. Women who kill their 
batterers have usually suffered violent unilateral abuse, yet it is evident 
from the cases on remand that an expert on battered woman syndrome 
does not ensure acquittal, even though a woman's actions may appear to 
be self-defensive. In addition, the battered woman syndrome cannot 
explain the reasonable actions of all battered women. It is proper for the 
executive to use the clemency power to release from prison those wom-
en who acted out of a fear of imminent danger of death or bodily harm. 
Notions of fairness, deserved punishment and society's interests all sup-
port that many battered women in prison in California and other states 
do not deserve to be imprisoned for acts in defense of themselves or 
others that can be considered morally and legally justified. By granting 
clemency, the Governor would be ensuring justice, not merely extending 
mercy, to the battered women in California prisons who killed to save 
their own lives or those of their children. 
414. See supra note 374 and accompanying text. 
